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ABSTRACT

Recent debates in the area of metaethics and moral epistemology have centered around
evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). These arguments purport to show that the
conclusions of Darwinian evolution pose a serious problem for moral knowledge. I argue that
attempts to resolve the issues around debunking arguments from a non-theistic framework fail. I
also agree with some atheists who argue that the evidence shows universal benevolence to be an
attitude-independent moral truth. I then show that non-theistic approaches do not adequately
account for this, whereas theism does. Theism not only explains the cosmic coincidence between
our moral beliefs and moral facts, but it also explains the deeper cosmic coincidence between
universal benevolence and human flourishing.
I examine several prominent EDAs, with particular attention given to those of Sharon
Street, Richard Joyce, and Michael Ruse, as well as several other less well-known arguments.
Some EDAs aim at undermining moral realism in general, while others target certain moral
intuitions. I examine both types of EDA, along with some preliminary objections aimed at
keeping EDAs from getting off the ground. Various counterarguments from moral realists are
examined, including general objections that EDAs overreach into other domains besides
morality, as well as extended discussion of third-factor arguments which attempt to neutralize the
debunking challenge by arguing that evolution could select for some third factor which correlates
with moral truths. I argue that all of these non-theistic responses by moral realists fail due to the
fact that they are question-begging or illegitimate attempts to shift the burden of proof.
The solution proposed by debunkers to the challenge to moral realism is to adopt moral
antirealism. Special attention is given to Street’s Humean metaethical constructivism, which she
thinks provides the only way to evade moral skepticism in the light of debunking arguments. I
iii

argue that antirealism does not avoid skepticism because it is a form of skepticism. Non-theistic
arguments between debunkers and moral realists result in a standoff in which both sides have to
beg important questions.
Very little attention has been given in the literature to possible implications of EDAs for
theistic views. This dissertation aims at providing a remedy for this.
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On then! Value means survivalValue. If our progeny
Spreads and spawns and licks each rival,
That will prove its deity
(Far from pleasant, by our present
Standards, though it well may be).
–C. S. Lewis, “Evolutionary Hymn”

And as you wish that others would do to you, do so to them.
–Jesus
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PREFACE

This is not the dissertation I set out to write. In fact, I did not even know about the
controversy over evolutionary debunking arguments until I happened upon it in during the early
stages of my research for a moral argument based on the doctrine of the Trinity. Part of that
argument was to show that naturalism is unable to provide an adequate account of love. Toward
that end, I began studying Darwinian accounts of altruism. One thing that struck me was that
evolutionary accounts of altruism seemed unable to account for universal benevolence, instead
only being able to account for altruism at most toward close kin or those within a community.
This seemed like a promising angle on my topic.
While I was engaged in this research, I was also reading Thomas Nagel’s Mind and
Cosmos. There he refers to Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma, which is the most often cited
evolutionary debunking argument in the literature. This reference in Nagel was my introduction
to EDAs. A passing remark in an article by Eric Wielenberg, in which he commented how little
work has been done on evolutionary debunking arguments from a theistic standpoint, led me to
start thinking about changing my dissertation topic. I was always told that the point of a
dissertation was to make an original contribution to a field of study, so this seemed like a wideopen area. Meanwhile, I had shared some of my ideas with my advisor, David Baggett. He wrote
a side comment that I could do a whole dissertation just on debunking arguments. That settled it
for me, and I began to delve into the literature on EDAs.
One question I had was how many published articles there are on this topic. I still do not
know the answer to that, except that it is more than I was able to include in this dissertation.
There were many articles that I did not get to simply due to limitations of time and space. I
covered all of the most important sources as thoroughly as possible, as well as the most
x

important responses to those. I found the material to be extremely challenging, but also more
interesting that I expected. I was also pleasantly surprised in some ways when I discovered that
de Lazari-Radek and Singer make an argument based on the inability of evolution to account for
universal altruism. They obviously reach a different conclusion than I do; nevertheless, it was
encouraging to me to see in published philosophical work the same argument that I hoped to
develop. The fact that I am about as far removed from Peter Singer on the ideological spectrum
as it is possible to be made his endorsement of this argument a more useful bridge for my own
argument.
My academic career has mostly been in theological disciplines, but I have taken the
opportunity to study philosophy as much as possible. While at Asbury Seminary, I took as many
philosophy courses from Jerry Walls as I could fit in my schedule. After my wife, Tricia, and I
graduated together from Asbury, we moved to Kalamazoo, Michigan. There I had the
opportunity to do additional graduate studies in philosophy at Western Michigan University,
including taking a class with Tim McGrew. My wife and I developed a friendship with Tim and
his wife, Lydia, which continues to this day. We then served as missionaries in Hungary for
several years before I enrolled in the Ph.D. program at Liberty University. My classes with
David Baggett at Liberty were a highlight of my Ph.D. coursework and opened up new areas of
interest for me.
My philosophical background is thus a bit eclectic, which has its pros and cons. I think of
myself more as a theologian with a philosophical bent than as a philosopher with a theological
bent. That may color the work in some ways – whether for good or for ill I do not know. I have
been privileged to study under many excellent Christian philosophers and theologians. In
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addition to those named above I would want to include Gary Habermas. My study of the
historical Jesus under his tutelage is reflected, if but a little, in chapter five.
I am thankful to David Baggett for agreeing to continue as my advisor after he left
Liberty to take a position at Houston Baptist University. His encouraging feedback during the
writing process of this dissertation was more helpful than he probably knows. I am also thankful
to the administration at Liberty for approving this arrangement, and to my committee members,
Jerry Walls and Edward Martin, for their willingness to wade through what ended up being a
longer dissertation than I intended.
I am also very grateful for the patience and understanding of my family: my wife, Tricia,
and our three children, Hannah, Matthew, and Jonathan. Hannah was particularly helpful in
printing and mailing hard copies of the early drafts for me while she was studying at Houghton
College. The writing of my dissertation coincided with the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic that
began in 2020 and is still ongoing at the time of this writing. As a result, this study was done
under various levels of government lockdowns and curfews. In some ways, that made it easier to
focus on studying, as a number of planned trips and conferences were all canceled. This is a
period in world history that none of us will ever forget who have lived through it.
My hope is that this work will be of benefit to others who are interested in this topic, and
in the theistic implications of evolutionary debunking arguments. Hopefully the errors my
arguments doubtless contain are not so severe as to fatally impair it.

Budapest, Hungary
March 2021
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INTRODUCTION

In his 1993 book, Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga presents an
evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). In essence, Plantinga’s argument is that
unguided natural selection, because it favors adaptive behavior rather than true beliefs, presents
an epistemic problem for naturalists; namely, when combined with naturalism, it provides an
undefeated defeater for belief in naturalism. Plantinga’s argument received quite a bit of
attention for a time, but then gradually faded into the background in epistemological circles.
Most responses from naturalists were skeptical that Plantinga’s argument posed any real threat to
belief in naturalism.
In the decades since Plantinga published his EAAN, a class of arguments has developed
that utilizes the same basic premise as Plantinga’s – that natural selection favors adaptive
behavior rather than true beliefs – except that these arguments only target moral beliefs. These
are referred to in the literature as evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). The main
proponents of this view are Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, and Richard Joyce. Ruse’s work on this
issue in Taking Darwin Seriously, published in 1986, actually predates Plantinga’s EAAN.
Joyce’s publication of The Evolution of Morality in 2005 was followed in 2006 with Street’s “A
Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Wielenberg credits Street’s article with
triggering “an explosion of interest in arguments concerned specifically with normative beliefs or
with some specific subset thereof.”1 Street’s and Joyce’s arguments have garnered by far the
most attention of any published EDAs, and, of the two, Street’s is the most discussed. One
challenge facing evolutionary debunkers is explaining why the belief in objective moral truth is
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Erik J. Wielenberg, “Ethics and Evolutionary Theory,” Analysis 76, no. 4 (October 2016): 502.
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so ubiquitous if in fact there is no such thing. This is where evolutionary theories about the
development of the moral sense come into play.
Numerous articles responding to EDAs have been published as well, including many
defenses of moral realism against the debunking challenge. Some of these are general critiques,
including Shafer-Landau, Clarke-Doane, Schafer, and Crow among others. One particular
category of realist responses is that of third factor arguments. These arguments attempt to show
that, while natural selection does not select for true moral beliefs directly, it could do so
indirectly by selecting for some third factor which provides an evolutionary advantage, and
which is correlated in some way with moral truths. Enoch and Wielenberg are among the most
prominent proponents of this view. Other third factor arguments have been given by Behrends,
Skarsaune, Vavova, and Brosnan.
In terms of the overall structure of this dissertation, the first chapter deals with the
empirical question of evolutionary theory as it pertains to the development of moral beliefs and
moral behavior. This includes the puzzling phenomenon of altruism, and the various models that
have been developed by theorists to explain it in Darwinian terms. One of the questions pressed
against debunkers is if their use of evolutionary theory in support of their arguments is
legitimate. Thus, chapter one includes not just evolutionary theories as presented by debunkers,
but the models from evolutionary theorists themselves. The conclusion of this first chapter is that
the debunkers are on solid ground as far as the evolutionary theories of morality are concerned.
The second chapter examines several of the leading EDAs. The arguments of Ruse,
Joyce, and Street are given a special section in view of their importance to the overall debate.
Other arguments that are examined include those of Bedke, Morton, Bogardus, and Fraser.*

*

No relation to this author.
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These arguments aim to target moral realism in general, and to show that if moral realism is true,
then evolutionary theory implies that we can have no moral knowledge. There is also another
class of EDAs that are more limited in scope, targeting some moral beliefs. These include
arguments by Singer, Greene, and Huemer; they are addressed in a separate section. The main
purpose of the chapter is to try to understand and articulate the debunking challenge as clearly as
possible before examining counterarguments.
Chapter three focuses on the responses by moral realists to EDAs. One argument that
receives special attention is what I call the argument from overreach – namely, that the logic of
debunking arguments goes beyond moral beliefs into areas such as mathematics, which would
threaten to result in a debunking of science itself, and hence the debunker’s own argument. In
addition, the third factor arguments mentioned above are examined in detail. Other realist
responses which are aimed at grasping one of the other of the horns of Street’s dilemma are also
considered. Two questions which are frequently raised in these arguments have to do with who
has the burden of proof, and whether certain kinds of responses are question-begging (notably
third factor arguments). These issues merit a special section of their own. Chapter three ends on a
somewhat ambivalent note. It isn’t clear one way or the other if debunking arguments can be
kept from undermining themselves, but at the same time there does seem to be a problem for
moral realists which is not clearly resolved by any of the solutions which have been offered.
One solution to the debunking challenge is that offered by Street herself, and that is to
give up normative realism and become a normative antirealist. This move is based on the
supposition that antirealism is the only way to avoid moral skepticism in the face of the
debunking challenge. Street’s version of antirealism is Humean metaethical constructivism.
Chapter four gives attention to Street’s argument, particular in light of Dworkin’s defense of
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moral objectivism to which Street has responded. While Dworkin’s argument is not directly
aimed at EDAs for the most part, nevertheless the interaction between Street and Dworkin is
very illuminating with respect to several key issues. In particular, Street’s framing of the debate
in terms of normativity rather than morality is shown to be a way of stacking the deck in favor of
antirealism, since it includes non-moral normative truths as well as moral ones. Dworkin offers
his own dilemma argument – written before Street’s – which aims to show that both sides are
begging the question. This brings the issue between moral realists and antirealists to a stalemate.
In addition to this, the last part of chapter four aims to show that, rather than being an escape
from skepticism, antirealism just is a form of skepticism. As such, it is not an acceptable solution
to the debunking challenge, either.
Chapter five attempts to build an argument for a solution which neither side in this
debate, for the most part, has any interest in even discussing, and that is theism. The argument
that is developed here is based on the inability of EDAs to account for belief in universal
altruism. This argument actually receives support from de Lazari-Radek and Singer, who argue
that belief in universal altruism escapes EDAs, and should be considered an established moral
truth. In addition, Huemer argues for realism based on the worldwide convergence on liberal
values. These thinkers all endorse a version of consequentialism. Chapter five seeks to show that
their moral theories undermine their own arguments, and that the evidence actually points to
theism rather than non-theistic realism as they hold. Finally, attention is given to the views of
Dworkin and Nagel. Both are atheists, but both also reject the approaches typified by the realist
arguments presented in chapter three. The arguments of Dworkin and Nagel also come up short,
but help to demonstrate why a theistic argument can be successful where non-theistic approaches
fail.
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CHAPTER 1
EVOLUTION AND THE MORAL SENSE

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) hold that the genealogy of our moral beliefs
under Darwinian theory raises serious questions about their status and/or justification. As a
preliminary rough sketch, EDAs posit that if our moral beliefs and/or belief-forming faculties are
products of Darwinian evolution through natural selection, then those beliefs are the result of a
process which is indifferent to whether or not they are true. As a consequence, we should have
no confidence in those beliefs. The details of this rough sketch will be filled in over the course of
these first two chapters. EDAs are generally taken to have an empirical (causal) premise, along
with an epistemic premise, roughly like the following2:
(1) Darwinian forces have had a pervasive influence on our moral beliefs [empirical
premise].
(2) If (1) then our moral beliefs are the result of a process indifferent to their truth and
have greatly diminished epistemic status or are completely debunked [epistemic
premise].
(3) Our moral beliefs have greatly diminished epistemic status or are completely
debunked.
Whether the stronger conclusion (complete debunking) or the weaker one (diminished status)
obtains depends upon the specific details of the particular arguments as we will see in chapter

For examples of slightly different formulations of a general EDA, see Guy Kahane, “Evolutionary
Debunking Arguments,” Noûs 45, no. 1 (March 2011): 106, accessed May 23, 2020,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x; David Copp, “How to Avoid Begging the Question Against
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” Ratio 32, no. 4 (December 2019): 232, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12222;
Kevin Brosnan, “Do the Evolutionary Origins of Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge?” Biology and
Philosophy 26, no. 1 (January 2011): 52, accessed July 22, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-010-9235-1;
Daniel Z. Korman, “Debunking arguments,” Philosophy Compass 14, no. 12 (December 2019): 1, accessed July 18,
2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12638; Justin Morton, “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against
Moral Realism,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 234, accessed July 18,
2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.14; and Russ Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism
and Moral Knowledge,” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 7, no. 1 (December 2012): 4, accessed June 29,
2020, EBSCO.
2
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two.
This chapter will focus on the evolutionary backstory that underwrites our moral
beliefs/belief-forming faculties if the picture given by Darwinian evolution is true, or at least
roughly true.3 This will serve as support for the empirical premise of EDAs. Some preliminary
challenges to the empirical premise will be addressed toward the end of the chapter.
Darwin on the Evolution of Morality
Questions about the status of moral beliefs under Darwinism go back to Darwin himself.
In The Descent of Man, Darwin addressed the implications of his theory of evolution for our
understanding of human nature. Among the topics covered are the phenomena of religion and
morality. Regarding religion, Darwin’s view was that belief in God was not universal among
early human beings but that belief in spirits was. He speculated that the belief in spirits first arose
through the dreams of “savages,” who “do not readily distinguish between subjective and
objective impressions.”4 Later, when faculties such as imagination, curiosity, and reason had
been sufficiently developed, the belief in spirits arose.5 This subsequently gave rise to the belief
in the existence of one or more gods,6 and finally to monotheism.7
Based on a dubious genealogical explanation like this, one might think that belief in God
would be extremely suspect in Darwin’s mind, as the belief in spirits evidently was to him. This,
however, does not appear to be the case, at least in Descent. On the contrary, Darwin wrote that
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Part of that story involves the claim that everything about human nature can be described as the result of a
long process of natural cause-and-effect through the operation of the physical laws of nature. The Darwinian picture
thus described is, then, thoroughly naturalistic.
4
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: J. Murray, 1871), 1:66,
Adobe PDF eBook.
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Darwin, Descent of Man, 1:67.
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the question of the existence of God “has been answered in the affirmative by the highest
intellects that have ever lived.”8 Darwin does not explain this odd set of circumstances, namely
that a series of false beliefs springing from the overwrought imagination of the primitive
ancestors of modern humans ultimately landed on a true belief in the existence of God, which
was subsequently affirmed by intellectual giants. Many of Darwin’s ideological descendants
would accept something like Darwin’s genealogical account of the belief in God but reject the
affirmation that God nevertheless exists.
A parallel is found in Darwin’s thinking about morality. Darwin speculated that any
animal with social instincts would develop a moral sense, which he equated with conscience,
when its other intellectual powers became as well developed as in humans.9 At the same time, he
also expressly denied that other creatures would develop the same moral sense as humans. In one
passage that is occasionally cited in contemporary debunking literature,10 Darwin gives the
following hypothetical: “If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under
precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried
females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers
would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.”11 The
implication is that behavior which we would call murder could be perfectly acceptable and even
mandatory in different conditions, which would seem to call into question the status of
prohibitions against murder – along with potentially any other moral prohibition.

8

Darwin, Descent of Man, 1:65.
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Darwin, Descent of Man, 1:71-72.
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See for example William J. FitzPatrick, “Why Darwinism Does Not Debunk Objective Morality,” in The
Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics, ed. Michael Ruse and Robert J. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), 190, Adobe PDF eBook.
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Darwin believed the origins of the moral sense began with social instincts that were
favored by natural selection through familial relations which tended toward certain behaviors in
lower animals, but also toward love and emotions of sympathy in higher animals, while noting
that “These instincts are not extended to all the individuals of the species, but only to those of the
same community.”12 Darwin is referring here to the theories of kin selection and group selection,
which will be examined in more detail below. These theories are prominent in discussion
surrounding the problem of the evolution of altruism. Darwin himself makes the connection
between the problem of altruism (which he refers to at one point in Origin of Species as having
been potentially fatal to his entire theory)13 and the development of the moral sense.
Beginning with this primitive social instinct, Darwin thought it probable that a moral
sense would progress in stages. First, social instincts would lead to pleasure in the company of
others, producing feelings of sympathy, and prompting a creature to perform services for others.
Second, developed mental faculties would lead to past actions and motives passing through the
brain incessantly, leading to feelings of dissatisfaction caused by giving in to stronger instincts
than the social instinct. Third, acquiring language would lead to public opinion forming a guide
to action for all for the good of the community. Finally, social instincts and impulses would be
strengthened by habit.14
We will return to other ideas of Darwin’s with respect to morality later. What is
important to notice at this stage is the nature of Darwin’s explanation. First, there is the idea that
the social instincts which form the basis of the moral sense are attributed to natural selection

12

Darwin, Descent of Man, 2:391
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Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1964), 236, Adobe PDF eBook.
14

Darwin, Descent of Man, 1:72-73.
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because “they are highly beneficial to the species.”15 In other words, these instincts allow for
propagation of the species by increasing fitness for survival and reproduction. This is a key
component of the debunking argument, namely that the underlying traits of our moral beliefforming faculties are a result of selection for evolutionary fitness rather than for correspondence
with objective moral truths. That idea goes back all the way to Darwin himself, and as we will
see it has continued in subsequent theorizing by his intellectual heirs.
Another important feature of Darwin’s argument is the nature of it as a just so story, both
in his explanation of belief in God and in his ideas about the development of the moral sense.
There is no actual empirical evidence that, for example, the progenitors of modern humans came
to believe in spirits because they lacked the discernment to distinguish between dreams and
reality or that their moral sense developed in the way that Darwin hypothesizes. Moreover, there
is no way to test these hypotheses. This might cause one to question whether they should really
be considered scientific, which will also become important in discussion about the status of
EDAs. While this is an oft-noted weakness of virtually any theory in the field of evolutionary
psychology, discussion here will be limited to its impact on EDAs.
The Problem of Altruism
All accounts of the evolutionary origins of morality begin with the problem of altruism.
On the surface at least, evolution seems to predict selfish behavior, with life seen as a battle for
the “survival of the fittest.” As mentioned above, Darwin recognized the problem of explaining
altruistic behavior in terms of natural selection as early as Origin. An organism which sacrifices
itself for another will not continue to propagate, and thus such altruistic behavior should be
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eliminated by natural selection. Even behavior which does not result in the death of the altruist
but still decreases its relative fitness in evolutionary terms should be selected against. Bekoff and
Pierce acknowledge the problem in that “Cooperative behavior . . . doesn’t fit the predictions of
Darwinian theory, which has sent us looking instead for competition and unfettered
aggression.”16 Nowak agrees, writing that, “The question of how natural selection can lead to
cooperative behavior has fascinated evolutionary biologists for several decades.”17 Finally,
Sussman and Cloninger have this to say: “The traits of altruism and cooperation often are
assumed to be among humanity’s essential and defining characteristics. However, it has been
difficult to account for the origins and evolution of altruistic behavior.”18
The difficulty of explaining altruism from an evolutionary standpoint has given rise to a
substantial body of literature devoted to this very question, with an intersection of biologists,
philosophers, and social scientists among others chiming in – and occasionally even
theologians.19 For the purposes of this dissertation, it will suffice to compare the rough sketch of
evolutionary explanations of altruism and the moral sense with the arguments put forward by
EDA proponents. Many of the disputes surrounding academic discussions of the evolution of
altruism and morality have to do with specific details and mechanisms more so than with general
principles. One important question that will need to be kept in mind is how close the arguments
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of debunkers must be to what is determined to be the best scientific theory in order for the
argument to go through. Some opposition to EDAs is based on the proposition that the
controversial nature of the details surrounding the evolution of our moral faculties renders the
entire argument suspect.20 That objection will be considered in more detail below.
Darwin’s thinking about the evolution of altruism touched on two distinct mechanisms:
kin selection and group selection. In kin selection, natural selection favors behavior that is
directed toward close relatives, whereas with group selection, altruistic behavior toward other
members of the creature’s close community is favored regardless of whether or not they are
closely related. These ideas have been in competition among biologists since Darwin’s time.
While group selection initially had the upper hand, kin selection became the dominant view after
W.D. Hamilton developed a mathematical formula for selection of kin which is known as
Hamilton’s Rule.21
Kin selection, very briefly, is the idea that natural selection will favor altruistic behavior
toward close relatives – but only up to a certain point. The closer the blood relation, the more
natural selection will favor it. For example, a mother who has an altruistic tendency to sacrifice
herself for her children will be more likely to have her descendants survive and reproduce, thus
passing on the altruistic tendency (given the plausible assumption that something like a
predisposition toward altruistic behavior is genetically inheritable). However, this same selection
effect does not work for non-kin, since an altruistic act toward someone who is unrelated will not
have the effect of increasing the odds of the survival of one’s own offspring. This is, of course, a
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greatly oversimplified picture of kin selection, but enough of a start for the purposes of this
dissertation.22
Hamilton himself felt that his theory of kin selection explained a great deal of not only
evolutionary theory, but also human behavior – so much so that it caused him some discomfort.
He writes of his dislike for the idea that his and his friends’ behavior was explicable in terms of
kin selection. He says, “I like always to imagine that I and we are above all that, subject to far
more mysterious laws. In this prejudice, however, I seem, rather sadly, to have been losing more
ground than I gain. The theory that I outline in the paper has turned out very successful.”23 (One
might well ask the question why the thought of reducing morality to biological laws would cause
emotional discomfort. Can that discomfort itself be explained as the operation of a biological
law, or does it point to something else?)
This is not to say that the problem of altruism was solved by Hamilton. Hamilton’s Rule
at best only provides a very limited explanation of how self-sacrificial behavior could still be
favored by natural selection, contrary to conventional wisdom, under certain conditions.
However, altruistic behavior is observed in nature to a greater extent than what Hamilton’s Rule
alone would predict, and so biologists have developed other ideas to help explain this. Ruse, for
example, gives in addition to kin selection the principle of reciprocity as the two primary
mechanisms for producing help and cooperation.24 Nowak further refines this, with three
different forms of reciprocity in addition to kin selection (direct, indirect, and what he calls
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network reciprocity).25 Nowak includes group selection in his set of altruistic-promoting
principles26 even though many other biologists reject it.27 Wilson and Sober, on the other hand,
express confidence that group selection is still viable.28
The limitations of these explanations cannot be overstated. For example, kin selection can
only explain behavior that is directed toward others who are closely related, such as immediate
family members, not extending much further than first cousins. Explanations involving
reciprocity are often derived from game theory, in particular a game known as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Different strategies have been suggested as a means to solving the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, including iterated versions of it. However, it is questionable just how well these
scenarios actually model real-world interactions between different organisms.29 Even the
controversial idea of group selection, which appears to still be rejected by most contemporary
biologists, is quite limited in that “it promotes both within-group niceness and between-group
nastiness.”30 For the purposes of EDAs, however, the important idea is that the roots of morality
are in theory traceable to our evolutionary ancestry, regardless of controversies over specific
details of how it came about. At the same time, it should be noted that there does not appear to be
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a full and satisfactory explanation of altruism from a purely evolutionary perspective, and the
attempts to explain it appeal to a number of different mechanisms, starting at the very least with
kin selection and reciprocity.
It also must be kept in mind that what we think of as altruism in a morally significant
sense is different from, say, a honeybee sacrificing itself for the sake of the hive by stinging an
intruder and dying in the process. Sober distinguishes evolutionary altruism from psychological
altruism. Evolutionary altruism is behavior that enhances the fitness of the recipient (defined in
evolutionary terms as ability to survive and reproduce) while decreasing the fitness of the
donor.31 Psychological altruism, on the other hand, has to do with motives or intentions and only
applies to beings with minds.32 Cloninger and Kedia argue in favor of limiting the word altruism
to creatures with “the capacity for self-transcendence, which requires identification with what is
beyond the existence of the individual.”33 They hold that “Altruism depends on brain structures
that are only present in human beings and not in nonhuman primates.”34
Thus, as Sussman and Cloninger write, “many would argue that only humans can be
altruistic, even though the biological preconditions might be seen in nonhuman animals. The
discrepancy between these positions can be constructively resolved by recognizing that there are
many precursor functions that underlie the conscious expression of intentional altruistic behavior
in human beings.”35 One part of the question with regard to EDAs is the extent to which
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evolutionary altruism can explain psychological altruism, particularly since all sides
acknowledge that there are other factors that influence human behavior besides evolutionary
instincts. Thus, it is necessary to refine this picture in order to get a fuller grasp of the argument.
According to the general Darwinian view, then, altruistic behavior arose among social
animals through natural selection by way of kin selection, various reciprocity relations, and
possibly group selection. This was followed by the development of creatures with larger brains,
ending in humans, in which these forces resulted in a cluster of dispositions toward certain kinds
of behavior which are held to have binding authority over us in the form of a moral sense or
moral intuitions. The theory thus implies that animals which are more closely related to humans
in the evolutionary tree of life will exhibit behavior that bears a closer resemblance to human
moral behavior.
The Moral Sense
Because of the gradualistic nature of his theory of evolution, Darwin’s understanding of
the development of the moral sense included two related ideas: first, that some humans (whom
he called “savages,” presumably in reference to indigenous tribal peoples) did not have the same
capacity for morality as, say, a Victorian British gentleman, and also that some nonhuman
species demonstrated capacities for behavior that, while not moral in the fullest sense of the
term, at least showed the rudimentary precursors of a moral sense. For example, after speculating
that an old dog might have a kind of self-consciousness, Darwin writes, “On the other hand, as
Büchner has remarked, how little can the hard-worked wife of a degraded Australian savage,
who uses hardly any abstract words and cannot count above four, exert her self-consciousness, or
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reflect on the nature of her own existence.”36 Darwin actually wrote in opposition to those who
took a high view of the moral nature of indigenous people, arguing that these “savages” had
“insufficient powers of reasoning” as well as a lack of self-control from habit and religion to
attain to the high morality of his day and age in Victorian England.37
It is also worth noting that many of the virtues that Darwin lauded as examples of a high
moral sense included “hatred of indecency” and chastity. Darwin approvingly quotes Sir G.
Staunton as saying the latter belongs exclusively “to civilised life.”38 This was in contrast to
indigenous peoples, of which Darwin writes, “The greatest intemperance with savages is no
reproach. Their utter licentiousness, not to mention unnatural crimes, is something astounding.”39
Darwin refers to the work of McLennan which includes examples such as the practice of
polyandry, and kinship through females only.40 McLennan attributes this latter practice to the
fact that promiscuity was so widespread that male parentage was uncertain. Examples he gives
includes the custom of having wives in common, lending wives and daughters to guests, frequent
divorce, marriages for a limited, often short, duration, as well as widespread general
promiscuity.41
Even in Darwin’s day, his low opinion of the moral capacity of indigenous peoples was
sometimes challenged by others.42 Few, if any, Darwinists today would want to defend the
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premise that indigenous people lack essential attributes for advanced moral reasoning. This
presents something of a challenge to the gradualist Darwinian view. The option does remain
open to argue that what most people see as the clear demarcation between human and nonhuman
species with regard to morality is not as stark as is commonly believed. One of the more extreme
examples of this is the view of Bekoff and Pierce, who actually argue that we should not regard
the behavior of nonhuman species as precursors to morality, but as the real thing.43 At the
opposite end of the spectrum, Kagan argues for the uniqueness of humans in five distinct
capacities not found in nonhuman species, namely “The ability and habitual tendency to infer the
thoughts and feelings of others,” “Self-awareness,” “Application of the categories ‘good’ and
‘bad’ to objects, events, and self,” “Reflection on past actions,” and “The ability to decide that a
particular action could have been suppressed.”44
Elsewhere, Kagan hints that his view is at odds with the majority, since in his view “Most
natural scientists, even if they had not read him, would have agreed with T. H. Huxley that no
clear line of demarcation between animals and humans exists, and therefore they were unwilling
to ascribe to humans any qualities that would render them biologically distinctive.”45 At the same
time, Kagan finds that “The reluctance to acknowledge the uniqueness of the human moral
motive is a bit odd because biologists acknowledge unique traits in a large number of species.
The spinning of webs by spiders, echolocation in bats, and imprinting in precocial birds are
restricted to a particular genus or species. Unique characteristics are totally consistent with
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Darwinian theory.”46 Some would argue that many examples of such remarkably unique traits in
fact are not consistent with Darwinian theory,47 which could explain the reluctance on the part of
scientists to acknowledge the uniqueness of humans that Kagan articulates.
Having said that, Darwin himself had no such reservations when he wrote that, “We have
no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity. . . . But in the case of man,
who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being, actions of a certain class are called
moral, whether performed deliberately after a struggle with opposing motives, or from the effects
of slowly-gained habit, or impulsively through instinct.”48 Adjudicating this question is beyond
the scope of this dissertation. It does, however, raise the follow-up question – to what extent is
the behavior of nonhuman species evidence of evolutionary precursors to human morality, as
opposed to being assumed as such as a consequence of a strong commitment to Darwinian
theory? If evidence of the continuity between humans and nonhuman species counts in favor of
the larger Darwinian thesis, then evidence against that continuity should also count against. This
question will become important later on. As far as EDAs are concerned, the immediate question
is whether or not Darwinian theory presents a challenge to morality.
The challenge of EDAs, as has already been hinted at but will be seen at greater length
below, is based on the commitment to Darwinism, including the assumption that everything
about human nature can ultimately be attributed to the operation of underlying physical laws of
nature over a long period of time. If that commitment can be shown to be strongly in tension
with a commitment to moral realism, that is a very important consideration for moral philosophy
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in general. In spite of Darwin’s statement above about the uniqueness of humans in the moral
sphere, he nevertheless did see the behavior of many other species as pointing to precursors to
full-fledged human morality. Following Darwin, modern Darwinists also point to the behavior of
many non-human species, particularly primates, as demonstrating such precursors. As we will
see, this is taken by EDA proponents as another important piece of evidence that morality is an
evolutionary adaptation, and that our moral beliefs are thus rife with the primitive influence
passed down by our evolutionary forebears.
Morality in Animals?
Flack and de Waal highlight three main areas in which they argue that primates display
signs of pre-moral behavior. These include reciprocal behaviors, conflict resolution, and
behavior that might indicate a capacity for empathy.49 Reciprocal behaviors cited by Flack and
de Waal include food sharing as well as performing of services like grooming. They argue that,
“Monkeys and apes appear capable of holding received services in mind, selectively repaying
those individuals who performed the favours. They seem to hold negative acts in mind as well,
leading to retribution and revenge.”50 With conflict resolution often relying on dominance
relations, nevertheless Flack and de Waal find the presence of other mechanisms among
monkeys and apes, specifically “reconciliation; consolation; impartial, protective, and pacifying
interventions; and perhaps community concern.”51 Finally, they find that, “There is some
evidence to suggest that apes, like humans, are capable of cognitive empathy but its existence in
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monkeys remains questionable.”52
These findings are not, however, uncontested. Bernstein argues that none of the behaviors
studied by Flack and de Waal require any inference to rudimentary pre-moral or moral systems.53
Berstein observes that, “To the frustration of those of us who study animal behaviour, motivation
is a private internal state.”54 This is not to say that Berstein disputes the conclusions of Flack and
de Waal and others like them, but rather that demonstrating those conclusions is beyond the
reach of scientific analysis.55 With regard to the idea that the basis of human morality is present
in other primates, he writes that, “Evolutionary theory and biological continuity support such a
position. Surely if morality has a biological basis, its rudiments must [emphasis added] be
present in the behaviour of non-human primates. Demonstrating the existence of these rudiments
is quite another matter.”56 This raises the question of whether researchers such as Flack and de
Waal are reading into the behavior of other animals motivations that are simply not present.
Another complication of this research is that it admits of very different conclusions about
morality and moral systems depending on which data is used. Troyer argues that, “If you look to
food-sharing and grooming behaviour in chimpanzees, you may find yourself agreeing with
Kropotkin that cooperative anarchistic communities are the way to go. If you instead stumble on
apes that are killing and eating their conspecifics, you may find yourself agreeing with Hobbes
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that only a strong state and a large police force can keep us from annihilating one another.”57
The central question that concerns us for the moment, however, is whether or not
research into primate behavior provides supporting evidence for the empirical premise of the
EDA, that evolutionary forces have greatly influenced our predispositions to form certain kinds
of moral judgments. Flack and de Waal argue that, in spite of the fact that humans do have
intellectual capacities that other animals lack, “it is also clear that we are born with powerful
inclinations and emotions that bias our thinking and behaviour. It is in this area that many of the
continuities with other animals lie.”58 Some of the critiques above would suggest that this
conclusion is driven by what must be the case if Darwinian evolution is a true and largely
complete account of human nature rather than by strictly evidentiary considerations.
An alternative theory is that our moral faculties are a product not of adaptation, but of
exaptation. With exaptation, a biological structure that serves one purpose in an evolutionary
ancestor is co-opted for a different purpose in the genealogical lineage. Pievani argues that
precursors to human cooperation and altruism could have arisen in the form of “empathy, refusal
of someone else’s suffering, and reciprocity.” Ancient hominids could have retained these traits
for protection from predators. Later, these same acquired characteristics could have been exapted
for more organized hunting, which in modern humans became a model of social organization
“with division of the work and new forms of exploitation of ecosystems.”59 Among the
advantages that Pievani sees with the exaptation model is that “We no longer need a radical
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discontinuity between our biology and our culture.”60 The interplay between biology and culture
will be expanded on below, but with respect to the debunking argument it matters little whether
adaptation or exaptation is the preferred evolutionary explanation. As we will see, the debunking
argument is that the evolutionary dispositions that we have inherited are not likely to lead to
moral truth even if moral truths exist. There is no obvious reason why an exaptation model
would be any more likely than an adaptation model to avoid the debunking challenge. The issue
of culture that Pievani alludes to will be examined more closely later.
Moral Sense Theory Revisited
Returning to theories about the evolution of the moral sense, Monroe, Martin, and Ghosh
argue that the evidence from developmental psychology, the study of animal behavior, and
neuroscience “provide a scientific foundation for the idea of an innate moral sense.”61 In making
this argument, they utilize much of the same research already touched on above, including de
Waal,62 Haidt,63 and others. While their main interest has to do with the implications of moral
sense theory for politics, they do not directly address the metaethical implications of it. One of
their central claims is that “much of what is deemed ‘moral reasoning’ (a la Kant, Kohlberg, et
al.) is often in fact post hoc rationalizing of judgments already made.”64 Our actual moral
judgments are, in their view, primarily emotional rather than rational, and “The evidence . . .
suggests human beings are born with constrained repertoires of behavior for a variety of bodily
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and social functions; moral behavior is likely consonant with these evolutionarily constrained
faculties.”65
The closest Monroe and company come to addressing the metaethical implications of this
is when they write,
The work from animal behavior as a whole seems to answer one critique of moral sense
theory: How do we resolve differences between one person's moral sense and another
person's? The external standard that critics of moral sense theory have asked for may be
provided by the regularity of behavior in the animal kingdom. If all animals show a
concern for the group and caring for others, is this not strong evidence of the need for
such behavior as a part of our biologically determined need to flourish as human
beings?66
Contrary to Monroe and company, it isn’t critics of moral sense theory that ask for an external
standard for morality, but critics of moral realism. However, the problem with this approach, as
many commentators have pointed out, is that virtually any behavior that one wishes to use as a
standard can be found in the animal kingdom. While Monroe and company point to concern for
the group and care for others as an external standard, one could just as easily point to animal
behavior that resembles revenge and spite. In fact, George Price showed that Hamilton’s Rule
could be used to predict not just altruistic behavior, but also cruelty.67 Thus, there is no
independent reason to select one over the other as an external standard for morality. One would
have to already have an existing set of values to map onto the data in order to justify such a
proposition, but in that case it would be the predetermined set of values that is the actual
standard, rather than the behavior of animals. What matters for the purposes of this study is to
see how this empirical data is used in showing how evolutionary forces may have been
responsible for the creation of a moral sense in Darwinian fashion.
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As we have seen, theorizing on the development of the moral sense in human beings
includes study of nonhuman animals (especially primates), as well as study of human moral
development. With regard to reliance on studies of animals, this approach raises the specter of
anthropomorphism – that researchers will interpret animal behavior as involving human-like
phenomenology from the standpoint of the animal. Cloninger and Kedia warn against this,
arguing that “Communication and understanding are compromised when people attribute
functions like intimacy to species that have no brain capacity for emotionality, taboo or culture to
species that have no capacity for symbolization, or altruism to species that have no capacity for
self-awareness.”68 Bekoff and Pierce, in stark contrast, fully embrace anthropomorphism, writing
that the negative attitude toward it in science, as well as the negative attitude toward anecdotal
evidence, is “a prejudice that science needs to get over.”69 They argue that, “Anthropomorphism
endures because it is a necessity, but it also must be done carefully, consciously, empathetically,
and from the point of view of the animal, always asking, ‘What is it like to be that individual?’
We must make every attempt to maintain the animal’s point of view. We must repeatedly ask,
‘What is that individual’s experience?’”70
The worry, of course, is that by asking the question about an animal, “what is that
individual’s experience?” we are naturally going to use imagination to picture ourselves in the
same set of circumstances and think of what the experience would be like for us as humans. Thus
it seems absurd to suggest that we engage in anthropomorphism from the point of view of the
animal, since this is actually the problem with anthropomorphism to begin with. It is a virtual
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certainty that the experience of the animal is not like our experience would be in the same set of
circumstances. There is also no way to ever know what it is like for the animal.71 When Bekoff
and Pierce write that “we will never know exactly what it is like to be a wolf,”72 they imply that
we might get pretty close by imagining ourselves in that situation. But in fact we can’t even
know if we are in the ballpark. In fact, because of the physiological differences between humans
and other species, we can be sure that we are not in the ballpark. As Cloninger and Kedia write,
“People can observe the behavioral expressions and responses of dogs and may empathically
project what another human being would feel if they showed the same expressions and
behavioral responses. However, dogs simply cannot have the same affective experience that
human beings can imagine they might be having.”73
Katz makes the observation that there is something of a generational divide among
researchers with respect to this very issue, with a “progressive relaxation of norms against
ascribing cognitive and conscious states to nonhuman animals in behavioural science.”74 That is
to say, older researchers take a more stringent line against any kind of anthropomorphism, while
younger researchers are far more open to it. Furthermore, much of the work in this areas appears
to rely on a relatively small number of studies, with work by de Waal and Haidt being the most
frequently relied upon.75 Thus the question of anecdotal evidence becomes more of a concern, as
well as the issue of anthropomorphism. These are certainly vulnerabilities for evolutionary
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explanations of morality. How they are handled by debunkers will be seen below. But these
issues do have the potential to call into question just how objective the findings of researchers in
these areas are.
In addition, Kagan might be on to something when he says that “The stringent positivist
standards in the biological disciplines require a degree of experimental control that can only be
achieved with animals. As a result, investigations of fear, perception, memory, and conditioning,
all of which can be studied in animals, take precedence over the study of moral motives and
emotions, which have no obvious analogue in animals. There can be no mouse model for human
pride, shame, or guilt.”76 Beyond this limitation, he also notes that strong experimental methods
are more likely to result in professional success for those researching in this area, but some of the
discoveries produced by them “are not very relevant to an understanding of human ethical
choice.”77 Nevertheless, as far as evolutionary theory is concerned, there appears to be
substantial agreement that “human beings are born with constrained repertoires of behavior for a
variety of bodily and social functions; moral behavior is likely consonant with these
evolutionarily constrained faculties.”78 With this background in mind, we now turn our attention
to EDA proponents themselves.
The Empirical Premise of EDAs
The material that has been examined above, for the most part, comes not from the
arguments of EDA proponents, but from evolutionary biologists and researchers (including
Darwin himself). The thinkers cited above are not writing with an agenda to debunk morality,
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and, generally speaking, do not even touch on questions of metaethics even though such
questions seem to follow quite naturally from their theorizing. It is important to ask if the
arguments of EDA proponents generally line up with the kinds of arguments that are put forward
by evolutionary researchers as it pertains to the genealogical history of our moral belief-forming
faculties, understood from the standpoint of Darwinian science. To answer this question, we
must now examine in some detail the arguments put forward by EDA proponents themselves for
comparison. While many EDA proponents give little more than a cursory treatment of the
empirical premise, there are some notable exceptions. Ruse, Joyce, Kitcher, and, to a lesser
extent, Street, give detailed treatments of how evolutionary forces are thought to have shaped our
moral faculties and beliefs by appealing to the findings of evolutionary biologists.79
In Taking Darwin Seriously, Ruse presents a detailed defense of Darwinian evolution in
general and how it bears on philosophical issues in epistemology and ethics. The central
argument for debunking is found in the sixth and final chapter. To begin with, Ruse rejects group
selection as a viable explanation of cooperation leading to the precursors of morality.80 In this
regard, Ruse is in line with the majority view of biologists, but again the issue makes no
difference with regard to the overall debunking argument. He does cite kin selection and
reciprocity as the two primary mechanisms favored by Darwinians for the evolution of helping
and cooperative behavior.81 Kin selection in particular he lauds as “one of the great triumphs of
twentieth-century biology.”82
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Ruse also appeals to animal behavior that bears a resemblance to human morality,
pointing in particular to de Waal’s study of primates.83 What is at issue for Ruse is not whether
all of our behavior is controlled by reciprocity or kin selection, but “whether we have innate
tendencies or dispositions inclining us to social thoughts and actions, which later would improve
our reproductive chances.”84 Darwinian forces are responsible for our basic moral inclinations,
but culture still plays a role in developing them.85 He likens this to a skeleton (our biology) and
flesh (culture), while he leaves “relatively unexplored the ways in which cultures, under the
influence of biology, actually develop.”86 Ruse’s argument is that the science behind our moral
inclinations forces the committed Darwinian to the conclusion that morality is subjective.87
While he calls this “little more than a statement of faith” at this stage of the argument, 88 he does
proceed to give further arguments in support of it. As those arguments relate to the epistemic
premise of the EDA, however, consideration of them will be put on hold until chapter two.
Maybe because Ruse’s book-length argument for antirealism based on Darwinism is
older, it doesn’t receive nearly as much attention in recent works as the arguments of Joyce and
Street. These are by far the two most-discussed EDAs in the literature. Joyce’s argument in
particular is worth discussing concerning the evolutionary genealogy of our moral faculties and
beliefs due to the fact that, like Ruse’s, it is a book-length argument. Many commentators on
Joyce in fact pay little attention to his extended discussion of the empirical premise. The first
five chapters of The Evolution of Morality deal with various aspects of the theory of evolution as
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it relates to morality, and only in chapter six is Joyce’s debunking argument laid out in detail.
Joyce begins in chapter one of Evolution of Morality with a discussion of the problem of
altruism, although he limits the use of the term to acting with the intention of helping another
with a non-instrumental motivation of concern for the other’s welfare (in contrast to
selfishness).89 The important point, argues Joyce, is that natural selection has favored certain
kinds of helpful behavior in humans, which is regulated by the proximate mechanism of altruism
and morality. He writes, “In order to make an organism successfully helpful, natural selection
may favor the trait of making moral judgments.”90 The means by which these traits evolved are
already familiar from the material covered above. Joyce includes kin selection,91 direct
reciprocity,92 indirect reciprocity,93 and the controversial idea of group selection94 in his
explanation of the evolution of altruism, including a separate category of what he calls
mutualism. This last principle he takes as describing helping behavior which does not sacrifice
fitness for the helper.95
In explaining the evolution of our moral sense, it should be noted that Joyce seeks to
explain how a moral sense was adaptive, not that it necessarily is or continues to be adaptive.96
He acknowledges that it is beyond the capability of researchers to say how natural selection
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worked to bring about our moral sense.97 At the same time, he writes that, “I take seriously the
hypothesis that human morality is a trait that was not selected for. It may be akin to one of
Gould’s spandrels: a fortuitous by-product of natural selection, with no evolutionary function.”98
This seems to create a situation in which the naturalistic origins of the moral sense are a foregone
conclusion. Even if it becomes too problematic to explain the moral sense by Darwinian
adaptation, it can be explained naturalistically some other way.
Joyce argues that the universality of the moral sense is evidence that it is innate, rather
than something that is learned or acquired. “No one would deny that cultural learning plays a
central role in determining the content of the moral judgments that an individual ends up making;
the claim is that there is a specialized innate mechanism (or series of mechanisms) designed to
enable this type of learning.”99 The evidence he offers for this comes from research into the
moral development of children. In particular he notes the ability of very young children to
distinguish between moral and conventional norms, as well as an “extremely reliable sequence”
of moral development in general.100 He further notes that this is a cross-cultural ability.101
While the evolutionary processes discussed above had a major role in human ancestry
according to Joyce, he also says that they work only for small groups.102 He argues that, “This is
not a problem for the hypothesis of this book, for it is quite possible that morality evolved when
our ancestors were still in relatively small bands.”103 Kitcher echoes this when he argues that a
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capacity for normative guidance evolved from altruistic dispositions as the early hominid
ancestors of humans lived together in larger groups.104 The progression to full-blown morality
involved additional factors, as psychological mechanisms in humans developed through natural
selection which then in turn became the means of transmitting prosocial cultural traits.105
Cultural evolution thus took over after the foundations of the moral sense were laid down by
natural selection, working through the mechanisms given above. Joyce in particular argues that
indirect reciprocity is most likely the process responsible for the moral sense,106 but again the
particular details are not crucial to the force of the debunking argument.
Street’s approach to the genealogical issue is different from the detailed evolutionary
explanations presented by Ruse, Joyce, and Kitcher. Instead of giving details of evolutionary
theory on the development of the moral sense, Street begins with our evaluative judgments and
works backwards. Specifically, she posits that certain kinds of evaluative judgments, such as
endangering one’s own survival and causing harm to one’s own kin, for example, would have a
very negative impact on one’s success at survival and reproduction. Meanwhile, other kinds of
evaluative judgments, such as promoting one’s own survival and caring for one’s own offspring,
would have a correspondingly positive impact on survival and reproductive success.107 She
argues that the fact that so many of our evaluative judgments correspond to what promotes
reproductive success, and the absence of judgments which have the opposite tendency, is
evidence “in favor of the view that natural selection has had a tremendous influence on that
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content.”108 Among the evolutionary explanations for tendencies toward certain specific kinds of
judgments, Street includes kin selection and reciprocal altruism, in line with the arguments given
by Ruse, Joyce, and Kitcher.109
As with the other writers that we have looked at, Street considers the observable behavior
of many nonhuman species, particularly those closer to humans in the evolutionary tree, to be
additional evidence of the influence of evolutionary forces on our evaluative tendencies. She
appeals to the behavior of chimpanzees in such things as grooming and sharing food as an
example of nonhuman animals experiencing certain behavior as “called for.”110 She concludes
that, “We may view many of our evaluative judgements as conscious, reflective endorsements of
more basic evaluative tendencies that we share with other animals.”111 In Street’s view, however,
this does not mean that the content of evaluative judgments is directly heritable. Instead, she
argues that the influence of evolutionary forces on our evaluative judgments is indirect in
shaping our basic evaluative tendencies.112 According to Street’s view, other factors can and do
influence the judgments that we actually make. These include other biological forces such as
genetic drift, not to mention that “many other forces were not evolutionary at all, but rather
social, cultural, historical, or of some other kind. And then there is the crucial and sui generis
influence of rational reflection that must also be taken into account.”113
Still, in setting the stage for her epistemic argument (which she presents in the form of a
dilemma which we will look at in more detail in chapter two), Street maintains that the influence
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of evolutionary forces on our evaluative judgments is pervasive through the basic underlying
tendencies that we have inherited from our evolutionary ancestors and which we share with other
creatures. She also argues that “The truth of some account very roughly along these lines is all
that is required for the Darwinian Dilemma to get off the ground.”114 Some might raise the
question of just how “roughly” the genealogical account needs to line up with what Street has
presented in order to serve as the basis for her argument. With all of these debunking arguments,
the specific details at every step are controversial. This might lead one to conclude that the entire
argument is therefore suspect, and rests on a faulty foundation. Objections of this kind will be
considered below. For the debunkers, however, getting the specific details of the causal premise
right is not necessary, and it is important to understand why, from their perspective, that it the
case.
How Close Is “Close Enough”?
The reason why the specific details are not so important for the debunker is that this
theorizing is not meant to show how the human moral sense developed, but merely to develop a
theory of how it could have. Joyce, for example, writes that, “remember that the objective is to
show how helping behavior could develop through the forces of biological natural selection.”115
Ruse also is explicit about the standard for the debunker as far as the empirical premise is
concerned, stating that, “At the empirical level, the biologist has got to make good the claim that
he can show, through natural selection, how the moral capacity or sense could [emphasis added]
have evolved.”116 In putting forth his own theory of how morality evolved, Kitcher writes that,
A ‘how possibly’ explanation is important because we sometimes wonder whether a
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chain of occurrences could have occurred, or whether the occurrence of the sequence is
permitted by a particular theory. . . . It would be marvelous, of course, to be able to say
how the history actually went, but, given the temporal remoteness of the events and the
limitations of our evidence, modesty is required. In the context of rebutting the skeptical
challenge, modesty—settling for ‘how possibly’—is enough.117
To be clear, the skeptical challenge that Kitcher refers to here is the challenge of those who
might be skeptical that a naturalistic explanation such as Darwinian evolution can fully explain
moral phenomena.118 Street likewise approaches the empirical premise with initial caution when
she writes that, “it must suffice to emphasize the hypothetical nature of my arguments, and to say
that while I am skeptical of the details of the evolutionary picture I offer, I think its outlines are
certain enough to make it well worth exploring the philosophical implications.”119
But the question might well be raised if a “how possibly” explanation is a solid enough
base on which to build an argument such as the EDA. “Possibly” is, after all, not the same as
“probably.” While all of the debunkers just cited take an appropriately modest approach to the
evidence for the empirical premise, they reach epistemic conclusions that are much stronger. In
his chapter on “Biology and Ethics,” Kitcher makes an insightful comment. While it is in the
context of his theory of how the transition in early hominids to what he calls a “capacity for
normative guidance” came about, it could well be applied to the entire empirical premise of the
EDA. Kitcher says, “The principal reason for taking the possibility seriously lies in the difficulty
of thinking of serious rivals.”120 It is not expressed what counts as a “serious” rival, but one gets
the feeling that a serious rival would be one that fits within the naturalistic framework of modern
science, and in particular a Darwinian one. In the introduction to The Ethical Project, Kitcher
117

Kitcher, Ethical Project, 12.

“To answer skeptics claiming that ‘real ethics’ requires resources naturalists cannot allow, some
narrative needs to be given.” Kitcher, Ethical Project, 12.
118

119

Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 113.

120

Kitcher, “Biology and Ethics,” 172.

35
writes that his position on the evolution of ethics, which he terms pragmatic naturalism, allows
“only such novel entities as can be justified through accepted methods of rigorous inquiry.
Appeals to divine will, to a realm of values, to faculties of ethical perception and ‘pure practical
reason,’ have to go.”121
There is also another worry that might be raised in connection with all of the theories that
have been touched on above about altruism and the development of the moral sense, which is
this: how can we even know that anything like the proposed theories really is possible? It is easy
to say on paper. If the question is one of mere logical possibility, that would hardly seem to
require argument. There is no obvious way to show that it is logically impossible for something
like the human moral sense to develop stepwise over a long period of time through a chain of
cause-and-effect. It is worth keeping in mind that, for the Darwinist, there must be a natural
explanation of how our moral faculties developed by natural processes. This is crucial in setting
the stage for the debunking argument that stems from it. Resisting the causal premise will be
quite difficult for the committed naturalist, and will require more than simply pointing out that
there are plenty of holes in the theory of how morality developed over the course of evolutionary
history that seem to be filled with a lot of just so stories. In one particularly telling passage, Ruse
writes that, “We know that evolution occurred, that it was Darwinian in nature, and that humans
are part of the natural order. Therefore, in something as important to us as our morality, there is a
strong presumption that natural selection will have had a causal influence. Such a presumption
may ultimately prove wrong. I doubt anyone expects a definitive case. Nevertheless, we go into
our enquiry with a great deal of positive background knowledge.”122 There are several hidden

121

Kitcher, Ethical Project, 3-4.

122

Ruse, 224.

36
assumptions packed into this statement. Perhaps the most significant is the underlying
assumption that no other important force or forces had anything to do with the development of
our underlying human nature, which includes our moral faculties. The main alternative to
Darwinism that Ruse considers (and rejects) is Lamarckism, in which traits can be acquired and
passed on to one’s descendants.123 Forces which are not explicable in terms of natural laws are
excluded from any consideration at all. The question thus becomes whether or not Darwinism
can adequately explain the phenomenon of morality. If the conclusion is that it can, then that
raises the metaethical question of the status of moral beliefs.
In cases such as Kitcher, it is unclear if his rejection of moral realism is a conclusion that
follows from Darwinism, or if it is a presumption based on naturalism and the Darwinian
theorizing is simply an attempt to explain why most people believe in objective moral truth when
there is no such thing. Kitcher offers not so much of a debunking argument as a debunking
starting point with a Darwinian explanation of moral beliefs. One might wonder if Ruse is in the
same boat, although in an autobiographical note in Taking Darwin Seriously, Ruse writes that he
was a professional philosopher for twenty years before questioning whether his Darwinism might
have a bearing on the question of the objectivity of morality – a question which he eventually
answered with the conclusion that morality is subjective.124
Objections to the Empirical Premise
Before we can move on to discussion of the epistemic premise in the next chapter, we
first must consider challenges to the empirical premise. The first objection to be examined is the
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question of whether or not the arguments of the debunkers are adequate to establish that
evolutionary forces have, in fact, had as pervasive an influence on our evaluative and moral
judgments as the debunker maintains.
FitzPatrick is one who answers this question in the negative. According to him, the only
thing that can be shown by the empirical premise is that to the extent that evolutionary forces
have shaped our moral beliefs, that influence was not truth-tracking. However, the really crucial
question is “Q: How much influence has natural selection actually had on the content of our
current moral beliefs, by influencing ancestral moral belief-forming dispositions to whatever
extent it did?”125 FitzPatrick holds that “Everything depends on the correct answer to Q, and this
issue deserves far greater attention than it receives in these discussions.”126 Because of this,
FitzPatrick thinks that the conclusions of the debunkers are not as scientific as they purport to be,
but simply beg the question against moral realism. He concludes that, “Not only do current
debunking arguments fail, but it is hard to see how evolutionary biology will ever be in a
position to debunk ethical realism.”127
FitzPatrick’s larger argument appeals to the idea that we can use rational reflection to
compensate for any evolutionary influence on our moral judgments. This is a common move
from moral realists who attempt to resist the EDA, but as it falls under realist responses to the
debunking challenge, it will be discussed at length in chapter three. With respect to the empirical
premise, the point for now is that, at least in FitzPatrick’s mind, the debunker has a burden to
demonstrate with much more accuracy the extent to which evolution has influenced our moral
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beliefs. As we have seen above, the debunkers themselves acknowledge the speculative nature of
the arguments. If the realist demands scientific precision, free from just-so storytelling, then
likely the debunker is bound to fall short. At the same time, the response of the debunker might
well be to ask, as Kitcher does, what the alternative explanation is. FitzPatrick’s argument here is
more of an attempt to shift the burden of proof back to the debunker to prove that evolutionary
forces have had a pervasive distorting effect on our moral beliefs. The debunker, however, would
counter that the burden is on FitzPatrick and his fellow anti-debunkers to show how evolutionary
forces could produce moral faculties that track with mind-independent moral truths.
The burden-of-proof question will be discussed further in chapter three, but the prima
facie case appears stronger with the debunkers. That is, if our moral faculties are really a product
of unguided natural selection, then Darwinists who wish to argue for the reliability of our moral
faculties have a burden to show how that could be the case. One aspect of this argument also
touches on the nature of moral truths. If they are based on discrete, intuitive judgments as
opposed to principles of reason, this could make a difference. These questions will be set aside
until chapter three as well.
Levy and Levy challenge the argument that the empirical premise of the debunking
argument still works even if the details of any particular argument are mistaken. Their aim is to
show that both empirical and theoretical considerations “combine to cast doubt on the
availability of a satisfactory evolutionary explanation, suitable for the debunker’s aims.”128
Against the arguments of Joyce and Street, they suggest that “there is no plausible alternative
hypothesis that Street or Joyce could appeal to to vindicate their respective debunking
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projects.”129 Even a tentative argument to this effect would put a significant damper on the
enthusiasm of debunkers, so it is worth examining Levy and Levy’s arguments more closely.
While Levy and Levy claim that their argument focuses on the causal premise,130 in fact a
number of their objections seem more of an attempt undermine either the epistemic premise or
the conclusion. Their own version of the causal (empirical) premise of the EDA is very typical:
“One’s belief that p (for a moral p) is explained by evolution through natural selection.”131
However, one of the first objections they raise against Joyce is that his debunking argument
would overgeneralize beyond the moral domain into other areas such as prudential and epistemic
beliefs, and thus potentially be self-defeating.132 This is an important objection which has been
noted by many commentators (including Joyce), and will be addressed in chapter three.
However, it is not an objection to the causal premise of the EDA per se. Instead, it is better seen
as a reductio ad absurdum of the entire debunking argument, which has different possible
outcomes.133
Where Levy and Levy do make a hit on the empirical premise, however, it is in response
to Joyce’s argument that the universality of the moral sense is evidence of its evolutionary
origins. Levy and Levy call some of the research relied upon by Joyce into question, particularly
studies by Turiel. In support of this, they cite research by Machery and Mallon.134 However, a
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careful reading of Machery and Mallon shows that in fact they themselves recognize they are
going against the received wisdom of contemporary psychology.135 While it is outside of the
scope of this dissertation to adjudicate this dispute, Levy and Levy’s objection appears to be
much weaker than they make it out to be. In addition, Machery and Mallon’s argument is that
younger children consider all norms to be moral, and that the development of coming to see
some norms as merely conventional may happen at different times.136 However, this does
nothing to damage Joyce’s argument that a moral sense appears to be innate rather than learned.
Also, Levy and Levy attempt to undermine the argument that morality is adaptive.137 However,
as shown above, Joyce only argues that morality was adaptive in the past, not that it necessarily
is at present. He also holds that it could be a trait which was not selected for at all, in which case
Levy and Levy’s argument falls flat.
In addressing the causal premise, Kahane argues that “It is not enough if a causal
explanation cites factors that are off track. The full causal explanation of any belief will
inevitably cite such factors.”138 As an illustration, he says that if Einstein had had more musical
ability, he might never have discovered relativity.139 While some commentators do use
counterfactual arguments against EDAs, this particular counterfactual is not quite the same. One
counterfactual debunking argument says that if moral realism is true and moral truths were
different, we would still have the same moral beliefs that we do at present because of the
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influence of evolutionary forces. Another form of counterfactual is that if evolution had taken a
different path (such as Darwin’s argument about honeybees above), our moral beliefs would be
different even if the moral truths were the same. With these counterfactuals, there is a direct
relationship between our moral beliefs and the counterfactual claim. With Kahane’s illustration
of Einstein, the relationship is indirect – Einstein wouldn’t have discovered relativity because he
was too busy playing piano instead. Thus the parallel that Kahane tries to make is tenuous at
best.
However, Kahane does have a point in that there are factors in the causal history of our
beliefs which have no connection with the truth or falsity of those beliefs. By themselves, such
factors are insufficient to call those beliefs into question, provided there are other justifications
for them. In the case of moral beliefs, however, this is the crucial question. If our moral beliefs
are based on moral intuitions, then the origin of those intuitions takes on a much greater
importance than would be the case if other justifications were available. As Kahane admits,
“Debunking explanations of such intuitions can leave a belief lacking both actual and alternative
support.”140 Kahane’s own conclusion about how successful EDAs are is somewhat ambiguous,
as we will see below.
With regard to the empirical premise, Vavova writes that, “The debunker claims that
evolutionary forces have shaped our moral beliefs. The evolutionary psychology behind this
empirical claim is controversial. Both sides should acknowledge this and move on.”141 Instead,
Vavova wants to focus on the conditional that if something like the empirical premise of the
EDA is true, then what are the implications of that for the status of moral beliefs. She writes,
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“We should examine this conditional even if we think its antecedent false. Something very much
like it – in form, if not content – may be true.”142 Vavova dismisses two possible responses to the
debunker’s challenge, namely to reject moral realism or to reject the conclusions of evolutionary
science.143 Instead, she argues in favor of what is often referred to as a third-factor account,
which will be discussed in detail in chapter three.144
Vavova is correct in saying that the evolutionary psychology behind the debunking claim
is controversial, but this masks an important distinction. As we have seen, there are various
controversies about specific details, such as whether group selection is a viable explanation, and
many specific details concerning the evolution of our moral faculties. However, anyone
committed to Darwinian evolution very much appears to be committed to something like the
debunkers’ explanation in general form. Thus Vavova’s statement that something like this may
be true – again, for someone who is committed to the conclusions of Darwinian science – is too
weak. Kitcher’s question above about the difficulty of thinking of any serious rival would appear
to have enough force against any naturalistic view of morality as to place the burden of proof on
the side of moral realists who wish to defend Darwinism to explain exactly how that would be
possible. Before getting to that, however, we first need a clearer understanding of how the
empirical premise debunks moral beliefs in combination with the epistemic premise. The next
chapter will examine in detail the epistemic premise of the EDA and how it supposedly leads to a
debilitating conclusion for moral realism.
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Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined the empirical premise of EDAs. This premise argues that
evolutionary forces have had a pervasive effect on our moral judgments in that it was those
forces which formed our moral faculties. In support of this premise, theories of evolutionary
researchers concerning the evolution of altruism, cooperation, and the moral sense were
considered in some detail. These theories did not come from the debunkers themselves, but
rather from scientists who were seeking to explain the puzzle of how Darwinian evolution could
account for altruistic behavior and for moral phenomena in humans. These theories were
compared with the arguments of debunkers, and were found to be consonant with them. Attempts
to reject the empirical premise were found to fall short. The conclusion of this chapter is that the
empirical premise of EDAs is well-supported by the academic literature. This lays the foundation
for a significant challenge to anyone who wants to both defend moral realism and remain
committed to Darwinian evolution as a full and complete explanation of human nature. Whether
this challenge can be met by moral realists will be examined in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

In the first chapter we examined the basis for what is called the empirical or causal
premise of EDAs. In essence, Darwinian theory gives us reason to believe that our moral
faculties (roughly understood as those physiological/mental faculties that help to produce moral
intuitions and beliefs) were a result of natural selection working through processes involving
things such as kin selection and reciprocity to produce cooperative behavior that would confer
measurable benefits in terms of evolutionary fitness. Given that this is the case, it poses
something of a challenge for those who believe that our moral beliefs give us knowledge of
moral truths which exist independently of what anyone believes about them.
The precise nature of that challenge, however, is the subject of some dispute. It has been
formulated in several different ways. This chapter will examine exactly how the empirical
premise is thought to challenge morality. We will look at both limited and global forms of EDAs.
In addition, we will examine the complicated question of whether EDAs constitute a unique
challenge to morality, and, if so, what form that challenge should be thought to take.
Defending the Epistemic Premise
Ruse and Subjectivism
In the previous chapter, we saw that Ruse’s conclusion to his debunking argument was
that morality is subjective rather than objective. That was left hanging as a “statement of faith”
by his own admission. However, he follows that “statement of faith” by presenting arguments in
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favor of subjectivism and against objectivism.145 Ruse writes, “As we know, the big weakness of
traditional subjectivism is that it fails to account for the true nature of our moral experience. The
whole point about morality is that it is binding, not open to individual choice. It is greater than
and above any of us. In other words, it has all of the features that we associate with
objectivity.”146 Ruse argues that the Darwinian explanation handles this issue not by explaining
how morality actually does have binding authority, but rather why we think it does. Ruse writes,
“The point about morality (says the Darwinian) is that it is an adaptation to get us to go beyond
regular wishes, desires and fears, and to interact socially with people. How does it get us to do
this? By filling us full of thoughts about obligations and duties, and so forth. And the key to what
is going on is that we are then moved to action, precisely because we think morality is something
laid upon us.”147
Ruse’s argument, then, is that Darwinism accounts for the “true nature of our moral
experience” by informing us that we are mistaken about its true nature. Ruse says the weakness
of traditional subjectivism is that it fails to account for why we think of morality as objectively
binding, but it should be noted that there are non-Darwinian explanations for this
phenomenon.148 Certainly it is crucial for an argument against moral realism to be able to
account for moral beliefs, but this does not constitute an argument against realism. The lack of
any plausible naturalistic account of morality having actual binding authority leads Joyce to
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reject moral naturalism as a viable metaethical theory.149 But Joyce doesn’t offer this as an
argument against moral realism; rather, he argues that naturalism lacks the resources to ground
actual binding authority (which he calls “practical clout”).150
In case anyone were to think that this does away with morality altogether, Ruse writes, “I
am certainly not saying that morality is unreal. Of course it is not! What is unreal is the apparent
objective reference of morality.”151 It is hard to know what Ruse means by saying that morality
is not unreal if it has no objective reference. It seems like wanting to have his cake and eat it, too.
Consider a parallel argument. Ruse says that he doesn’t think God is objectively real, either, but
that God “does, however, serve an extremely useful biological purpose, inasmuch as He backs up
the objective, binding status of morality.”152 Imagine if someone made the statement, “of course
God is not unreal! Only the apparent objective reference of God is.” Having no “objective
reference” is normally what we mean by saying that something is not real. There appears, then,
to be a very strained asymmetry between Ruse’s treatment of God and his treatment of morality
even though they are, in an important sense, parallel in Ruse’s thinking. Ruse wants to say that
morality is not unreal even though it has no objective reference. But if he were to say that God is
not unreal even though there is no objective reference for God, this would likely be dismissed as
nonsense. The question of whether antirealism can actually serve as an adequate response to the
debunking challenge will be discussed in chapter four.
Ruse also argues that objectivism in morality is excluded because “You would believe
what you do about right and wrong, irrespective of whether or not a 'true' right and wrong
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existed! The Darwinian claims that his/her theory gives an entire analysis of our moral
sentiments. Nothing more is needed.”153 How does this exclude objectivism, according to Ruse?
By making it redundant. According to Ruse, this redundancy is unacceptable to the objectivist
view in that it would imply something like the following: “God wants us to be good, and that is
the ultimate defining source of good, but it wouldn’t matter whether He did or not!”154 Here
Ruse’s argument appears to confuse epistemology with ontology. Moral realism in general (and
theism in particular) has to do with the existence of objective moral truths (ontology), whereas
the Darwinian genealogy of our beliefs is an epistemological question (i.e. why we believe things
to be objectively right or wrong). But Ruse appears to be drawing an ontological conclusion from
an epistemological premise. Furthermore, a committed theist might not be necessarily committed
to the view that Darwinian evolution explains everything about human nature, which would
make Ruse’s argument question-begging against the theist. However, the question of parsimony
that Ruse raises is an important issue that will receive more attention later on, as it is an
important feature of many debunking arguments.
Ruse further argues that realists (“objectivists” is his preferred term) have no plausible
remedy for the redundancy problem “so long as one locates the foundation of morality in some
sort of extra-human existence, like God’s will or non-natural properties.”155 This still leaves open
some version of moral naturalism. Ruse ultimately rejects any version of objectivism based on
Kantian thinking, instead arguing in favor of Hume as a precursor to Darwinian thought,156 but
this doesn’t go far enough. As Joyce points out, it is too hasty to simply excise moral facts with
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Ockham’s Razor, since moral facts could still be reducible to the non-moral facts of the nonmoral genealogy.157 As we saw above, Joyce concludes that no form of moral naturalism can
provide actual authority or “practical clout.” He also argues that “a value system lacking
practical clout could not so effectively play the social roles to which we put morality, and thus
we could not use it as we use morality, indicating that clout may be considered a vital aspect of
morality.”158 It is Joyce’s broader debunking argument that we will examine next.
Ruse concludes that Darwinism rules out objective morality, saying that, “To suppose
that evolution will seek out the true morality is to revert right back to Spencerian
progressionism.”159 Ruse is touching on the idea of truth-tracking, which will come into sharper
focus in later EDAs. One complaint at this point might be that Ruse’s argument is a bit vague
and the conclusion is stronger than is warranted. For example, FitzPatrick argues that, if the
choice is between parsimony and moral realism, one should choose realism.160 Whether that
move would have other repercussions is another matter that will be examined later, but Ruse’s
argument does not carry the immediate force he seems to believe. It does, however, point in the
direction of other debunking arguments that have come along since.
Joyce and the Genealogy of Moral Beliefs
Where Joyce does think parsimony can be properly used is in eliminating non-naturalism
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and supernaturalism (presumably theism).161 Thus Joyce sees the EDA as successful against
theism and non-theistic forms of non-naturalism based solely on parsimony regardless of
whether or not any version of moral naturalism can be found that will succeed. He writes, “Once
we have a complete non-moral genealogy of moral judgment, if moral naturalism succeeds nonnaturalism and supernaturalism are sunk, and if moral naturalism fails non-naturalism and
supernaturalism are sunk.”162
As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the evidence does not show a complete nonmoral genealogy of moral judgment. Instead, theories about the development of altruism and the
moral sense are based on the assumption that Darwinism fully accounts for human nature in one
way or another in spite of the fact that most of the evidence could be categorized as just so
stories (Joyce’s complaints notwithstanding) and the lack of what most scholars today would
consider to be a good alternative. Even debunkers themselves recognize that we likely never will
have a complete non-moral genealogy of our moral beliefs. The question of whether moral
naturalism is better positioned to resist the debunking challenge than non-naturalism will be
examined more closely below.
Part of Joyce’s argument is an analogy which is often cited in the literature. He imagines
what would be the case if there were two pills, one of which made a person believe Napoleon
lost Waterloo, the other that he won. If a person learned they had been given the “Napoleon lost”
pill, it would undermine that person’s belief that Napoleon had lost Waterloo. It wouldn’t show
the belief was false, but it would remove justification for the belief.163 To restore justification,
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one would have to first take an antidote for the pill and then set about to find evidence supporting
the belief that Napoleon lost. This, Joyce argues, is analogous to our moral sense.
Joyce pre-emptively counters two possible objections to his analogy. First, some would
object that human traits are not hard-wired to develop inevitably but require input from the
environment. Joyce argues that this doesn’t make our moral beliefs sensitive to evidence, and so
our moral beliefs would still not be justified.164 Second, it might be objected that Joyce’s
arguments for an innate moral sense do not claim that specific moral judgments are innate, and
so the analogy doesn’t work because it refers to a specific propositional belief. Joyce counters
that the analogy can be modified in such a way that the pill disposes a person to form beliefs
about Napoleon in general. This would undermine all of one’s beliefs about Napoleon until
taking the antidote and investigating the evidence from scratch.165 Thus, Joyce argues that we
should be agnostic not merely about whether our moral beliefs are right, but about whether there
exists anything that is morally right and wrong at all.166
Shafer-Landau, however, argues that even if one accepts the genealogy of moral beliefs
that Joyce gives, the Napoleon pill analogy only works if it’s the case that “our inability to
exclude the possibility of insensitive doxastic origins for a set of beliefs S mandates suspension
of judgment regarding all beliefs within that set.”167 But this, argues Shafer-Landau, would result
in “wholesale skepticism.”168 This touches on a very important concern for EDAs, namely how
the resulting skepticism can be limited to moral beliefs without extending to other beliefs which
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could even undermine the EDA itself. This issue will be dealt with more fully below. As far as
the objection to Joyce’s Napoleon pill analogy, however, Shafer-Landau’s move amounts to a
shifting of the burden of proof. The particular phrasing Shafer-Landau uses above provides the
key. In Shafer-Landau’s reading of Joyce, Joyce’s argument implies that the mere possibility of
insensitive doxastic origins for a given set of beliefs would render it unjustified, and that only in
that case would the analogy succeed. But Joyce’s analogy does not turn upon a mere possibility
that one may have taken the pill, which is how Shafer-Landau characterizes it.169 Rather, Joyce
writes of the pill analogy that “we are imagining that you somehow discover beyond any shred of
doubt that your belief is the product of such a pill.”170
The dispute is between the debunkers’ argument that our moral sense must have come
about in a way that is at least approximated by the model outlined in the previous chapter (if not
in exact detail) and the realists’ view here represented by Shafer-Landau who would reduce that
to a mere possibility. The challenge for Shafer-Landau and other realists who want to resist the
analogy and the argument is to provide an alternative explanation for the development of our
moral faculties. The debunking argument claims legitimacy on the basis of science. Under
Darwinism, in order for our moral beliefs to be sensitive to moral truth, there would have to be a
demonstrated benefit in terms of survival and reproduction in having beliefs which aligned with
moral truth. Thus, Joyce (and as we will see below, other debunkers as well) would argue that
the burden of proof is on realists to show how true moral beliefs are evolutionarily beneficial.
Shafer-Landau subtly reverses that by arguing that we can’t exclude the possibility of insensitive
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origins for other beliefs. Shafer-Landau’s objection also changes the argument from a
probabilistic one to something like a logically deductive one. In order to exclude insensitive
doxastic origins for a set of beliefs, it would require something like showing such origins to be
logically impossible. This not only shifts the burden of proof, but raises the standard of proof to
an unreasonably high level. Debunking arguments are typically expressed in probabilistic terms
as an inference to the best explanation rather than as a logically deductive argument.
Street’s Darwinian Dilemma
Street’s debunking argument is the one that is most often cited in the literature, and so it
is worth taking an extended look at it. In the first chapter we saw that the target of Street’s
debunking argument is not morality, but rather value realism. This distinction will become
important at certain points. Many commentators, either consciously or not, simply apply Street’s
argument to morality and take it as a refutation of moral realism more specifically.171 In Street’s
formulation, there is a dilemma for the value realist based on whether or not there is a relation
between evolutionary forces on the one hand, and the independent evaluative truths affirmed by
the realist on the other.172 Starting with the assumption that there are attitude-independent,
evaluative truths, the first horn in Street’s dilemma says there is no relation between these truths
and evolutionary forces, while the second horn says there is. Either way, argues Street, the realist
is stuck in the unfortunate position of having no reliable knowledge of the independent
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evaluative truths.
If the realist takes the first horn of the dilemma, Street argues that our normative faculties
will only arrive at truth by random chance, since natural selection directs us toward tendencies
that enhance reproductive fitness, not toward true normative beliefs.173 Street uses the analogy of
someone trying to get to Bermuda by boat, but who simply allows the wind and waves to guide
the vessel. Very rarely the boat will end up in Bermuda, but most of the time that won’t
happen.174 Street anticipates the objection that we could use our rational faculties for reflection to
correct for the distorting effects of evolutionary forces, and argues that this will not help the
realist. This is because rational reflection can only work by weighing some evaluative judgments
against others which are presumed to be correct. Since our entire fund of judgments is in
question from the outset, however, there is no secure starting point for rational reflection to begin
its work.175
With Street’s second horn, there is a relation of some kind between evolutionary forces
and the independent evaluative truths. Street argues that the only relation that will help the realist
is a tracking relation, in which evolution pushes us in the direction of true normative beliefs.176
But in that case, Street argues that the realist is committed to engaging in a scientific argument
about how natural selection works.177 This means that the realist’s tracking account must serve as
a better explanation than other scientific accounts.178 This would require showing that there is an
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evolutionary advantage to having true evaluative beliefs. Street, however, argues that an
“adaptive link” account, in which the forces of evolution selected for evaluative beliefs (or
dispositions toward beliefs) that resulted in behavior that promoted survival and reproduction
with no regard to independent evaluative truths is superior to any tracking account the realist can
give in terms of parsimony, clarity, and being more illuminating with respect to why people
make certain evaluative judgments rather than others.179
Given this predicament, Street argues that we are forced to give up realism altogether and
adopt antirealism with respect to evaluative truths.180 Elsewhere Street clarifies this point
somewhat. The conclusion of her dilemma is not that normative realism is false. It is, rather, that
if normative realism is true, then “we are in all likelihood hopeless at discovering the normative
truth.”181 However, in order to continue making normative judgments (which we all must do), we
are forced to reject normative realism, since “It is incoherent to affirm, for example, that ‘I
should do Y, but I’m in all likelihood hopeless at recognizing what I should do.’”182 In other
words, Street has given a practical argument against normative realism.183
Street anticipates three objections to her dilemma and attempts to head them off. The first
has to do with value naturalism, that evaluative facts are identical to certain natural facts.184
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Street argues that any such theory, if it is realist in a fully robust way,185 will be susceptible to a
slightly modified form of her dilemma. In the case of value naturalism, argues Street,
evolutionary forces would have to track not independent evaluative truths, but rather independent
natural-normative identities. According to Street, this would result in a more serious failure as a
scientific explanation than other forms of realism, “For it is even more obscure how tracking
something as esoteric as independent facts about natural-normative identities could ever have
promoted reproductive success in the environment of our ancestors.”186 The second objection
Street anticipates is the idea that our moral faculties developed as a byproduct of some other
capacity that was evolutionarily advantageous.187 Street argues that this would only push the
problem back a level, and also that the realist would need to account for what this other capacity
was and how it resulted in the development of our moral faculties.188
The third and final objection Street addresses has to do with utilizing the badness of pain
as the starting point for developing an independent evaluative truth.189 The idea for the realist is
that pain is bad independently of our evaluative attitudes. To defeat this, Street constructs
another dilemma (which she fittingly calls the “pain dilemma”), based on whether or not the
realist accepts a definition of pain as “a sensation such that the creature having the sensation
unreflectively takes that sensation to count in favor of doing whatever would avoid, lessen, or
stop it.”190 If the realist rejects this definition, then it is conceivable that pain could have been
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such that we would unreflectively want to bring it about or intensify it, in which case it is not
plausible to hold to a realist view that creatures have a reason to avoid, lessen, or stop it
independently of their evaluative attitudes.191 Even if there would be a reason to fix whatever
problem is causing the pain in a particular case, it wouldn’t be the pain itself which calls for
stopping the pain but rather some other evaluative judgment.192 Also, if the realist accepts the
first horn of the dilemma by rejecting Street’s definition of pain, then the question arises as to
why so many people dislike and avoid pain, for which evolution provides a perfectly good
answer.193 Street writes that, “The realist tells us that it is an independent evaluative truth that
pain sensations (however he or she defines them) are bad, and yet this is precisely what
evolutionary theory would have predicted that we come to think. And once again the realist is
unable to give any good account of this coincidence.”194 If the realist takes the second horn of the
pain dilemma by accepting the definition that Street has given, then the badness of pain depends
upon our evaluative attitudes, and it is those attitudes that make it bad (and thus no longer a
genuinely realist position).195 Street contends that this argument would also apply to pleasure
being good.196
This argument is of particular interest because it relates to what are called “third factor
accounts,” which is one type of response by realists to EDAs. The main feature of third factor
accounts is that they attempt to show that natural selection, while not favoring independent moral
or evaluative truth directly, does so indirectly by favoring some other factor (called a third
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factor) which itself is good. Several different versions of this type of argument have been given
by realists. This will be covered in more detail in chapter three, but it is worth noting at this point
that Vavova suggests that a third factor account using the badness of pain is a promising route
for realists.197 Rather than addressing Street’s pain dilemma, Vavova defers to Skarsaune’s
attempt to challenge Street’s definition of realism.198 Two issues are crucial in evaluating this
response, both of which will be deferred for the time being. One has to do with the definition of
realism, and the other with whether third factor responses are question-begging. Vavova argues
that, while some such responses are, hers is not.199 However, since she does not include a
response to Street’s pain dilemma in her argument or even acknowledge it, it is hard to know
how Vavova thinks she can escape Street’s attempt to head it off.
There are some features of Street’s argument in particular that are worth noting. First is
the underlying emphasis, occasionally articulated, that our theory of metaethics should be
consistent with science. For example, the opening statement of her paper is: “Contemporary
realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science.”200 As we have already
seen, the basis of the challenge presented by the second horn of her dilemma (which posits a
relation between evolutionary forces and independent evaluative truths) is expressed as a
scientific argument between a tracking account and her adaptive link account. Street argues that
antirealism avoids this problem by affirming that our evaluative beliefs have come about because
of evolutionary forces, and thus that there are no evaluative truths which are independent of the
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evaluative attitudes of people.201 Thus, antirealism is presented as a means of avoiding the
skepticism which is generated when normative realism is combined with a Darwinian account of
human nature. Chapter four will examine this question more closely to see if Street’s antirealism
(specifically her version of constructivism) can avoid skepticism. If it cannot, then if Street’s
dilemma does pose a real problem for metaethics, it is also a problem for her own metaethical
theory. Street’s commitment to a scientific worldview, however, also assumes that materialism is
true. This, however, is not a scientific conclusion, and not something that can be proven by the
scientific method.
This becomes clear in Street’s brief theoretical argument for antirealism. Street writes,
“Before life began, nothing was valuable. But then life arose and began to value – not because it
was recognizing anything, but because creatures who valued (certain things in particular) tended
to survive. In this broadest sense, valuing was (and still is) prior to value. That is why antirealism
about value is right.”202 It is not hard to see what Street is getting at with this argument. In this
account (which she holds to be the correct scientific account of natural history), there was no
God and no realm of independent evaluative or moral truths prior to the arrival of “creatures who
valued.” However, this cannot be the basis of an argument against value realism since it would
obviously be question-begging. Thus, Street’s argument against realism begins by assuming that
realism is true, and then arguing that in that case we can have no confidence in any of our
evaluative judgments. This leaves us stuck with skepticism unless we become antirealists.
However, Street assumes that we will want to hold to her understanding of what constitutes
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scientific. And indeed, for many academics that will be a persuasive consideration.203
One possible implication of Street’s view would be that it is impossible for anyone to be
mistaken in their evaluative judgment, any more than it would be possible for someone to be
wrong about any personal preference. Street’s position, however, is that the truth of an evaluative
judgment is a function of what judgment one would hold in a state of reflective equilibrium.204
Thus, someone could be mistaken about a particular judgment if they would not hold that
judgment in reflective equilibrium.205 This raises several worries. One worry has to do with the
circularity of this position. Street can’t maintain that it is an attitude-independent truth that the
judgment one would hold in reflective equilibrium is true for that person, because even if there
are attitude-independent evaluative truths we have no knowledge of them by her own argument.
Another worry arises when we ask how a person can actually know what judgments they would
hold in reflective equilibrium. If this cannot be known, then any advantage from Street’s
constructivism over normative realism is at least diminished. These concerns and others will be
addressed in chapter four.
Other Debunking Arguments
The arguments of Street and Joyce in particular have received a significant number of
responses in the literature, both positive and negative. In addition, many other scholars have
offered their own variant of debunking argument. Space does not permit a comprehensive
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examination of all of them, but some of the more notable ones will be touched on briefly here.
We will look at the arguments by Bedke, Morton, Bogardus, and Fraser and see what issues they
bring to light. Like the preceding arguments, these arguments aim to debunk moral realism.
There are also EDAs which aim at a more limited target; these will be discussed below as well.
Bedke and Cosmic Coincidence
Bedke’s debunking argument aims at a narrower target than that of either Street or Joyce,
namely intuitive non-naturalism.206 He defines intuitionism as “the view that certain cognitions
non-inferentially and prima facie justify corresponding ethical beliefs.”207 According to Bedke’s
argument, intuitionism is incompatible with ethical non-naturalism because it would require a
mysterious “cosmic coincidence” in order for our intuitive moral beliefs to be in alignment with
non-natural moral facts.208
While Bedke’s argument makes reference to evolution, his emphasis is on the causal
closure of the physical universe. He writes, “We would need something like a god rigging the
ethical facts and the causal order to ensure their serendipitous coincidence. And without evidence
of this happy coincidence one cannot justifiably hold that those ethical beliefs, insofar as they
were previously supported by intuition, are true.”209 Thus the real problem, if Bedke’s argument
is successful, is the commitment to a naturalistic worldview including causal closure. In defense
of this, Bedke argues that, “The closure of the physical . . . is widely accepted and supported
daily by advances in causal explanations of the various sciences. Any rejection of this premise
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motivated by a desire to save a favored blend of theories in ethics is bound to look ad hoc.”210
In response, it should be noted that advances in science do not actually provide evidence
for the closure of the physical. Theists can happily recognize that the physical sciences explain
many phenomena without stipulating that they can explain all phenomena. Appealing to how
widely accepted this principle is does not constitute evidence in favor of it. Furthermore, the
view that the physical is not closed has a very long history and includes many notable thinkers.
Bedke’s suggestion that it would be ad hoc for someone to appeal to it to escape debunking is
thus unpersuasive. It may be the case that thoughtful examination of debunking arguments might
lead someone to take another look at arguments for theism. As we will see, one’s prior
philosophical commitments play a much bigger role in these arguments than some debunkers
might like to admit.
One key premise in Bedke’s argument is that moral intuitions “qua justifiers” are
physical states.211 In defending this premise, Bedke argues against two competing views. These
include the view that intuitions are a kind of perception (either direct or representational), and
that ethical truths are self-evident.212 The details of these arguments are outside the scope of this
dissertation, but Bedke’s conclusion concerning intuitions is instructive. He writes that,
“defensible theories of ethical intuition are hospitable to [the premise that intuitions are physical
states]. From this and the causal closure of the physical it follows that ethical intuitions (insofar
as they include only that which is needed for justification) are physically caused.”213 This modest
conclusion is weaker than the conclusion of his overall argument, which is that the need for

210

Bedke, 190.

211

Bedke, 190.

212

Bedke, 191-95.

213

Bedke, 195.

62
cosmic coincidence defeats justification for intuitive beliefs about non-natural ethical facts.214
There is, after all, a difference between saying that defensible theories are hospitable to your
position, and arguing that your position is proven. There is still room for the realist to resist this
strong conclusion and perhaps concede that Bedke’s argument casts some doubt on the
justification of those beliefs without entirely defeating it.215
Another important point raised by Bedke is whether his argument would debunk other
kinds of beliefs besides ethical beliefs. He argues that perceptual beliefs would not be affected.
This is so because with ethical intuitions, the “seemings” that are involved can be explained
without referring to ethical facts, whereas with perceptual beliefs this is not the case. This is the
first of what Bedke calls two crucial ingredients for the cosmic coincidence argument to apply to
a class of beliefs.216 The second ingredient has to do with the properties of the facts
themselves.217 Earlier in his argument, Bedke illustrated how the need for cosmic coincidence
serves as a defeater for intuitively justified beliefs about non-physical facts and properties. He
uses two separate illustrations – someone with a belief that everyone has a spirit animal and for
whom it just seems that way, and someone else who believes there is a non-physical goblin war
all around. 218 In the first case, we are asked to suppose that the spirit-animal belief could be
explained as being fully determined by sociological and psychological facts,219 while in the
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second case it is caused by a tumor in the person’s brain.220 In both cases, Bedke argues, the
person’s belief in spirit animals/goblin war would be defeated and no longer justified.221
These illustrations are instructive in that in both cases, the beliefs in question are
abnormal when compared to the overall population. This is most obvious with Bedke’s goblin
war analogy. Belief in spirit animals may be (as far as I know) prevalent in certain cultures or
subcultures, but not among humanity as a whole. Belief in moral realism, however, appears to be
ubiquitous. The rejoinder of the debunker is that that is because natural selection has favored
creatures with a moral sense and so forth. But the plausibility of that argument depends upon the
plausibility of other factors, most notably the commitment to a naturalistic worldview. This is
explicitly the case with Bedke’s argument, while it is implicit with those such as Street, Joyce,
Ruse, and Kitcher. Thus, Bedke’s argument with respect to the justification of belief in spirit
animals/goblin wars appears to be somewhat superfluous. It also is an interesting feature of this
argument that he chooses examples which are not likely to be disputed by any Westerner who
might otherwise be inclined to disagree with his conclusion. Bedke notes that his point is related
to Mackie’s argument for error theory based on the “queerness” of ethical facts.222
Bedke believes that his argument can debunk belief in ethical facts without debunking
perceptual beliefs, but what about other sorts of beliefs? Bedke applies his own argument to
logical and mathematical beliefs. This is an important topic which will be addressed in more
detail below. Bedke argues that the skeptical damage can be limited to “a priori justified belief
in synthetic truths about non-natural facts.”223 However, he also acknowledges that “The
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challenge here is genuine and it might require us to rethink the metaphysics or epistemology of
some domains.”224
The solution to the debunking problem in ethics, according to Bedke, is to either deny
moral non-naturalism by accepting naturalism, or adopt antirealism.225 Since Bedke himself sees
moral naturalism as unpromising, he adopts the antirealist position.226 But two noteworthy
features of his conclusion should be pointed out. First, he says that “intuitive modes of
justification are indispensable in ethics, and so we should explore other metaphysical views that
leave the intuitive justification intact.”227 Second is his claim that “the conclusion here does not
necessarily lead to skepticism.”228 But consider again Bedke’s analogies to spirit animals and an
invisible goblin war. According to his own analogy, when the individuals with these beliefs
discover that their beliefs are explained by causes which have no bearing on their being true,
justification is defeated. Yet somehow Bedke (and other debunkers) argue that justification for
moral beliefs can be regained by adopting an antirealist view of them. Bedke offers no
explanation of how this is supposed to work, but consider the same move applied to spirit
animals. If the person with the belief in spirit animals adopted an antirealist view of spirit
animals, would that restore justification to that belief? It is hard to make sense of that because it
is hard to know what it even means. Justification for beliefs is typically understood to mean that
the person with the belief has a good reason to think the belief is true. But with the antirealist
position, the person no longer thinks the belief is true. What, then, would it mean for such a
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belief to be justified? This question will be addressed more fully in chapter four on antirealism.
Morton’s New Evolutionary Debunking Argument
Morton has constructed a version of EDA which he believes is stronger than what he
calls the standard EDA.229 He argues that his version of EDA defeats the claim that categorical
reasons exist, which is entailed by all positive moral claims. Thus, we can thus have no
knowledge of moral truths.230 He also argues that his EDA is better able to reply to four key
objections to the standard EDA.231 Although it is debatable whether Morton’s version of EDA is
superior to preceding ones as he claims, the objections that he lists are useful in highlighting
important areas of disagreement between debunkers and realists.
The key important difference that Morton sees between his EDA and the general EDA is
that his account aims to defeat categorical reasons in general.232 He writes, “While the Standard
EDA debunks moral beliefs on the basis of their contents, the New EDA debunks moral beliefs
on the basis of a claim that they all entail.”233 Morton’s EDA includes the following empirical
premise: “Evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons.”234 He explicates
this premise as meaning that evolution selected for humans “who have a sense that there are
some actions (or desires, etc.) that are favored no matter what.”235 Because there is no
independent justification for believing in such reasons, Morton argues that this belief is defeated.
Furthermore, because all positive moral knowledge claims entail that categorical reasons exist,
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we do not have any positive moral knowledge.236
It is not at all clear, however, that Morton’s generalization that other EDAs focus on
debunking beliefs because of the content of those beliefs really does justice to the arguments. As
we already saw above, Joyce spends a considerable amount of space on the topic of “practical
clout,” by which he means the binding authority of morality. This is precisely what Morton
means by categorical reasons. Street, likewise, in her response to Copp which we will look at
more closely in chapter three, refines her definition of normative realism that she discussed in
“Darwinian Dilemma.” In “Reply to Copp,” she calls this “uncompromising normative realism,”
which she describes as the view that “there are at least some normative facts or truths that hold
independently of all our evaluative attitudes, such that an agent can have normative reason
(simpliciter) to do Y even though the conclusion that she has this reason in no way follows from
within her own practical point of view, understood roughly as her own set of evaluative
attitudes.”237 In other words, Street’s Darwinian dilemma is aimed at debunking this kind of
normative realism, which is exactly what Morton means by categorical reasons. Finally, Ruse’s
argument also involves evolutionary forces selecting for creatures who hold that certain actions
are required in a way that has binding authority. While none of these other debunking arguments
explicitly use the language of categorical reasons238 in formulating the argument, it is clear that
this is what they are, in fact, aiming at. If Morton’s argument is stronger, it is arguably only by
making an explicit formulation of what is implicit in other EDAs. At the same time, there is a
danger with Morton’s formulation in that it is presented as a deductive argument rather than an
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inference to the best explanation. This might appear to have greater force, but it also means that
opponents simply have to show that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises.
Hence, even a highly improbable counterargument would suffice to show that the conclusion
does not follow, and there are several such lines of attack which are available to the realist as
even Morton recognizes.
Morton covers four objections to the standard EDA and why he believes his argument is
better equipped to handle each one. The first is what he calls the limited explanation objection, in
which the realist argues that, while some moral beliefs can be explained by the evolutionary
benefits they confer on those who hold them, others are not so clearly susceptible to this
explanation.239 The realist can point to undebunked moral beliefs as a starting point for
establishing reliable moral beliefs.240 The standard EDA proponent, as Morton points out, will
argue that evolution has indirectly affected these other beliefs.241 His new EDA, he argues, can
handle this objection more easily because there is only one belief which needs to be explained as
being adaptive, which is belief in categorical reasons.242 This is an important objection, but
Morton’s claim to having a superior argument is highly questionable. The belief in categorical
reasons only has an evolutionary advantage if the specific beliefs it is attached to also have such
benefits. In other words, the belief in categorical reasons does not, by itself, confer any
advantage to anyone. It is only by giving certain behaviors the force of apparent authority that
the belief in categorical reasons is supposedly effective. But this is no different from other
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debunking arguments, so the apparent advantage of Morton’s argument is illusory.
Another objection addressed by Morton is that the reliability of our moral faculties can be
established “by showing that it is either identical with or a species of a doxastic faculty that we
have independent warrant for believing to be reliable.”243 Morton holds that his argument avoids
this objection altogether because it targets a particular belief (that categorical reasons exist)
rather than our moral faculties.244 Again, the advantage of Morton’s position is more apparent
than real. The debunking arguments we have looked at target moral realism (or in Street’s case
normative realism), which, in essence, just is the belief that categorical reasons exist. Morton’s
formulation is basically the same argument in different words.
One objection which has already been touched on is the problem of overgeneralization.
Morton is less confident in the superiority of his debunking argument in handling this
objection.245 He gives very little detail in this regard, but he is certainly correct that this is a
major point of attack by realists which will be examined in chapter three. The fourth and final
objection that Morton deals with is the category of third-factor accounts. Morton argues that such
objections arguably beg the question246 (these will also be examined in detail in chapter three).
Where this is arguably not the case is when a third-factor account relies on a belief which itself is
not easily debunked. In such a situation, argues Morton, the strength of the response by the
debunker depends crucially upon the response to the limited explanation objection.247 Because
the details of this argument are of central importance, we will defer further discussion until
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chapter three where third-factor accounts will receive careful attention.
To close discussion of Morton’s new EDA, while it is questionable that his argument
enjoys significant advantages over other formulations, nevertheless the discussion of possible
objections from realists is very useful. One question that will need to be asked is if realists can
make any of these objections stick. The view which will be defended here is that realists will
have a very difficult time of it if they have to start from the same naturalistic assumptions that
the debunker relies upon.
Bogardus and Debunking of Naturalists
One argument which does target moral realists who are also naturalists is that of
Bogardus.248 Bogardus analyzes the epistemic challenge of EDAs in terms of four different
epistemic principles as candidates for how best to explicate the challenge. Those four principles
are sensitivity, safety, accidentality, and symmetry. He contends that EDAs based on sensitivity,
safety, and accidentality all fail, while what he calls the argument from symmetry succeeds
against naturalism. In addition, Bogardus argues that EDAs depend on a particular view of moral
psychology which he calls “representationalism.”249 He distinguishes this from two other views,
namely divine revelation and rationalism. To set the stage for his argument requires some
unpacking of these concepts.
In Bogardus’s terminology, representationalism holds that “all our moral judgments come
by way of a mental intermediary, indication, report, or representation, which is delivered by our
moral faculty and figures crucially into our formation of moral beliefs.”250 This sounds a lot like
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the idea of a moral sense that debunking arguments tend to utilize. Bogardus maintains that these
representations “might be sentiments like attraction and revulsion (or ‘affect-laden intuitions,’ or
‘gut reactions’), as Sentimentalists maintain, but they might instead be calculations or
thoughts.”251 What Bogardus calls rationalism, on the other hand, is the view that “moral beliefs
also can be formed solely on the basis of what’s been variously called rational insight, direct
perception, direct apprehension, or simply presentation.”252 Divine revelation is relatively
straightforward. In this view, “moral beliefs can be formed solely on the basis of divine
testimony, a supernaturally endowed conscience, the inward instigation of the Holy Spirit (as
Aquinas might say), and so forth.”253 As a theist himself, Bogardus is one of the few writers in
this area who gives more than passing or dismissive attention to this topic.
It should be noted that, while Bogardus claims that his analysis of moral psychology is
unique in the literature,254 all debunking arguments address in some fashion or other the question
of whether moral beliefs are formed through the operation of a moral sense or if they are derived
from the operation of rational principles as a kind of a priori knowledge. These roughly
correspond to the difference between Humean and Kantian approaches to ethics. Moreover,
Bogardus does not explain the difference in phenomenological terms between what could be
considered a “calculation or thought” under his representationalist view and what he calls the
rationalist one. The question of whether our rational faculties can be used to separate intuitions
that are indicative of truth from those that are not is another matter which will be examined more
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fully in chapter three. As we saw above, Street argues that this cannot work. But it is not clear
that Bogardus’s categories add anything to that discussion.255
The main point of interest in Bogardus’s argument is his contention that an argument
from symmetry defeats naturalistic views. He argues that if our moral faculties were selected for
adaptive beliefs rather than true beliefs, then it is not the case that “had our species evolved
elsewhere, elsewhen and we later formed moral beliefs using the same method we actually used,
our beliefs would be true.”256 This means that, in nearby possible worlds, we would have
different moral beliefs from those we do have, and those beliefs would be false by our own
lights.257 However, it is not clear that we are in a better epistemic position in the actual world
than we would be in these nearby possible worlds. Because of this, our moral beliefs do not
constitute knowledge.258
Bogardus argues that rationalists and divine revelationists need not worry about the
possibility that alternative evolutionary paths would have produced false moral beliefs. With
divine revelation this seems fairly clear-cut, but his explanation of why rationalists can escape
this implication is less so. He writes that under rationalism we “‘just see’ the truth value of
evaluative propositions in order to form (at least some of our) moral beliefs, and this method
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would not easily lead us astray even if our social ancestry had been different.”259 However, this
seems more like an assertion than an argument, and Bogardus never explains exactly how this
“just seeing” is supposed to work, what faculties are used in such a case, and how those faculties
are supposedly able to “see” mind-independent moral truths in a way that is explicable in terms
of the presumed evolutionary ancestry of those faculties. In the end, however, he concludes that
rationalism and naturalism are hard to reconcile, and that “Philosophers who self-describe as
rationalists tend to be nonnaturalists.”260 Thus, Bogardus believes his debunking argument puts
naturalists in a bind between either giving up moral realism or adopting rationalism.261
It seems doubtful that the epistemic premise that Bogardus relies on for his argument
(symmetry) can succeed. The basis of it is a requirement that, in order to have knowledge, we
must have good reason to think that we are in a better epistemic position in the actual world than
we would be in nearby possible worlds in which we held different beliefs. The basis for this
principle is one that Bogardus credits Kitcher with, although one can find similar arguments
elsewhere. It is the idea that if Christians had been born as, say, indigenous Australians, they
would hold completely different religious doctrines. Because of that, we should give no credence
to any religious beliefs.262 Rather than challenging this epistemic principle, Bogardus adapts it
for use with moral beliefs instead. However, at the very least one could say that the principle
enumerated by Kitcher would also undermine belief in naturalism or atheism. Plausibly, if
Kitcher had been born at a different time and place, he would not have been an atheist. So,
applying his own principle, why should he accept atheism? At the very least, a lot more work is
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necessary to show that this principle does not undermine a great many other beliefs which would
be considered knowledge. Bogardus makes no attempt to show how such a principle can be
delimited in this way.
Fraser and Reliability
One of the major concerns of debunkers has to do with the reliability of our moral
faculties. The argument is that, given that there are mind-independent moral truths, we have no
reason to believe that our moral faculties would have developed by evolutionary processes in
such a way as to produce true moral beliefs. Fraser offers a debunking argument that attempts to
refine this concern using empirical data to analyze moral faculties in terms of four specific
conditions which he argues must be met in order for an evolved faculty to be considered reliable.
These conditions are what he calls the environment condition, the information condition, the
error condition, and the tracking condition.263 Fraser notes that most of the focus of EDAs is on
the tracking condition. His discussion of tracking consists largely of refuting the arguments of
realists who attempt to show how our moral faculties might track moral facts even though they
were not selected for that purpose.264 As such, we will consider those responses in chapter three,
and here focus on Fraser’s arguments for the other three conditions.
What is of particular interest with Fraser’s argument is his emphasis on the cost (in
evolutionary terms) of building reliable mechanisms as opposed to alternatives which are
cheaper but are more prone to error. Fraser brings this concept to bear on the conditions for
reliability that he enumerates in different ways. For example, with the environment condition
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Fraser argues that mechanisms which are designed to be reliable in a particular environment may
be unreliable in others due to the economy of “‘fast and frugal’ heuristics.”265 This implies that,
even if our moral faculties were reliable in the evolutionary past, the environment of modern,
technologically advanced societies may produce quite different results.266 Fraser does not,
however, address the question of whether the moral faculties of our evolutionary ancestors would
have been reliable. As we have already seen above, some EDAs argue that morality began as an
adaptation for small group cooperation, which would suggest that the moral faculties of the
ancestors of modern humans were not reliable in the first place.
The information condition has to do with the trade-offs between mechanisms which
produce low error rates but are more costly, versus those which are cheaper but less reliable.267 If
the cost of accuracy is too high, then “it would be adaptive to settle for an error-prone but cheap
mechanism.”268 In order to flesh this out, however, one would need to specify the relevant
information needed for the mechanism to produce accurate results, which would require
specifying the exact nature of the moral facts in question. In the case of non-naturalism, Fraser
admits that he doesn’t know what kind of information would even be needed, and instead directs
his attention to “naturalistically respectable moral facts.”269 We saw above that part of Bedke’s
debunking argument is related to Mackie’s argument from queerness. While Fraser does not
mention Mackie, there are again shades of the argument from queerness in the background of
Fraser’s objection. Essentially, his argument is that it is difficult to specify how reliable our
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moral faculties are without specifying the nature of the facts that are supposed to be reliably
cognized. With regard to natural moral facts, Fraser argues that the realist needs to do more work
to show that our moral faculties are reliable.270 Likewise, the error condition specifies that
systemic bias in favor of either false positives or false negatives can negatively impact the
reliability of mechanisms, and, as with the previous conditions, Fraser argues that there are
empirical reasons for believing that our moral faculties are not reliable.271
Two features of Fraser’s argument should be noted. The first is that he aims at placing the
burden of proof on realists to show that our moral faculties are reliable by using empirical
arguments about the reliability of information systems in general. The question of burden of
proof goes to the heart of many debunking arguments. The question here is whether realists are
entitled to assume our moral faculties are reliable unless proven otherwise, or if the opposite is
the case. This is not an easy question to settle without making moves that would be considered
question-begging by the other side. However, since it appears that there are many more ways for
a cognitive faculty to go wrong than for it to get it right, there does seem to be a prima facie
argument that the burden is on realists to show that our moral faculties are reliable. Given a
Darwinian starting point, this seems like a tall order.
The second point about Fraser’s argument is that he argues that we actually lack a reason
to think there are any moral truths at all. He says, “moral facts may be natural, or non-natural, or
non-existent.”272 This, however, is a problematic move. The realist can rightly accuse the
debunker of begging the question if the burden is on the realist to prove that moral facts exist. A
parallel case can be shown by comparing it to facts about the physical world. There is no non-
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question-begging way to prove that an external world exists without using one’s perceptual
faculties, and to do that one must assume that one’s perceptual faculties are reliable. Thus, in
order to make the EDA work, the debunker has to grant the existence of moral facts for the sake
of argument on pain of begging the question. This is what most debunkers do. A possible
objection for the realist is whether arguments which debunk morality also debunk perceptual or
other beliefs. That will be addressed in chapter three.
Limited Debunking Arguments
The EDAs that we have examined above all attempt to debunk morality in toto. There is a
smaller group of EDAs that takes aim at some particular subset of moral beliefs which are
considered suspect because of their presumed evolutionary genealogy. Examples of this include
arguments by Singer and Greene. However, as we will see they are generally misunderstood.
While they sometimes appear to be taken as realists, in fact Greene is certainly not and it is
doubtful that Singer is. Huemer, on the other hand, is an example of a realist who utilizes
evolutionary considerations to debunk only some beliefs. Kahane, among others, raises serious
doubts about whether such a strategy can succeed.
Singer’s Debunking of Intuitionism
Singer appeals to evolution as an argument for debunking moral intuitions in favor of
utilitarianism. He argues that one of the main objections to utilitarianism has been that it is
contrary to many of our moral intuitions.273 Singer rejects Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium,
which suggests that, “where there is no inherently plausible theory that perfectly matches our
initial moral judgments, we should modify either the theory, or the judgments, until we have an
273
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equilibrium between the two.”274 Singer objects to this approach because of how it treats our
common moral judgments and intuitions as data in a scientific theory.275 He writes, “A normative
ethical theory . . . is not trying to explain our common moral intuitions. It might reject all of
them, and still be superior to other normative theories that better matched our moral
judgments.”276
Singer brings two lines of argument to bear against moral intuitions. The first is the
understanding of the effects of evolution, which he says is the “single most important advantage
we have over the great moral philosophers of the past.”277 While Singer lauds many preDarwinian philosophers for throwing off “the myth of the divine origin of morality,”278 he argues
that their understanding was limited in that they did not understand how evolutionary forces at
the genetic level affected our attitudes about morality.279 In particular, Singer sees evolutionary
considerations as explaining (and vindicating) many of Hume’s ideas about the passions and
moral judgements.280 One idea that is of particular interest is Singer’s observation that evolution
does not select for “a general feeling of benevolence for the strangers we pass in the street.”281 At
the same time, things like cooperation, reciprocity, and detecting and punishing cheats are
observable in non-human species (as we have already seen above), and is evidence to Singer that
“Morality is a natural phenomenon” even if human beings have introduced their own artificial
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refinements in the form of rules of justice.282
Singer’s second line of argument is complementary to the first, in the form of research in
neuroscience concerning how people actually form moral judgments.283 Singer argues, based on
empirical studies by Jonathan Haidt, that moral judgments are often automatic and intuitive, and
deliberate reasoning is usually a rationalization of the immediate, intuitive response.284 Singer
also makes use of the research of Greene into people’s responses to moral conundrums like the
well-known trolley problem. He argues that these responses are consistent with the evolutionary
picture of moral intuitions serving adaptive functions at the group level, but not having any
actual moral significance.285
Singer anticipates the objection that utilitarianism itself still rests on intuitions about what
is good, and so to abandon intuitions altogether will result in moral skepticism.286 He attempts to
circumvent this problem by separating intuitions that are more rational from those that are more
immediate and laden with emotion.287 Intuitions which do not seem to be a result of evolutionary
pressures but instead are based on rational considerations, such as Sidgwick’s ethical axioms,
might still be justified even if our more common intuitions are not.288 Separating these rational
intuitions from those emotion-based intuitions that are the result of our cultural and evolutionary
heritage is, in Singer’s mind, “the only way to avoid moral skepticism.”289
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Singer is sometimes taken to be a moral realist, as we will see below in the discussion
with Greene. However, even Singer appears to be indecisive about his own metaethical views. In
a back-and-forth exchange with Huemer (who asserts that Singer’s view is properly viewed as
noncognitivist290), Singer suggests that he himself is undecided between a very restricted kind of
intuitionism (following Sidgwick) or noncognitivism (following Hare).291 While it is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to work out the exact nuances of Singer’s metaethical view, it is worth
noting that it would be quite a stretch to regard him as a realist in the sense which universal
EDAs seek to undermine. At the same time, he does state that part of his project is to avoid
skepticism by means of endorsing a thoroughgoing utilitarian ethic. Singer himself appears to be
more concerned with the practical import of his approach than having a clearly worked-out
metaethics.
Greene’s Debunking of Deontological Ethics
Greene appeals to empirical research into how people respond to descriptions of various
morally challenging scenarios as a basis for debunking certain moral beliefs. In particular, he
argues that deontological moral beliefs are shown by scientific studies to be rationalizations of
innate, emotional responses to moral situations, whereas consequentialist beliefs are not. He
begins by presenting “multiple pieces of independent evidence that deontological patterns of
moral judgment are driven by emotional responses while consequentialist judgments are driven
by ‘cognitive’ processes.”292 He then argues that evolution uses emotion rather than cognition as
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the drive for moral behavior because, “emotions are very reliable, quick, and efficient responses
to recurring situations, whereas reasoning is unreliable, slow, and inefficient in such contexts.”293
The reason this gives rise to deontological moral theories, according to Greene, is that “humans
are, in general, irrepressible explainers and justifiers of their own behavior.”294
This might lead one to conclude that Greene’s view is similar to one which some realists
take in response to debunking – namely, that our intuitive moral judgments are a result of
evolutionary pressures on our moral faculties (which Greene also holds), but that we can utilize
our rational faculties to weed out false beliefs and be left with true moral beliefs. However,
Greene is not a moral realist even though some scholars seem to read him that way.295 Greene is
an antirealist296 and thinks that, “consequentialist principles, while not true, provide the best
available standard for public decision making and for determining which aspects of human
nature it is reasonable to try to change and which ones we would be wise to leave alone.”297 This
judgment, however, puts Greene in a conundrum which he apparently fails to see. In claiming
that consequentialist principles provide the “best” available standard, he is making an evaluative
claim. Is that claim objectively true? First, it raises the question of what would make that the
case. Greene’s argument addresses moral truths specifically rather than evaluative truths
generally. But claiming that consequentialist principles are the best standard would require
something like mind-independent evaluative truths (à la Street’s argument above), or else
agreed-upon criteria by which to evaluate what constitutes “best.” Second, even if Greene can
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make a case for consequentialism being the best standard, is anyone obligated to follow it?
Would that not require a realist understanding of obligation, or of reasons? Here we see that the
move from evaluative truths to moral truths still requires a realist understanding of morality. As
an antirealist, Greene has lost any standing by which to make such a move. These ideas will be
explored more fully in chapter four, but I call attention to them here.
Greene challenges deontologists to explain the coincidence between emotional responses
which are taken as morally significant, and the deontological theories which are used to justify
them.298 In doing so, he rejects Kant’s explanation, namely God. He writes,
Present-day rationalist deontologists, as citizens of the twenty-first century, cannot
depend on the notion that God gave us our moral emotions to encourage us to behave in
accordance with the rationally discoverable deontological moral truth. Instead, they need
some sort of naturalistically respectable explanation for the fact that the conclusions
reached by rationalist deontologists, as opposed to those reached by consequentialists,
appear to be driven by alarmlike emotional responses.299
Greene’s argument here is reminiscent of Bedke’s “cosmic coincidence” argument which was
examined above. While Greene is generally taken as advocating a limited debunking argument
(which in many ways is true), in fact the scope of his debunking is much more far-reaching. He
argues that there is no such thing as moral truth, but that we should be consequentialists. It is
hard to see this as anything other than self-refuting. Greene clearly has a personal preference for
consequentialist ethics, but his reasons for thinking that this is better than deontological theories
lack what Joyce calls “practical clout.”
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Huemer’s Revisionary Intuitionism
In some respects, Huemer uses a similar line of argument to Greene and Singer.
However, Huemer is explicit about his commitment to realism. Huemer endorses a version of
intuitionism which features moral realism and intuition as the ultimate justification for evaluative
beliefs.300 He gives two different accounts for intuitions, but his main point is that “intuitions are
taken to be cognitive, intellectual states with propositional contents.”301 He also holds that, while
intuitions may not be as reliable as sensory beliefs, “nevertheless, enough of our intuitions are
accurate that we can construct a substantial body of ethical knowledge.”302
Contra Street, Huemer argues that our starting fund of moral beliefs is not so thoroughly
contaminated that we cannot make any headway in attempting to sort the good from the bad.303
This will receive more attention in chapter three, since in this respect Huemer is an antidebunker. Huemer presents a set of five criteria which we can use to sort our moral intuitions.
These include things like finding a set of intuitions that cohere well, rejecting (or at least
distrusting) intuitions which appear culturally specific, as well as those which promote
reproductive fitness, which are favorable to yourself, and which align with strong emotions.304
Huemer actually singles out Singer as an example of using such a method.305 Like Greene and
Singer, Huemer is highly skeptical of commonsense morality, which he argues tends to be
deontological.306 Instead, he endorses a consequentialist approach which makes use of certain
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abstract theoretical intuitions in building a moral system, which he refers to as “formal
intuitions.”307
As for moral realism, Huemer argues that antirealist metaethical views do not support a
revisionary ethical theory.308 Huemer, like Greene and Singer, endorses the project of drastically
(but not completely) revising commonsense moral beliefs. Greene’s approach, as we have seen,
is ultimately incoherent in that there is no independent moral truth to ground the project.
Huemer, on the other hand believes that there are moral truths. He argues that the moral beliefs
of humans in general have been moving in the direction of liberal beliefs for centuries, and that
the best explanation for this is that liberal moral beliefs are true.309 Huemer also maintains that
global debunking arguments are unable to account for this universal convergence of human
morality on liberal values.310
Numerous debunkers (both limited and global) use prohibitions against incest as an
example of a moral belief that is the result of evolution. The argument is that, because incest
results in a higher rate of birth defects and thus decreases relative fitness of one’s genetic line,
evolutionary pressures selected for humans with a tendency toward feelings of disgust about
incest which became formulated as a moral prohibition. Huemer goes even further, arguing that,
“conventional sexual morality should probably be rejected more or less wholesale, excepting
those aspects that are mere applications to sexual behavior of general principles of benevolence
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and respect for others.”311 What makes this example particularly interesting is that prohibitions
against promiscuous sex seem to be very hard to explain using Huemer’s own criteria.
Specifically, promiscuous sex would seem to be favored rather than disfavored by natural
selection for the simple reason that it increases one’s chances of reproductive success, yet
Huemer’s criteria says we should be distrustful of intuitions which would promote reproductive
fitness. Promiscuous sex confers benefits to the individual in terms of both physical pleasure and,
at least with males, enhanced social status – which again, according to Huemer’s criteria is a
reason to be suspicious of it. Huemer also says we should be suspicious of intuitions that align
with strong feelings. Yet the natural sex drive of humans inclines toward promiscuity, not
chastity. It is also somewhat ironic that, as we saw in chapter one, Darwin himself supported
Victorian sexual mores using evolutionary principles to buttress them against the promiscuous
sexual practices of “savages.” It is not hard to see that Huemer’s principles are so malleable that
they can be used to justify many different, even contradictory moral systems.
Kahane’s Response to Limited Debunking
Most of the literature on EDAs deal with arguments against moral realism. Kahane is one
of the few writers to argue against limited debunking arguments. Kahane argues that the limited
use of debunking arguments is suspect because limited debunkers underestimate the extent to
which our evaluative beliefs are contaminated by evolution.312 For example, Kahane takes aim at
Singer’s argument that, while kin and reciprocal altruism are evolutionarily adaptive, universal
altruism is not and thus is not susceptible to a debunking argument.313 Kahane, however, argues
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that, “Even if this claim is correct, it would achieve little. If a disposition to partial altruism was
itself selected by evolution, then the epistemic status of its reasoned extension should also be
suspect.”314 Also, while Singer, Greene, and Huemer all endorse some form of utilitarianism,
Kahane argues that utilitarianism requires an account of well-being to supplement it. This is
problematic because evaluative beliefs about well-being “are some of the most obvious
candidates for evolutionary debunking.”315
Kahane concludes that even if limited debunking arguments can avoid collapsing into
global debunking (which he thinks is a “precarious assumption to make at this stage”316), the
result will likely be a much more radical overhaul of our moral beliefs than anything proposed by
utilitarians like Singer.317 Kahane does not give a firm answer on whether he thinks EDAs do
succeed, but some of the issues that he raises in connection with them will be discussed in
chapter three.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined several EDAs, particularly with respect to the
epistemic premise which attempts to describe precisely how it is that Darwinian evolution poses
a problem for moral knowledge. If the arguments are successful, it seems that a commitment to
Darwinian evolution implies moral skepticism. Since Darwinian evolution is considered to be
established by science, it also appears that science itself may lead to moral skepticism. As this is
an unwelcome outcome, many debunkers propose adopting antirealism with respect to moral
truths as a means of avoiding skepticism. However, this strategy requires much closer
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examination. It is not at all clear how adopting an antirealist stance toward some domain of
truths can avoid skepticism, and, at least in some cases, the idea seems absurd on its face. Before
considering this, however, we will consider some of the many responses to debunking arguments
from moral realists of various stripes.
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CHAPTER 3
REALIST RESPONSES TO THE DEBUNKING CHALLENGE

In the previous two chapters, we have examined the challenge from evolutionary
debunking arguments. That challenge consists of two main ideas: first, that our moral faculties
are a product of Darwinian forces working over a long period of time, and second, that this
genealogical history makes it so that we have no reason to think our moral beliefs are true. Thus,
even if there are mind-independent moral truths, evolution ensures that we can have no
knowledge of them.
This conclusion is unacceptable to moral realists. While the debunking challenge does
not actually demonstrate that moral realism is false, it does present the serious threat of
skepticism with regard to moral beliefs. As we saw in the previous chapter, most debunking
arguments target moral realism, resulting in skepticism toward all moral beliefs. Just to be clear,
the debunking challenge argues that if moral realism is true, then we can have no knowledge of
moral truths. This chapter will examine the responses of moral realists to this challenge.
Defending Moral Realism
Moral Realism Defined
One issue that demands attention at this point is what exactly we mean by moral realism.
Some writers give detailed, precise definitions, while others are more general. One widely-cited
definition comes from Shafer-Landau, who defines moral realism as “the tripartite view that (i)
sincere moral judgments express beliefs, rather than conative attitudes; (ii) some of these beliefs
are true; and (iii) such beliefs, when true, are not true by virtue of being the object of, or being
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implied by, the attitudes of (even idealized) agents.”318 It is worth mentioning as a side note that
based on this understanding, traditional theistic ethics would not qualify as a form of realism if it
depends upon God’s attitudes in any way. Theists might therefore qualify Shafer-Landau’s third
criterion somewhat to specify that moral truths are independent of the attitudes of human agents.
Clarke-Doane gives a similar set of three conditions for moral realism (or realism in any given
domain), but also adds a fourth, namely that statements from a given domain “should be
interpreted literally.”319 This avoids a situation in which statements are “reinterpreted as being,
for example, only conditional claims about what follows from a given framework or theory.”320
Of these criteria, the one most universally recognized as defining realism is that of attitude- or
stance-independence.321
These definitions provide a good starting point for understanding the “realism” in moral
realism. However, it leaves somewhat open what is meant by “moral.” In chapter two we looked
at Joyce’s understanding of “practical clout,” as well as Street’s view of “uncompromising
normative realism.” Both of these views see moral truths, if they exist, in terms of categorical
reasons, and thus as having binding authority upon all rational, moral agents. Any answer to the
debunking challenge which is not able to vindicate morality in this sense, even if it can still
fulfill the criteria listed above for being realist, may be questionable as a form of moral realism.
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As we will see, in some cases the disagreement between debunkers and realists turns on the
understanding of moral realism that is being employed.
Naturalism, Non-naturalism, and “Robust” Realism
Some definitions of moral realism include non-naturalism in the definition. Enoch, for
example, defines “Robust Realism” as the view that “there are irreducibly, non-naturalist
normative truths, response-independent truths that are perfectly objective and that are not
reducible to—not even identical with—natural, not-obviously-normative truths.”322 Baras builds
on this, writing that “robust moral realism” includes the idea that moral properties are sui generis
and that “moral facts are never fully grounded in non-moral facts.”323 The general consensus is
that moral naturalism is better equipped to handle EDAs than moral non-naturalism. Street
observes that, “Since value naturalists construe evaluative facts as natural facts with causal
powers, it is much more comprehensible how grasping such facts could have had an impact on
reproductive success.”324 This relates to the reason given by debunkers as to why EDAs do not
undermine perceptual beliefs – namely, because there is clearly an evolutionary advantage in
being able to accurately ascertain truths about threats in one’s physical environment. Street,
Joyce, and several other debunkers do give special attention to moral naturalism in their
arguments. However, their primary target is what is sometimes referred to as “robust” moral
realism, which by some definitions at least is incompatible with moral naturalism.
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One question in this debate is what the target of EDAs is. Street is quite explicit that her
argument targets “robust” normative realism, which includes both the ideas of attitudeindependence and something like binding authority on all moral agents. That is, if moral realism
is true, then everyone has a reason to do whatever it is that is stipulated by these independent
moral truths. Perhaps the important question is what is the view of morality among the general
populace, people who are not moral philosophers, and how do EDAs affect that? Dworkin refers
to this as the “face-value” view of morality, which he defends against what he calls
“archidmedean” skepticism that “concedes objective truth to ‘descriptive’ claims, including
mathematical ones, but denies it to ‘evaluative’ – moral or ethical or interpretive or aesthetic –
ones.”325 While Dworkin’s defense does not specifically respond to evolutionary arguments, as
we will see his critique of limited skepticism of values is relevant to the argument.
One part of his argument that merits consideration in the present context is the following:
Dworkin argues that second-order statements about moral truths are, in fact, simply restatements
of the original claim. For example, there is the statement that “genocide in Bosnia is wrong,” and
additional statements such as that the claim that genocide is wrong is true, and that it is
objectively true.326 Dworkin goes to some length to show that there is no sensible way to
interpret the last two statements as anything other than a restatement of the original claim in
supposedly neutral language which does not itself contain any value judgements, but which in
fact does.327 If this is correct, then the idea of “robust” moral realism is just the plain,
commonsense view of morality that ordinary language users have. The reason why this is
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important is that some attempts at undermining debunking arguments do so by redefining moral
realism in such a way that it loses the essential features of this commonsense (or “face-value”)
morality. It is also important because debunkers themselves sometimes seek to salvage morality
by understanding it in antirealist terms as we have already noticed. But Dworkin argues that “If
anyone is persuaded to give up the face-value view of morality, he must surrender morality along
with it.”328 The implication of this statement, which will be unpacked further in this chapter and
the next, is that one cannot save one’s first-order moral beliefs from skepticism simply by
revising the status of those beliefs.329
The Argument from Overreach
Perhaps one of the most notable vulnerabilities of EDAs is the question of whether the
skepticism of the debunker can be limited to moral truths alone without undermining other
domains of knowledge which are needed to support the EDA itself, such as logic. This argument
was touched on briefly in chapter one. The argument is about whether EDAs would also
eliminate knowledge in other domains besides morality, and, if so, what the implication of that is
for the argument. Other domains frequently discussed in the literature include
perceptual/empirical beliefs, mathematical beliefs, and logical beliefs. This can also be
formulated as an argument about a priori beliefs in general, with moral beliefs constituting one
type of a priori belief.
Two complications in this discussion concern the status of a priori knowledge in general,
and particularly the status of mathematical beliefs. Not all philosophers agree on mathematical
realism, or on whether other kinds of a priori beliefs (such as logical beliefs) are objectively true
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as opposed to being a construct. In addition, mathematical and logical truths are often thought of
as necessary truths. Thus, it is complicated to assess whether EDAs undermine knowledge in
these areas, as it depends on whether moral beliefs are viewed as a kind of a priori knowledge,
and whether some or all moral beliefs are held to be necessarily true. Thus, the least complicated
domain to consider is that of perceptual beliefs. Virtually everyone accepts realism with regard
to the physical world, and virtually everyone agrees that empirical truths are not necessary truths.
Because of this we will begin the discussion with perceptual beliefs.
Perceptual Beliefs
Street explains why her debunking argument doesn’t work against beliefs about our
physical environment. She writes, “consider truths about a creature’s manifest surroundings – for
example, that there is a fire raging in front of it, or a predator rushing toward it. It is perfectly
clear why it tends to promote reproductive success for a creature to grasp such truths: the fire
might burn it to a crisp; the predator might eat it up.”330 This is problematic for non-naturalists,
argues Street, because there is no clear advantage in terms of survival in being able to grasp
mind-independent evaluative truths, like the kinds of empirical truths that Street alludes to.331
Street suggests that value naturalists might have a stronger case than non-naturalists for positing
that knowledge of evaluative truths could have survival value, since value naturalists consider
evaluative facts to be a class of natural facts. However, Street contends that there isn’t any good
explanation for how these special natural facts promote survival and reproduction or what
exactly they are.332
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Shafer-Landau believes he has an answer as a non-naturalist to this line of argument. He
maintains that “We can know that adaptive perceptual practices are also reliable ones only if we
already have a sense of which perceptual judgments are true and which are false. We can tell that
dispositions to hold false perceptual beliefs are likely to be maladaptive only if we can identify
some false perceptual beliefs, show that they tend to undermine fitness and make inferences from
those cases.”333 By the same logic, Shafer-Landau argues that we can only know if false moral
beliefs are maladaptive if we can identify particular beliefs as false and show how they are
maladaptive, which would also imply that we can identify some true moral beliefs.334
Shafer-Landau’s objection, however, fails to hit the mark. The debunker’s argument is
not that false moral beliefs are maladaptive; rather, it’s that holding certain moral beliefs would
still be adaptive even if they were false and conversely that certain moral beliefs would be
maladaptive even if they were true. In other words, the issue is that there is no relation between
the truth of moral beliefs and their adaptiveness. The same cannot be said for perceptual beliefs.
Consider the over-used example of a tiger. If one fails to accurately perceive a live tiger in one’s
vicinity, that person will be much less likely to survive and reproduce than the person whose
relevant faculties are accurate. On the other hand, take a moral belief like “one should care for
one’s own offspring.” Even if there is no corresponding fact of the matter that one should do this,
doing it will improve the chances of one’s genetic material propagating. Furthermore, believing
that this is an overriding imperative will increase the chances that one will do it. The problem
with mistaken perceptual beliefs is that the objects of those beliefs, if they are real, present an
immediate danger from an evolutionary standpoint. With moral beliefs, there is no such danger
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presented by the objects of those beliefs even if they are real. One might argue that falsely
believing some physical danger is present when it is not would not necessarily be maladaptive, in
which case false positives in perceptual terms are not so bad. False negatives, on the other hand,
are potentially fatal.
Karl Schafer argues that perceptual faculties do enjoy one advantage over our normative
faculties, namely, that the explanation of the origin of our normative faculties “does not, on its
own, imply anything about their reliability,”335 whereas with our perceptual faculties, this may
not be the case.336 The key difference is that the development of normative faculties does not
include any reference to normative facts, which, as Schafer notes, is also the case with matters of
taste.337 While Schafer grants that this could be construed as a reason for more confidence in the
reliability of our perceptual faculties, he ultimately rejects this as mistaken, concluding that the
arguments of the debunkers fail. Schafer argues that this is because we must rely on our
perceptual faculties even in assessing the evidence for evolution, so the only way to vindicate our
perceptual faculties via evolution is if we are entitled a priori to take them as reliable. The result
is what he calls a kind of “reflective endorsement.”338 But, if we allow our normative faculties
the same a priori entitlement to reliability, argues Schafer, then we will find that our normative
faculties pass the same sort of reflective endorsement test when comparing what Schafer calls the
best explanation of our normative faculties with “our best normative theory.”339
There are several problems with Schafer’s argument. One of the most obvious is that the
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concept of what constitutes “our best normative theory” is controversial to say the least, and
Schafer gives only a few hints as to what this might look like. First, he doesn’t indicate who the
“our” refers to, but presumably it refers to contemporary academic philosophers, since that is his
target audience. In that case, “our best normative theory” would equate to something like, “the
normative theory most preferred by contemporary moral philosophers.” Secondly, “best” is a
normative term, and it goes almost without saying that a great many people – in fact, likely most
people if one includes all of human history and cultures – will have significant points of
disagreement with Schafer about what is the “best” normative theory. Thus, Schafer’s reflective
endorsement test begins by tacitly assuming a particular set of substantive moral claims and
comparing those with the deliverances of our normative faculties, which is clearly a questionbegging argument.
Schafer might respond to the objection above by saying that perceptual faculties beg the
question in the exact same way, in that it begins by assuming what our “best” scientific
explanation for the origins of our perceptual faculties is and so must make a substantive
normative claim in making the argument. But this is again to miss the point in much the same
way that Shafer-Landau’s argument does. The question is what is the case given that Darwinian
evolution is true. The debunker makes the same assumption both for our normative faculties and
for our perceptual faculties, and thus is not begging any question. The issue is whether the
debunker’s argument undermines perceptual knowledge in the same way that it purports to
undermine moral/normative knowledge. Schafer’s argument aims at a different target, by
showing that the debunker’s argument does not answer a deeper and more pervasive kind of
skepticism. This is an important question to be addressed later, but it does not directly answer the
challenge posed by debunkers toward moral knowledge, given that Darwinian evolution is taken
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as true.
There are other serious problems with Schafer’s argument as well. For example, in his
discussion of our normative faculties Schafer talks about feelings of disgust, tracking pain of
ourselves and others, and reciprocity relations. 340 He argues that reflection will lead us to the
conclusion that feelings of disgust do not actually have normative significance, while the other
two faculties he mentions do.341 Again, there is no indication of who is included in the “we,” but
since Schafer is writing for academic philosophers we can assume this is who it refers to. In
other words, of the three normative faculties that Schafer mentions, he considers one of them to
be largely unreliable. He gives no explanation, however, as to why we should consider our other
normative faculties reliable when one of them, by his own admission, is not. If one or more of
our perceptual faculties was generally unreliable, one might think that would be a troubling
phenomenon in need of explanation. But if the explanation is that evolution has equipped us with
feelings of disgust for reasons related to adaptiveness rather than correspondence with moral
truth342, then that seems like a reason to think that our other normative faculties can also be
explained that way. As we have seen in the previous chapters, pain and reciprocity are, in fact,
used as examples of evolutionary adaptations.
Furthermore, Schafer’s argument is problematic in that he at first denies that rational
reflection can save realists from the debunker’s challenge, but then later relies on exactly that
device for a crucial step in his own argument. Schafer agrees with Street’s argument (which we
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looked at in chapter two) that higher-level reasoning and reflection, using the materials provided
by “our basic normative responses to certain sorts of stimuli,” will not help the realist in
ascertaining normative truth.343 However, just two pages later, while arguing about the reliability
of our normative faculties, Schafer writes that, “our reactions of disgust are highly sensitive to
what we might call ‘cleanliness’ or ‘purity’—factors that most of us, upon reflection [emphasis
added], do not regard as significant in many cases.”344 The problem, as Schafer himself has
already pointed out, is that our reflection can only be based on other normative judgments which
themselves are produced by our normative faculties, which we take to override these feelings of
disgust. But if these other normative judgments are also contaminated by distorting influences,
that is of no use in attaining true normative beliefs.
With respect to the question at hand, there appears to be no good reason for thinking that
EDAs overreach by undermining perceptual beliefs in addition to moral beliefs. The debunker
can show that there is reason to think that, if evolution is true, then natural selection would select
for reliable perceptual faculties, whereas the same cannot be said for reliable moral or normative
faculties. The issue becomes murkier, however, when it comes to other domains such as
mathematics and logic.
Mathematical Beliefs
Joyce argues that a faculty for simple mathematical beliefs, which appears to be innate in
the same way as with moral beliefs, would be of no use if it produced false beliefs. “Suppose you
are being chased by three lions, you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is now
safe to slow down. The truth of ‘1 + 1 = 2’ is a background assumption to any reasonable
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hypothesis of how this belief might have come to be innate.”345 Thus, he argues that his
genealogical critique of moral beliefs would not have an adverse effect on the status of at least
these beliefs.346 One initial response might be that it is questionable how many people engage in
this kind of arithmetical calculation in such circumstances. Other creatures, which seem to lack
any mathematical faculties at all, still seem to be able to evade predators. One might wonder why
evolution would invest in such an inefficient mechanism to do the same job that is done in
animals that lack mathematical faculties by more direct methods.
Sinnott-Armstrong echoes the point made by Joyce, arguing that, while the evolutionary
explanation of moral beliefs works even if there are no moral facts, people would not have
survived if they believed that 2 + 3 = 4.347 He may be thinking of a similar scenario to the one
postulated by Joyce in which being mistaken about the number of predators one must evade can
have deadly consequences, but he does not give any reason for his conclusion. As we will see,
however, the problem facing debunkers in this regard may go deeper.
Morton provides a more sophisticated argument as to why mathematical beliefs are not
debunked by EDAs but moral beliefs are. His analysis is based on what he calls probabilistic
independence, which is when the probability that we believe some proposition P is independent
of the truth of P.348 In the context of his larger argument, this relates to when a realist response to
skeptical challenges begs the question, in particular as it relates to third-factor accounts which
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will receive extended treatment below. Morton argues that if one assumes some substantive,
first-order beliefs in a given domain, but gives no explanation as to why we ended up with
reliable faculties for those beliefs, then it is question-begging.349 The condition which he
proposes that must be met by debunkers (including himself) is that beliefs within the domain
must be probabilistically independent of their truth in order to vindicate the relevant faculties. In
other words, we must be more likely to hold the belief if it is true than if it is false.350
We have already seen how this can be accomplished by debunkers in the domain of
perception. If there is a dangerous predator within striking distance, we are more likely to
survive if we believe that to be the case than if we do not. Thus, evolution will select for faculties
which form the relevant belief. In that case, by Morton’s analysis, the perceptual belief is not
probabilistically independent of the belief which is formed from reliance on perception. The
difficulty with mathematical beliefs (as well as logical beliefs), according to Morton, is that
mathematical and logical beliefs are necessarily true. The result of this is that the probability of
the truth of the relevant belief does not affect the probability that we will believe it, since it is
impossible for the belief to be false. He further argues that this is not the case with moral beliefs,
based on his conclusion that not all moral beliefs are necessarily true. Because of that, Morton
argues that mathematical and logical truths are trivially probabilistically independent of their
truth, whereas moral beliefs are so non-trivially.351
So, while Morton does see a problem for realism with respect to mathematical and logical
beliefs, it is a broader problem of skepticism generally rather than the evolutionary problem of
moral beliefs. It should also be noted that Morton’s analysis applies to realists who hold that
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moral beliefs are causally impotent. His argument allows that moral naturalists might be able to
escape the charge of begging the question in replies to EDAs.352 The problem of begging the
question will be examined more fully below as well.
It is not clear, however, that Morton can successfully carve out this special exemption for
mathematical and logical beliefs that is distinct from moral beliefs. Morton admits that, while
some moral beliefs are contingent, beliefs about fundamental moral principles are not.353
Examples of moral beliefs which are contingently true include things like beliefs “about whether
Hillary is a good person or whether we ought to donate to relief efforts for the latest
hurricane.”354 In order to make his exemption for mathematics and logic work, Morton specifies
that “we have to understand mathematical truths such that they do not include truths like ‘There
are more than 10 words in this paper’—and similarly for logic.”355 In other words, he ensures
that mathematical and logical truths only include fundamental principles rather than contingent
truths with a mathematical/logical component, but includes contingent truths in his taxonomy of
moral beliefs. Because of this, fundamental moral principles are left untouched by his own
argument. So even if contingent moral beliefs like the ones he offers are non-trivially
probabilistically independent of their truth value, fundamental moral principles (if they are
necessarily true, which Morton grants) are not. Morton fails to account for this in his final
analysis, but instead lumps all moral beliefs together in debunking them. However, if Morton
were to treat mathematical/logical beliefs and moral beliefs the same way (either by excising
contingent truths uniformly across the board or including them uniformly), then the distinction
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he makes would disappear. Either they are all non-trivially probabilistically independent or none
of them are (the question of whether moral truths are necessarily true is a separate one which will
be addressed below, but realists sometimes use this as an escape route around the debunking
argument).
Clarke-Doane argues that if moral realism falls to EDAs, so does mathematical realism.
Clarke-Doane’s argument has two parts – first, that the argument that our faculties would not be
selected for true moral beliefs also shows that they would not be selected for true mathematical
beliefs, and second, that the assumption that moral truths could be very different also show that
mathematical truths could be very different.356
With respect to the former argument, Clarke-Doane challenges the arguments of
debunkers like Joyce and Street. Clarke-Doane maintains that their argument depends on the
assumption that “if we must presuppose the contents of beliefs of a kind, D, in any evolutionary
explanation of our having those beliefs, then we were selected to have true D-beliefs.”357
However, Clarke-Doane believes this assumption is doubtful, arguing for example that, while we
likely need to assume the truth of elementary logical beliefs in an evolutionary explanation of
having those beliefs, “the question of whether we were selected to have true elementary logical
beliefs seems to be very much open.”358 Rather than presenting an argument for this, ClarkeDoane simply gives a reference with arguments for and against this idea.359 With respect to
EDAs, however, it is precisely the point of the argument that, if our faculties weren’t selected for
true beliefs in a given domain, then having reliable faculties would be something like a massive
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coincidence. What the anti-debunker needs to provide is an argument that this is not the case –
that, even if our faculties in a given domain were not preferred by natural selection, there is some
explanation for why they are reliable. Clarke-Doane’s objection amounts to little more than
suggesting that there is a still a logical possibility of having reliable faculties in elementary logic
and mathematics even given the debunkers’ arguments. But this is not in question, so the
objection is moot. None of the debunking arguments that we have examined argue against the
logical possibility of reliable moral faculties, but rather that it is enormously improbable.
Clarke-Doane also argues that, “In order to argue that we would be evolutionarily
selected to have true mathematical beliefs, one must argue, on the basis of evolutionary
considerations, that had the mathematical truths been very different, our mathematical beliefs
would have been correspondingly different.”360 This, however, appears to be a mistake. It
assumes that our current mathematical beliefs are largely correct and largely correspond to mindindependent truths, which is the very question under dispute. Thus, it is a question-begging
argument. What the argument actually needs to show is that our beliefs would correspond with
truth, regardless of what the truth is. For the sake of the argument, for all we know our current
mathematical beliefs are all wrong, but there was some evolutionary advantage in thinking them
to be right. With respect to mathematics, this seems like an implausible assumption, which is
why Clarke-Doane tacitly assumes that our current beliefs are largely correct. He also points out
later in his paper that disagreements about certain mathematical axioms almost always come
down to arguments about mathematical realism, which is a controversial topic among
philosophers.361 Clarke-Doane is, after all, mainly trying to show that arguments for
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mathematical realism and moral realism are on a par, so that “there would seem to be no
epistemological ground on which to be a moral antirealist and a mathematical realist.”362
One final important point made by Clarke-Doane has to do with the kinds of examples
that are used by debunkers to support the reliability of our mathematical faculties. He argues that
it is not the mathematical truths which are evolutionarily adaptive, but rather that there are firstorder logical truths about our surroundings that correspond with arithmetical truths such as
1+1=2 with respect to counting lions or other predators.363 Clarke-Doane concludes that, “What
matters, as in the case of elementary arithmetic, is how such creatures’ mathematical beliefs ‘line
up with’ truths about their environments. If the physical world appropriately aligns with their
mathematical beliefs, it does not matter whether the mathematical world does too.”364 This is an
intriguing argument in its own right, and suggests that there could be a sort of “cosmic
coincidence” in the alignment between the physical world and the mathematical world, akin to
the kind of cosmic coincidence which debunkers argue would be necessary for moral truths to
line up with our evolved moral faculties. That argument, however, is outside the scope of this
dissertation. The important point to note is that Clarke-Doane’s argument calls into question the
argument from debunkers that their arguments can be limited to the moral domain without
spilling over into other areas. Even if perception is still safe from debunking, mathematical
beliefs may well not be. Logical beliefs may also be in danger of falling prey to debunking, but
more work would be needed to show that.
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Overreach and the “Plantingian Pickle”
Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) uses evolutionary
considerations to undermine belief in naturalism based on a similar line of reasoning to EDAs.
However, in Plantinga’s argument, the conjunction of naturalism and evolutionary theory
undermines not just our moral faculties, but our cognitive faculties in general, and thus
undermines belief in naturalism. Crow argues that the reasoning used by Street is parallel to
Plantinga’s argument, and that if Street’s argument is successful she should be committed to
theism. Since this would contradict her own argument against moral realism, Street’s argument is
defeated by her own line of reasoning.365
There are, however, problems with Crow’s argument. Street’s argument against
normative realism does not directly address the existence of God. As we saw in chapter two,
Street has something like a theoretical argument in favor of normative antirealism which simply
assumes that God does not exist. Street does have a separate argument against the existence of
God which will be dealt with in chapter five. But she curiously omits from her Darwinian
dilemma any consideration of what would be the case if God did exist. Crow himself argues that
there are two ways to avoid skepticism in the face of a “cosmic coincidence” type of argument.
He writes, “One way is to embrace anti-realism – by claiming that the facts are (in some sense)
projections of our cognitive faculties. The other way is to accept the theological conviction that
God has engineered the coincidence between our beliefs and the stance-independent facts.”366 So
why can’t Street accept the second option? Crow gives no reason for this, he simply calls
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attention to the fact that Street takes the position of antirealism. However, I will argue in chapter
four that antirealism is not an escape from skepticism at all, but rather an acceptance of
skepticism with a sort of rhetorical camouflage. In that case, Crow’s own argument points to
theism rather than to antirealism.
It seems to be an assumption of many realist responses to EDAs that if EDAs do in fact
overreach into domains such as mathematics and logic, this would constitute a refutation of the
argument. As we have seen above, debunkers like Joyce also believe this to be the case (although
in Joyce’s case he believes his EDA can be restricted to morality). But why is this the case? The
most that such an argument from overreach can show is that there is a tension between
naturalistic evolutionary theory and certain domains of knowledge. By itself, the argument says
nothing about how to resolve such a tension. This issue will come to the forefront in chapter five,
but one way to resolve the problem is that suggested by Plantinga, which is to give up belief in
naturalism.367 This is not to say that the argument from overreach should be considered settled
one way or the other. The debate is still very much a live one, but it is far from clear that
debunkers can limit their argument to the moral domain.
Third Factor Arguments
Several realist arguments against EDAs fall under a category collectively known as “third
factor” arguments. These arguments aim to circumvent the skeptical conclusion of EDAs by
proposing that, rather than selecting for true moral beliefs directly, evolution selects for true
moral beliefs indirectly by means of a third factor which is correlated both to survival and
reproduction and to moral truth. How this is supposed to work depends upon the particular factor
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which is utilized. There are several third factor arguments in the literature. The examples to be
examined here include those by Wielenberg, Enoch, Behrends, Skarsaune, Vavova, and Brosnan.
Wielenberg and Rights
Wielenberg’s attempt at refuting EDAs is based on the notion that belief in a “moral
barrier” that surrounds us enhances fitness from an evolutionary standpoint by motivating us to
resist behavior from others that would decrease our evolutionary fitness.368 This explains why
evolution would select for creatures with a propensity to believe in a moral barrier for
themselves and their close kin, although Wielenberg recognizes that there is a problem with this
explanation for non-kin.369 His solution to this is what he calls a “likeness principle,” by which
creatures infer that things which are alike in their known properties are also alike in their
unknown properties.370 Wielenberg argues that this principle is fitness-enhancing when it comes
to knowing what sorts of food to eat, and when applied to the moral realm causes us to infer that
other people have moral barriers the same way that we do.371 In this way, Wielenberg tries to
explain how evolution could select for such a moral tendency even though it may not be fitnessenhancing itself.372
Granting that Wielenberg’s argument for belief in the rights of others is at least plausible,
there remains the need to explain having actual rights. Wielenberg argues that in order to form a
belief that one has certain rights, one must have the capacity to have a concept of rights.
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Moreover, if rights exist at all, they are founded on having certain cognitive faculties which are
the ones required to form beliefs about rights (or are closely related), meaning that if you think
you have moral barriers (or rights), then you do actually have them.373 Wielenberg concludes
that, “The very cognitive faculties that lead such beings to believe that they possess moral
barriers also entail the presence of those very barriers.”374
There are at least two problems with Wielenberg’s argument at this point. One is his
statement that, “assuming that rights are real, the processes that ultimately generate, say, the
belief that one has a right not to be tortured just for fun are significantly reliable, at least with
respect to beliefs of the relevant type.”375 The problem here is that it is a patently questionbegging argument to begin with the assumption that rights are real, since that is part of the
question that is in dispute. Debunking arguments generally allow that moral realism is true in
order to show that there is no evolutionary explanation as to how our beliefs line up with moral
truths. Wielenberg assumes that a belief such as “I have a right not to be tortured just for fun” is
one of those moral truths. He claims later in his paper that the coincidence between belief in
moral rights and having rights might be explained by a combination of the laws of nature and
“the existence of certain supervenience relationships.”376 He further contends that this is just a
brute fact with no further explanation.377 It seems unlikely that any debunker would be impressed
by this kind of argument.
A second problem has to do with the basis for his claim that thinking you have rights
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entails that you do have rights. Wielenberg’s argument for this is very thin indeed. He writes at
one point that, “While there are various theories about the foundation of rights, it is widely
agreed that if rights exist at all, their presence is guaranteed by the presence of certain cognitive
faculties.”378 For this statement, he cites an article by Zechenter along with the statement that he
(Wielenberg) is “proposing only a sufficient condition for the possession of a moral barrier, not a
necessary condition.”379 A closer look at Zechenter’s article, however, belies Wielenberg’s
argument. Zechenter gives three major theories that have been used to justify universal human
rights.380 Of the three, only rationalism comes close to Wielenberg’s position, in that it holds that
rights are derived from “the universal capacity of all humans to think rationally.”381 This is in
contrast to natural law theory, which holds that rights are “granted to all individuals by God or
Providence,”382 and positivism, which bases human rights on the worldwide acceptance in
modern nation states of laws and treaties concerning human rights.383 Zechenter writes that,
“Both rationalism and natural law theory are often combined in the modern human rights
discourse and take the form of claims that universal human rights exist independent of culture,
ideology, or value systems.”384 But this is highly problematic for Wielenberg’s position, since it
is not rationalism alone that is the basis for rights. In order to arrive at mind-independence, one
would conclude from reading Zechenter that natural law theory with its appeal to God or
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Providence must be included.
It is questionable if a rationalistic view of rights alone would even qualify as realist, since
it bases rights on our cognitive abilities, and thus most plausibly on our evaluative attitudes. If
moral truth depends upon having a particular attitude toward moral truth, it can hardly be
considered to be attitude- or stance-independent. Thus, Wielenberg’s theory is not only questionbegging, it is hard to see how it qualifies as a realist view except with a very strained definition
of realism. Rationalism alone would indicate that rights are relative, and depend upon one’s
cognitive ability. In fact, Zechenter’s entire paper is an argument against relativism. Applying
positivism to Wielenberg’s theory would produce a kind of constructivism, in that it would
suggest that rights depend upon the attitudes of people who have made these international
agreements. Debunkers like Street would have no problem with such a view, except that they
would not consider it realist in any kind of robust way.
At one point, Wielenberg cites the example of an icon made by a Quaker abolition
society in the eighteenth century that depicts a slave in shackles along with the words “Am I not
a man and a brother?”385 Wielenberg’s point has to do with the importance of recognizing others
as having the same kind of moral barriers as oneself. Wielenberg’s use of this, however, is
problematic. Quaker thinking about the common rights of slaves was based not on the possession
of certain cognitive abilities, but rather on Christian theology which teaches that all humans are
created in the image of God. The rationale behind the Quaker icon is not some “likeness
principle” such as that proposed by Wielenberg, even if he can artificially construe it that way.
Also, even Wielenberg admits that all major civilizations have treated out-groups as not having
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the same rights as insiders.386 Thus the genealogical explanation that Wielenberg proposes
appears to not only be nothing more than a just so story, it is also contradicted by the historical
evidence which Wielenberg himself presents. As we saw in chapter one, in-group/out-group
thinking is much more easily accounted for by evolutionary theory than the idea of universal
human rights. Wielenberg’s idea of a likeness principle applied to the moral realm seems like a
post hoc rationalization rather than an example of people using the same cognitive mechanism
that recognizes edible, as opposed to poisonous, foods and applying it to the realm of morality.
Enoch’s (Godless) Pre-established Harmony
One highly influential third factor argument is that of Enoch. To set the stage, Enoch
argues that the best way to understand the debunking challenge is in terms of explaining the
correlation between normative truths and normative judgments.387 He illustrates this with an
analogy of someone holding a number of beliefs about a village in Nepal which turned out to be
true. We would expect some explanation of this correspondence, without which it would be “too
miraculous to believe.”388 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Enoch’s view of robust
moral realism holds that normative truths are non-natural and response-independent, and so are
causally inert.389 This makes it particularly challenging to explain how we could come to have
knowledge of them using faculties with a naturalistic, evolutionary genealogy.
One problem with Enoch’s analogy of the Nepalese village should be noted at the outset.
With regard to a person’s claims about a particular village, we could discover whether or not the
claims were true by investigating ourselves – either by going to the village to find out or by
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asking people who had been there or were from there. With moral knowledge, we are left with
no such method of verification. A better analogy would be if the person made claims about a
colony of beings on a planet in a distant galaxy, call them Andromedans. Since we have no way
to independently verify claims about Andromedans and no explanation for how the person could
have gained such knowledge, we would conclude that the claims were false even absent proof
that they were false.390
Before proposing his own solution to the challenge, Enoch makes what he calls two
methodological remarks.391 The first has to do with finding the best explanation by what Enoch
calls “scoring points in an explanatory game.”392 While a brute, unexplained coincidence might
lose points for the realist, it doesn’t necessarily refute realism, but rather means that “we should
opt for the best metaethical theory, the one that—perhaps among other desiderata—best explains
whatever needs explaining.”393 Keep in mind that Enoch’s preferred explanation is nonnaturalist, but also non-theist (hence the “godless” in his theory394). But, says Enoch, the
correlation between our beliefs and the moral truths isn’t that striking because “We are not, after
all, that good in forming and revising our normative beliefs.”395 To illustrate this, Enoch writes
in a footnote, “Consider the false but seemingly evolutionarily useful ‘The interests of others
with whom we have no privileged genetic of reciprocal relations do not count at all,’ and ‘The
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interests of non-human animals do not count at all’.”396 Enoch appeals to the Nepalese village
illustration in arguing this point, suggesting that it would be as if a person made claims about the
village which were true more often than would be expected by guessing, but only by a little.397
But notice that this requires that we can verify how many of the beliefs are true, which Enoch
can’t do for normative beliefs without begging the question.
Again, our Andromedan illustration above is more suitable here. We can’t say, “the
accuracy of this person’s claims about Andromedans is only a little bit better than if she was
guessing,” because we are not in a position to say any such thing. Enoch assumes these beliefs he
mentions to be false and hence an example of a poor correlation, but he isn’t entitled to that
assumption since that is the very point in dispute. Very likely all of his readers will agree with
him that these moral beliefs are false, but that is irrelevant. The debunker argues that we don’t
know if there is any correlation between our moral beliefs and moral truth. For Enoch to argue
that the correlation isn’t that great is thus from the debunker’s perspective overly generous to the
realist.
Enoch’s second point about score keeping for explanations is that, as long as the starting
points of our normative beliefs are not too far off, our other reasoning mechanisms should be
able to get us closer to the normative truth.398 As we saw in chapter two, however, Street’s
argument is that there is no starting point from which rational deliberation can begin to work and
separate true beliefs from false.399 Before presenting his own third factor argument, Enoch has
already made some assumptions about moral beliefs as we saw above by assuming that our
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beliefs are in general reasonably close to the truth, even if not much better than someone could
get by guessing. But this presumes some moral knowledge to start with.
Enoch’s argument, then, is that he just has to rack up more explanatory points on the
whole than other metaethical views, including Street’s constructivism, preferably by avoiding
simply calling it a fluke.400 To do this, he proposes what he calls a “pre-established harmony”
between evolutionary forces and normative truths by proposing that we assume that survival and
reproductive success are “at least somewhat good.”401 Enoch argues that it need not be the case
that the survival and reproductive success of all creatures are good, since “some creatures just do
not have interests, and so presumably nothing is good for them.”402 As for creatures like us and
our ancestors, Enoch suggests, “the claim that their survival and reproductive success is of value
gains much plausibility, I think, from the observation that survival (or some such) is at the very
least good for the creature surviving, or for a close group of relatives, or something of this
kind.”403
This is a questionable starting point for the moral realist. Enoch specifies that survival is
good for the creature surviving, providing that the creature has an interest in its own survival. For
creatures with no interests, nothing is good. It seems questionable that this will qualify as
robustly realist, or even as realist at all. Rather than a mind-independent truth, Enoch has settled
for a starting point which depends entirely upon the attitude of the creature who values it. Thus,
even Enoch’s starting point is mind-dependent. Street would have no problem at all affirming
that survival is good for the creature that values survival. In fact, that is the entire basis for her
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antirealist view, that values did not exist until creatures who valued came to exist. Survival can
be good for a creature who values survival without “survival is pro tanto good” being a mindindependent truth. Furthermore, the debunker can respond that it is easy to see how evolution
would have selected for the belief that survival is good, even if it is not the case that survival is
good.
Assuming that survival and reproductive success are good (even if only somewhat) looks
patently question-begging. Enoch’s reply is that, for this not to be the case, “The evolutionary
‘aim’ would have had to not be of any value. And how could that be?”404 The answer to that is
that naturalistic evolution is a mindless process. Where would “values” come from? They must
be imported from somewhere else. One might as well argue that a supernova is good since that is
the end toward which stars progress. When evolution is said to have an “aim,” this is purely
metaphorical, which Enoch recognizes by the use of scare quotes. Evolution has no “aim” per se.
Naturalistic evolution is a substitute for teleological explanations, but evolution itself has no
telos. When a person has an aim or a goal, that aim or goal is by definition something that they
value. But with an impersonal process, there is no “aiming” involved, and the process does not
value anything.
Enoch’s argument thus fails to establish a basis for robustly realist normative values that
can stand in the face of the debunking challenge. Chapter four will examine the question of
whether antirealism/constructivism can provide a better explanation. However, Enoch has failed
to take into consideration how a theistic solution might resolve the problem he seeks to solve
with a godless one, and thus fails to consider the full range of metaethical views. We will return
to that question in chapter five. Enoch’s argument has nevertheless been quite influential, as both
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of the next two accounts attempt to build off of it in some way.
Behrends and Our Reasons to Survive
Behrends acknowledges that Enoch’s argument is question-begging in assuming that our
own survival is good.405 However, Behrends believes that Enoch’s approach nevertheless can be
modified in a way that will make for a successful rebuttal of the debunking challenge. Behrends
does endorse Enoch’s strategy of lowering the bar for the amount of correlation needed for a
successful realist explanation, both in terms of how many of our beliefs need to be correct, and
also in terms of only requiring a reasonably good starting point from which further reflection can
begin.406 While this strategy is laudable in attempting to give realists an easier task, as we saw
above both lowering the bar strategies are dubious. The first can only work if we have some way
of ascertaining which beliefs are correct and which are false. This would require a lot more than
begging the question about a single normative belief such as survival being good, but rather on a
whole host of other beliefs. The second strategy of finding a good starting place and working our
way up through the use of reason is really the central point of contention.
Behrends attempts to craft an argument that is based on meta-normative realism, which
he says is parallel to moral realism. He writes, “Just as moral realists take there to be facts about
morality that are stance-independently true, so too do meta-normative realists take there to be
stance-independently true facts about what reasons we have.”407 As we saw in chapter two, Street
targets value realism in general, which encompasses moral realism but is broader in scope.
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Behrends’s argument aims to defend that same target. The argument is based on the proposition
that if meta-normative realism is true, then we have reason to do something or other. Our
continued existence is necessary for us to do anything at all, so if meta-normative realism is true
(which debunkers must grant on pain of begging the question against realism), then we have a
reason to pursue our continued existence.408
Part of Behrends’s argument is that it makes no difference if we do not know the details
of what we have reason to do as long as we know we have reason to do something or other.
Behrends argues that virtually any normative reason will entail that we have reason to pursue our
own continued existence, as long as it entails that we have reason to do something at some future
time.409 One example he gives is having a reason to care for your children for an extended period
of time.410 Of course, this is an appealing argument because most people would affirm the
principle that we ought to care for our own offspring at least until they can take care of
themselves. As we have seen above, however, it is also highly susceptible to debunking, since
there is clearly an evolutionary advantage to such a belief. Behrends’s point, however, is not that
this particular belief is true, since the realist only requires that some belief entailing future
obligation is true, even if we don’t know what it is. He generalizes this into what he calls the “Do
Better” principle.411 This principle holds that “There is a pro tanto reason to make things better
than they are now.”412 Behrends argues that this also gives us a reason to pursue our own
survival (our own persistence as he puts it), since it “will entail that we always have some reason
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to continue acting, unless we have reached the maximally good state of affairs.”413 He contends
that in order to defuse this, the debunker would have to argue that the current state of affairs is
maximally good, which would be almost miraculous if true.414
Using his argument for survival, Behrends then argues that we can gain more knowledge
starting from this, such as having a reason to exercise, avoid danger, and “enter into mutually
advantageous relationships with others.”415 Behrends sees the possibility of building something
like a social contract theory based solely on the survival argument.416 It’s worth noting that
Behrends’s argument depends crucially upon Huemer’s concept of “formal intuitions” which we
discussed in chapter two. Behrends writes, “What is important about formal intuitions is that they
are unlikely to be the results of potentially distorting genealogical influences, such as
evolutionary forces.”417
Behrends considers his own argument to be unsound because it leaves open the
possibility that one’s only reason might be to kill oneself, but he thinks this is so implausible that
it can be discounted.418 However, it is worth giving this a bit more thought. Suppose that
Behrends is correct that we have reason to survive (and thus reason to pursue our own
persistence) so that we might do good. Then suppose that we are in the unhappy position of not
having knowledge of what is good. Behrends has argued that we can at least have reason to do
those things which contribute to our own persistence, but notice that this is an instrumental good
toward the aim of “doing better.” Until we find out exactly what it is that we are persisting to do,
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we don’t know if we are actually making things better or not, or even how to go about it.
Moreover, for all we know we might be making things worse instead of better. And if our life
ends up making things worse instead of better, would we still have reason to pursue our own
persistence? On the contrary, it actually seems like we would have reason to pursue our own
demise, if our life were to end up making things worse instead of better. Behrends’s “Do Better”
principle could be superseded by a “Don’t Do Worse” principle. In that case, Behrends’s idea
that having one’s only reason being to kill oneself might actually not be so implausible after all –
if, that is, we really have no knowledge of what it is that will make things better.
While Behrends argues that virtually any normative reason will give us reason to pursue
our own persistence, the only example he gives is caring for our children for an extended period
of time. Besides its susceptibility to debunking that was noted above, another problem with this
idea is that presumably when we die we are no longer subject to such reasons. One might well
say that a parent has reason to care for her offspring while the parent is alive (at least until the
child can take care of herself), but if the parent dies prematurely, surely that in itself is not a
moral failure on the part of the parent. Behrends’s argument, however, implies that it is.
It seems dubious, then, to speak of having reasons in the future rather than in the present.
Circumstances might change in the future which would also change one’s reasons, so it cannot
be properly said that I have reason now to do something in the future.419 It hardly makes sense to
say that I have a reason to pursue my own persistence when my demise would relieve me of the
very reason which was supposed to be a reason to pursue my persistence to begin with. The most
we could say is that we have reason to care for our offspring now, providing that we can find a
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way to support the intuition that we should care for our offspring. But Behrends fails to provide
that, and so we are left with an intuition which is subject to the debunker’s challenge. Without
knowing what it is that we need to do to make things better, we are also left without a reason to
pursue our own persistence. All of this obscures the fact that the survival instinct is easily
explained by debunkers. It is thus questionable in the end if Behrends’s argument presents any
more of an adequate response to debunkers than Enoch’s.
Skarsaune and Vavova – Pleasure and Pain
Both Skarsaune and Vavova attempt to subvert the debunking challenge by appealing to
the badness of pain, with Skarsaune also postulating the goodness of pleasure as a premise. We
will examine each in turn.
Skarsaune follows after Enoch in calling his own third factor account a pre-established
harmony.420 Skarsaune’s argument is based on the proposition that pleasure is usually good and
pain is usually bad.421 He notes that this is the case for the person experiencing them, and also
that there may be exceptions to this rule (hence “usually”).422 In Skarsaune’s thinking, the preestablished harmony is established by evolution itself. Evolution has a truth-conducive effect on
our beliefs by causing us to value that which is good.423 Skarsaune argues that evolution
“imbues” certain states of affairs with value by making those states pleasurable, while it is an
independent evaluative fact that pleasure is good (at least usually).424 He argues that, “The role
evolution has played is simply making these states of affairs pleasurable. But once evolution has
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done that, the independent evaluative fact ‘kicks in’, as it were, the end result being that these
states of affairs are good.”425
As we saw in chapter two, Street has a pre-emptive argument against using the badness of
pain as the basis for a realist account of value, which she calls the pain dilemma.426 That
argument also applies mutatis mutandis to pleasure being good. Skarsaune presents an attempt at
avoiding Street’s pain dilemma argument by challenging Street’s definition of realism.427 He
takes issue with Street’s contention that realism about values means that evaluative truths are
independent of all of our evaluative attitudes, including “the unreflective, affective responses
involved in pleasures and pains.”428 Skarsaune writes that “Together, this explicit definition of
‘realism’ and implicit definition of ‘evaluative attitudes’ allows Street to impute to realists the
bizarre commitment that, in effect, the evaluative facts are independent of our pleasures and
pains!”429 Skarsaune wants to define realism as holding that evaluative truths are independent of
our beliefs or judgments, but not of our unreflective, affective responses.430
Skarsaune also claims to have quotes from Parfit, Nagel, and Shafer-Landau which
supposedly contradict Street’s definition of realism, and hence showing that leading realist
philosophers are not affected by her argument.431 Upon close examination however, Skarsaune’s
quotes from these other writers are cherry-picked and taken out of context. Part of the problem
appears to be a confusion on Skarsaune’s part. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, moral
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realists (including Shafer-Landau) take it that there are some evaluative truths which are
independent of our attitudes. Certainly no realist would argue that all evaluative truths are mindor stance-independent. But Skarsaune’s argument is all-or-nothing, which might explain why he
thinks the standard realist definition is “bizarre.” It also should be noted that Nagel is on record
as saying that he finds Street’s argument convincing. Nagel writes, “I agree with Sharon Street
that an evolutionary self-understanding would almost certainly require us to give up moral
realism—the natural conviction that our moral judgments are true or false independent of our
beliefs.”432 It’s true that Nagel only talks about beliefs in this passage and not pleasures and
pains, but Nagel does not suggest that Street’s definition of realism is a straw man. Instead, he
uses Street’s dilemma as an argument for ditching evolutionary naturalism, a position we will
examine more closely in chapter five. As for Shafer-Landau, as we saw at the beginning of this
chapter, part of his definition of moral realism includes the proposition that moral beliefs “when
true, are not true by virtue of being the object of, or being implied by, the attitudes of (even
idealized) agents.”433 Skarsaune’s reading of Shafer-Landau would seem to contradict this last
point, assuming that there is a direct connection between our unreflective affective responses and
our attitudes. While this might seem like quibbling, by using a different definition of realism
Skarsaune changes the nature of the entire argument. It is Skarsaune who appears to be out of
step with leading realists, not Street.
Before presenting her own third factor argument based on pain, Vavova acknowledges
the question-begging nature of other third factor accounts such as Wielenberg’s and Enoch’s.434
She writes that, “We do believe that survival is good and that we have rights. But aren’t these
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moral beliefs what is called into question by the debunker’s story?”435 She continues, suggesting
that, “Perhaps we may assume that there are moral truths – though this isn’t obvious. But may
we also make substantial assumptions about the particular contents of those truths? May we
assume, for example, that we have rights, that pain is bad, or survival good? That is less clear,
and gets to the heart of the debate between the realist and the debunker.”436 So how does Vavova
justify starting with the assumption that pain is bad when she rejects Wielenberg’s and Enoch’s
arguments on the basis that they make substantive assumptions about the content of a particular
moral truth? Vavova has this to say: “return to the reason that third-factor responses seemed
question-begging. They begin, recall, with minimal moral assumptions, like that survival is good
or that we have rights. But we can run a third factor explanation with an even less controversial
claim: that pain is bad.”437
This is a head-scratching statement. It appeared as though Vavova’s complaint against
Enoch and Wielenberg was that they made any substantive moral assumptions at all, not that
they made controversial substantive assumptions. Furthermore, how is Enoch’s claim that
survival is pro tanto good any more controversial than “pain is bad”? Vavova makes no attempt
to explain this. Admittedly, she seems to be on firmer ground in this regard when it comes to
Wielenberg’s argument about rights. As we saw above, even the source Wielenberg uses to
justify his rather weak defense of this does not support his central claim that believing we have
rights entails that we do have rights. However, Vavova’s argument begs the same question in the
same way as Enoch’s, even if not Wielenberg’s.
As we have seen, Skarsaune tries to avoid the charge of begging the question by
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redefining realism so that our unreflective affective responses to certain states can serve as a
realist basis for goodness and badness. Vavova notes Skarsaune’s strategy in a footnote, calling it
“interesting” but without passing judgment on it.438 Vavova’s strategy for avoiding the charge of
begging the question is different. She argues that the problem is in allowing the debunker to
claim that morality could be about anything.439 Vavova suggests the we follow Cuneo and
Shafer-Landau, who argue that “some basic moral claims (like the claim that pain is bad) are
conceptual truths: if we don’t have them, we don’t have our concept of morality.”440 Vavova
comments on this saying, “If that is right, then it is not true that morality could be about
anything, and we have some foothold against the debunker.”441
It is difficult to see how a response like this could move the debunker. After all, the
debunker can simply reply that the reason we think certain moral claims are conceptual truths is
because the moral intuitions produced by our evolved faculties tell us that. Joyce makes a similar
point with regard to what he calls a foundationalist view of morality – namely, that “certain
beliefs are epistemically privileged and non-inferentially justified.”442 Joyce writes that,
The fact that morality may seem justified, and that we are deeply reluctant to admit
otherwise, doesn’t make it so, and in fact is itself a phenomenon predicted by the
genealogical hypothesis. It should be an embarrassment to the discipline of philosophy
that its history is crowded with thinkers taking their own parochial, contingent, personal
opinions and, observing that these propositions seem “just obvious,” elevating them to
the status of “self-evident truths.”443
The issue is not whether morality could be about anything, it’s about what reason there is for
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thinking that there is a correspondence between faculties selected for adaptive advantage and
mind-independent moral truths. It is not an answer to that question to simply assert that it’s a
conceptual truth that pain is bad. Also, as we saw in chapter two, Kahane points out in a different
context that “many of our evaluative beliefs about well-being, including the beliefs that pleasure
is good and pain is bad, are some of the most obvious candidates for evolutionary debunking.”444
Vavova also argues that because the burden of proof is on the debunker, the realist need
not worry. Vavova writes, “If we cannot make any substantive assumptions about particular
moral norms, then morality could (conceptually) be about anything. But if morality could be
about anything, then we have no idea what morality is about. So we have no idea if evolutionary
forces would have pushed us toward or away from the truth. So we have no reason to think we
are mistaken.”445 To this Vavova adds that, “The burden here, recall, is on the debunker to give
us reason to think we are in error. It isn’t on us to demonstrate that our beliefs are true. If the
debunker can’t give us reason to think we are wrong, she fails. We might have independent
reasons to worry about skepticism. But the evolutionary debunker hasn’t given us any.”446
This argument might be more convincing if Vavova were to fairly represent Street’s
dilemma and show how it can be refuted. However, like several other realist responses, Vavova
instead creates a different debunking argument and attacks that. Vavova’s reconstruction of
Street’s dilemma is deficient firstly because it only includes the coincidence argument447 which
is part of Street’s first horn. In the first horn of Street’s dilemma, the realist is obliged to accept
that there is no relation between evolutionary forces and independent evaluative truths. But in
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Vavova’s reconstruction, the problem arises purely from the number of possible coherent
normative belief systems of which only one is right, thus making it very low odds that ours is
right with no non-question-begging evidence to support it.448 This, however, is a straw man.
With Street’s first horn, the problem is that our faculties have been developed by a process which
has no relation to the independent evaluative truths, which is why it would be a massive bit of
luck if they coincided. The fact that there are many possible beliefs of which only one is right
does not by itself make an argument for or against anything.
Vavova entirely leaves out the second horn of Street’s dilemma, which is that if there is a
relation between evolution and evaluative truths, then the realist needs to explain how a tracking
account is better than Street’s adaptive link account. Third factor accounts like Vavova’s aim to
split the horns of the dilemma by stipulating that some particular normative belief is true, and it
happens to be a belief that provides an evolutionary advantage. But the initial belief can always
be explained by the debunker using something like Street’s adaptive link account. Essentially,
Vavova’s argument is that if we know what morality is about, then we have a basis for attacking
the debunker. But if have no idea what morality is about, then we are entitled to assume our
beliefs are right. This seems like arguing that we can assume beliefs about Andromedans are
largely correct (see argument under Enoch above). Surely the burden would be on the person
claiming to have knowledge about beings in a distant galaxy rather than the reverse.
Brosnan, Bayes’s Theorem, and Well-Being
Brosnan provides a slightly modified third factor argument which is based on wellbeing.449 Before examining how he attempts to ground this and avoid the critique of debunkers, it
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is worth examining Brosnan’s claim that tracking failures do not necessarily imply that a belief is
probably false.450 Brosnan supports this claim by using the odds form of Bayes’s Theorem.
Brosnan begins with the probability of our belief in a particular proposition p, given that p is true
versus false. He gives this as a ratio of Pr (We believe that p|p) / Pr (We believe that p|not-p).451
If the process which generates the belief is not truth-tracking, then the probability in each case
will be the same, giving a ratio of 1. If the process is truth-tracking, then the ratio of the
probabilities will be greater than 1.452 So far so good. But, says Brosnan, to show that our beliefs
are probably false, it isn’t enough to know the likelihood ratio, we also need to know the ratio of
the prior probabilities of p and not-p. Brosnan argues that assigning prior probabilities to our
moral beliefs has no justifiable basis, so we can’t calculate the ratio of the posterior
probabilities.453
Is that really the case? Think back to Street’s argument about the boat drifting on the
ocean, hoping to reach Bermuda. That argument is based on the plausible assumption that there
are a great many possible evaluative judgments which are false, given value realism, while the
number of true judgments is much smaller. In the same way, there are a great many more
possible destinations on earth besides Bermuda, so a boat drifting on the ocean is much more
likely to arrive somewhere else. If that is true, then the ratio of Pr (p) / Pr (not-p) for any given
evaluative judgment will be extremely bottom-heavy. Furthermore, as Brosnan points out, the
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likelihood ratio of a non-truth-tracking process is exactly 1. Therefore, the ratio of the posterior
probabilities will be exactly equal to the ratio of the priors. The important question, then, is
whether the prior probability of the truth of p is less than 0.5. If it is, then we can say that the
belief is probably false. If the number of possible true evaluative judgments and the number of
possible false evaluative judgments are exactly the same, then the prior probability of p is 0.5.
This, however, seems highly implausible. On the other hand, if the number of possible false
evaluative judgments is higher, then the prior probability of p is less than 0.5. We don’t need an
exact number, we only need to posit (as Street does) that the number of possible false evaluative
judgements exceeds true ones, probably by a very large amount. It is hard to see how that could
not be the case. In any domain of knowledge, there are many more wrong answers than right
ones. If morality is somehow different, why is that the case?
Also, notice that it doesn’t save the realist to argue that moral truths are necessary truths,
because that still doesn’t explain the correspondence between our belief and the necessary truth.
Arguably the solution to x + 1 = 2 is a necessary truth, but there are an infinite number of
possible false values for x.454 And if moral truths are not necessary truths, then the problem is
greater still. If this is correct, then the burden would be on Brosnan to show that there is some
reason for us to think that the number of possible true judgments is greater than or equal to the
number of possible false judgments in the moral domain. That is the only way he can avoid the
conclusion that, with a non-truth-tracking process, our beliefs are probably false. It would be like
having a bin with all possible evaluative judgments in it on a slip of paper, including both true
and false. Assuming the false judgments vastly outnumber the true ones, the probability of a
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given judgment being true – with nothing else to go on – will be very low. If the process that
produced the belief is not truth-tracking in some way, then there is nothing else to go on. We
can’t independently verify the mind-independent truths as we have already seen. Brosnan is
technically correct in his argument that a process which does not track truth does not by itself
imply that our beliefs are probably false. However, if the possible number of false beliefs is
much higher than the number of true ones (which seems to always be the case), then it does
imply that.
Brosnan also disputes Street’s contention that rational reflection cannot help us progress
toward moral truth if our starting beliefs are thoroughly contaminated by evolutionary influence.
Brosnan believes it is still possible to make progress as long as our moral beliefs are not
radically false.455 To illustrate this, he suggests starting with the following two moral judgments:
J1: One ought to help kin, but not members of one’s community who aren’t kin
J2: One ought to help unrelated members of one’s community, but not outsiders456
Brosnan argues that we could reflect on the “kernel of truth” in each belief to arrive at the
conclusion that we should help anyone.457 But notice that this is a patently question-begging
argument. First, each of J1 and J2 is not a single belief, but a conjunction of two beliefs (i.e. J1 can
be formulated as two propositions: “one ought to help kin,” and “one ought not to help members
of one’s community who aren’t kin.”). In each case, one of the beliefs is, Brosnan assumes
(along with his readers no doubt), true, and the other false. But in order to accomplish successful
rational reflection with this, one still has to know (or at least figure out somehow) which part is
true and which false. One could just as easily start with these two propositions and conclude that
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we ought not to help anyone, not even kin. There is no logical reason to reach one conclusion
rather than the other. There is, however, an evolutionary explanation for preferring one to the
other.
In the final part of his argument, Brosnan challenges Street’s contention that evolution
does not track truth. This is where his third factor argument comes into play. For this, Brosnan
relies on a distinction between selection of and selection for based on the work of Sober.458
Brosnan argues that while evolution did not select for faculties that track moral truth, there could
still have been selection of those faculties.459 This would require that creatures were selected for
some other trait which was connected in some way to truth-tracking moral faculties. This is, in
essence, the structure of all third factor arguments. The third factor in Brosnan’s argument, as
mentioned above, has to do with well-being. Brosnan asks us to consider the belief that
cooperation is morally good. He argues that, “The helping behavior that this belief generates has
two effects: it promotes fitness, and it promotes wellbeing [sic]. The former effect is what
explains why it might evolve by natural selection. The latter effect is part of what may explain
why it is that cooperation in fact is morally good. If what’s morally good has to do with
behaviors that promote rather than hinder wellbeing [sic], then part of what makes cooperation
good is that it typically has this effect.”460
This seems problematic, since as we saw above beliefs about well-being seem to be a
particularly easy target for debunking. Thus, simply assuming that moral goodness consists in
behavior that promotes well-being seems like exactly the kind of propensity that one would
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expect from evolved moral faculties. Brosnan contends that his position does not beg any
important questions, because “Joyce and Street both assume for the sake of argument that moral
facts exist. . . . Moreover, it’s as reasonable an assumption as any that among these facts is this
one: what’s morally good has to do with actions that promote rather than hinder wellbeing.”461
But this simply will not fly. It’s true that sophisticated debunkers assume that moral facts exist;
without that assumption, they would rightly be accused of begging the question against realists.
However, to assume that “behavior that promotes well-being is morally good” is one of those
mind-independent moral facts is something different altogether. One can assume the former
without assuming the latter, no matter how reasonable it appears. Thus Brosnan does appear to
be begging a very important question indeed.
Other Realist Responses
If third factor arguments are an attempt to split the horns of Street’s dilemma, other
responses take a more direct approach. The following two responses take direct aim at one or the
other of the two horns of the Darwinian dilemma.
FitzPatrick’s “No Dilemma” Argument
FitzPatrick argues that there is no dilemma for realists because Street’s second horn
(which requires the realist provide a tracking account superior to the adaptive link account) is
simply not an option.462 FitzPatrick must therefore challenge the first horn, which includes
Street’s argument that evolutionary forces have had such a distorting effect on our evaluative
judgments that there is no good starting place for rational reflection to lead us to moral truth.
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FitzPatrick thinks the crucial question in the argument is “Q: How much influence has natural
selection actually had on the content of our current moral beliefs, by influencing ancestral moral
belief-forming dispositions to whatever extent it did?”463 FitzPatrick argues that, “without a very
strong answer to Q, we can grant everything implied by the best scientific account of how
evolution would have shaped moral belief to whatever extent it did, without granting any general
claim about how our current moral beliefs have in fact been shaped on the whole. Everything
depends on the correct answer to Q, and this issue deserves far greater attention than it receives
in these discussions.”464
Although he is willing to grant that our moral beliefs have been partially formed by
unguided influences, FitzPatrick argues that this does not preclude the possibility that humans
have risen above those influences by apprehending (moral) facts, which is what he argues has
happened in other fields of knowledge including science, math, and metaphysics.465 FitzPatrick
argues that diversity of moral beliefs shows that humans are not “condemned to moralize along
tracks laid down for us by Pleistocene evolutionary history,”466 which is a surprising move since
many debunking arguments point to diversity of moral beliefs as part of a debunking strategy.467
As an example, FitzPatrick posits that “We might, for example, grasp the fact that slavery
is wrong through grasping values such as human dignity in the course of rich, emotionally laden
human interactions in the context of a decent upbringing, and then reflecting on how this grounds
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strong negative moral rights, and then seeing that the practice of slavery is a gross violation of
such rights—though again, various realists could offer alternative accounts here, developing the
details in different ways.”468
It should be pointed out that Street herself grants that evolutionary forces are not the only
thing that has influenced our evaluative judgments, because “we are reflective creatures, and as
such are capable of noticing any given evaluative tendency in ourselves, stepping back from it,
and deciding on reflection to disavow it and fight against it rather than to endorse the content
suggested by it.”469 While FitzPatrick argues that rational reflection could have led us to
evaluative truths, this would still require some faculty which was in tune with those truths. With
FitzPatrick’s slavery example, he suggests we could grasp the value of human dignity. This
assumes that human dignity is a mind-independent value, and that we have some faculty which
has the ability to grasp it. But whatever faculty that would be would have been produced by
evolutionary processes (assuming, as FitzPatrick seems to grant, that all of our faculties were
thus produced), so FitzPatrick’s vague theorizing seems far too weak to escape Street’s dilemma.
Also, it would be question-begging to simply assume that human dignity is an independent value,
no matter how strongly FitzPatrick or his readers believe it is.470
FitzPatrick wants to make a parallel between moral beliefs on the one hand and science,
mathematics, and metaphysics on the other. We have already seen above that there are potential
issues with mathematical beliefs. For FitzPatrick to appeal to metaphysics is likely to be even
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more controversial. Scientific beliefs are, of course, central to the debunking challenge, and a
ripe area for debate as we saw above – a debate in which it may be too early to declare a winner.
FitzPatrick assumes these other areas are a given and that morality should therefore be included.
For many debunkers, however, moral truths are particularly problematic, so appealing to other
domains is not a quick resolution.
FitzPatrick grants that, once we become aware of the evolutionary influence on the
content of certain of our moral beliefs which were not corrected by grasping moral facts, “our
justification for those beliefs is defeated. And realists should in fact be happy to grant that this is
plausibly the situation for any number of familiar moral beliefs that stem from unreflective
moralizing about such things as sexual purity, rigid gender roles, clan loyalty, or deference to
traditional authority, and that do not stand up to open, informed, critical reflection.”471 Thus,
FitzPatrick argues that limiting moral consideration to out-group members can be discarded,
while we retain the belief that we have a duty to care for our children.472 Mitigating climate
change also makes FitzPatrick’s approved list.473 This, combined with his somewhat vague
reference to questioning traditional beliefs about sexual purity, gender roles, and so forth, gives
the impression that FitzPatrick is essentially endorsing the general moral code of modern
progressive academics, while rejecting what are held as conservative beliefs as being the result
of distorting influences from the past.
It is worth remembering from chapter one that Darwin held up traditional Victorian
sexual mores as a reflection of high moral development. With FitzPatrick, meanwhile, it very
much appears that the moral truths which we attain by rational reflection just happen to line up
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with modern, Western, progressive values. Also notice that it is not the case that FitzPatrick
simply rejects beliefs which align with evolutionary influences; instead, he picks and chooses
based on what he believes are “good reasons.” It is not hard to imagine that one could come up
with a very different set of moral beliefs simply by picking and choosing different evolutionary
influences to reject – all for what someone would consider to be “good reasons.”
FitzPatrick is willing to grant that the debunker’s argument presents a challenge to
realism, but he maintains that it does not debunk it.474 He also concedes that the realist “still
owes a moral metaphysics and epistemology that provides some plausible account of how we
have been able to develop reliable moral belief-forming dispositions analogous to what we’ve
done in other domains.”475 However, he also believes that until such an account is given, realists
are under no obligation to abandon their moral convictions.476 With regard to this point, Street
would likely respond that she does not expect realists to abandon their convictions, but rather to
adopt an antirealist view toward them. We will examine that strategy more closely in the next
chapter.
FitzPatrick argues that other realist responses to EDAs, including Copp’s, Wielenberg’s,
and Enoch’s, concede too much ground to the debunker by essentially granting what FitzPatrick
calls the “Extreme Explanatory Claim” (EEC).477 FitzPatrick presents this claim as consisting of
two propositions relating to the content of our moral beliefs across the board, namely that said
content “(i) reflects deep shaping by evolutionary forces that operated on the moral beliefforming dispositions of ancestral humans, according to principles insensitive to the truth of the
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content of moral beliefs, and (ii) does not reflect any independent influence from developed
forms of moral reflection guided by independent moral facts as such, through a grasp of their
grounds as such.”478 The problem is that FitzPatrick wants to avoid the EEC while also
disavowing any attempt at supporting a tracking account. However, in order to posit that we are
in possession of faculties capable of apprehending independent moral truths, he needs something
very much like a tracking account.
This might explain why in his argumentation he appears to inch toward such an account.
For example, FitzPatrick discusses Street’s appeal to parsimony by saying that, “Her view may
be more parsimonious, but that is only one philosophical consideration among others, and
parsimony is a theoretical virtue only where reality is correspondingly spare, which is just what
is at issue.”479 Street’s discussion of parsimony is in relation to her argument that her adaptive
link account is superior to a tracking account. This in turn is part of her discussion of the second
horn of the dilemma which FitzPatrick ostensibly rejects.480 The only reason for FitzPatrick to
care about parsimony is if he does want to posit some kind of tracking account. Meanwhile,
FitzPatrick is perfectly willing to take parsimony off the table, saying that, “If parsimony comes
at the cost of having to deny, for example, that our belief that rape is wrong has anything to do
with its actually being wrong (in the realist’s attitude-independent sense), then so much the
worse for parsimony.”481 On the one hand, it might be pointed out that abandoning parsimony in
order to retain a favored metaethical view might be a questionable move, particularly where
scientific views are in question. In addition, parsimony is only one of three theoretical virtues in
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which Street thinks her adaptive link account is superior to any tracking account.482
FitzPatrick’s argument appears to be an attempt to have his cake and eat it, too. He
disavows the need for a tracking account, but then argues that we may have been able to
eliminate or greatly reduce the distorting effects of evolution on our faculties by a process of
rational reflection on truths which we have somehow managed to grasp. It seems illegitimate to
claim that realists are entitled to maintain their convictions that their moral beliefs correspond to
the mind-independent moral truths in the absence of an explanation for how their normative
faculties have arrived at these truths. At the same time, FitzPatrick is on to something in
suggesting that realists maintain their stronger convictions even in the face of the debunking
challenge. That very idea could point the way toward showing that Street’s constructivism does
not grant her an escape route from her own dilemma as we will see in the next chapter.
Copp’s Society-Centered Theory
Copp responds to Street’s Darwinian dilemma by taking the second horn and attempting
to show a relation between the forces of evolution and moral facts.483 Rather than a tracking
relation, however, Copp argues that the realist only needs to provide a “quasi-tracking” account
in which evolutionary forces influenced the content of our moral beliefs to an “epistemically
sufficient degree” for rational reflection to be able to correct for distorting influences.484 In order
to do this, Copp argues that the realist needs “to propose a theory of the truth conditions of moral
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judgments.”485 Copp attempts to meet this by offering what he calls a society-centered moral
theory.486 In Copp’s view, moral truth consists in those norms which best enable society to meet
its needs in living together “peacefully, cooperatively, and productively.”487
Appealing to the intuition that “a society needs a ‘social moral code,’”488 Copp writes
that, “According to society-centered theory, the code that would best serve the basic needs of a
society, if it were to serve as the societal moral code in that society, is the code that is morally
authoritative with respect to that society.”489 Because of this, wrongness is relative to the moral
code of a given society.490 Copp believes his theory can escape Street’s dilemma because
societies will be more successful at meeting their needs with a moral code that promotes
prosocial behavior, and this is what determines (approximately) the truth of the resulting moral
beliefs that people within the society will tend to hold.491 This implies that Copp’s theory is a
kind of moral naturalism, in which “the moral facts are identical to certain ordinary natural facts
having to do with the needs of societies.”492
Copp attempts to avoid Street’s objection to value naturalism by reframing it. Recall from
chapter two that Street’s objection to value naturalism was based on her contention that tracking
independent natural-normative identities is even more obscure than tracking independent
evaluative truths when it comes to providing an evolutionary advantage.493 According to Copp,
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the basis for Street’s objection is that “a naturalist must rely largely on moral intuitions in
devising a theory as to which natural facts are identical to the moral facts, and, on the Darwinian
hypothesis, the content of these intuitions has been heavily influenced by natural selection.”494
Copp replies that his theory rests on second-order philosophical intuitions rather than moral
intuitions, and argues that it is implausible that these are susceptible to Street’s challenge.495 But
Street’s dilemma is targeted at evaluative facts, not just moral facts. Even if Copp is correct that
his theory does not rest on moral intuitions, it still depends on evaluative judgments such as that
society needs a moral code to be more successful, as well as the criteria for what constitutes
success, how different needs in society should be ranked in case of conflict, and what constitutes
a “better” way of meeting them. In relying on these, Copp assumes a whole array of evaluative
judgments as the starting point for building his theory, but those are the very judgments that
Street’s dilemma calls into question as far as corresponding to mind-independent truths. Copp
cannot escape Street’s dilemma by appealing to second-order philosophical intuitions when those
intuitions themselves are based on other evaluative judgments.
It could also be asked how mind-independent Copp’s theory is. He insists it is a version
of moral realism, but that would seem to depend on one’s definition of realism. In her response
to Copp’s argument, Street argues that, on the most likely reading, Copp’s theory is not the kind
of robust, mind-independent realism that her dilemma targets.496 Street appears to have the upper
hand in that argument. All of the criteria which Copp appeals to are clearly mind-dependent,
such as what constitutes a society which is most successful at meeting its needs. Copp asks us to
think about society’s need for a moral code. He writes that,
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Other things being equal, a society with such a moral code would experience less conflict
among its members, and less harmful conflict, than it would if it lacked such a code.
Other things being equal, there would be more cooperation among its members than
would be the case if it lacked such a code, and its members would be more successful at
meeting their own needs and pursuing their values. A society with such a code does
better, other things being equal, than it otherwise would, at meeting its need for there to
be cooperation among its members, and its need to avoid harmful internal conflict.497
It is one thing to say that a society with a moral code will have more cooperation and less
internal conflict than one without, but it is entirely another to say that more cooperation and less
conflict is “better,” or that any given society has “needs.” Individuals within a society have
various needs relative to a specific function or purpose. For example, we have needs for nutrition
in order to continue to physically function. And it is natural that we would consider adequate
nutrition to be good. That doesn’t make it a mind-independent truth that this is good any more
than a star having an adequate supply of hydrogen to continue burning is good. A society’s
“needs” can only be assessed with respect to a particular purpose or function; if naturalism is true
then the idea that there is a purpose or function to society beyond what its members attribute to it
has no basis. In that case Street is correct – there were no values until creatures came along who
valued.
Even more problematic is Copp’s argument that “According to society-centered theory,
the code that would best serve the basic needs of a society, if it were to serve as the societal
moral code in that society, is the code that is morally authoritative with respect to that
society.”498 It is questionable, to say the least, that any such ideal moral code exists. Copp’s
pragmatic approach reduces morality to a kind of engineering problem. The problem is that in
engineering there is no ideal way to solve a problem. Think of, say, building a bridge in a
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specific location. Is there one ideal bridge that would be best? Of course not. Instead, there are a
variety of criteria which must be weighed, such as cost, safety, aesthetics, durability, time needed
to complete, and so forth. The “best” bridge will be determined by how one weighs these
different factors, and even then there will be an element of subjectivity involved. So just the
thought that there is an ideal moral law for any given society if naturalism is true seems naïve at
the very least. There is also the problem of how we can have knowledge of this ideal moral law
even if it exists. Is it just by attaining agreement among the majority of moral philosophers? But
then why should that be the morally authoritative standard?
If by “most successful at meeting its needs” Copp simply means the society which is best
at reproducing and propagating itself, then he has simply made evolution itself the standard for
good, except at the social rather than individual level. However, it should be easy to see why
evolutionary processes would “program” us to think that evolution itself is the highest good. If
Copp wants to assert that the mind-independent moral truth just happens to line up with
evolution at a societal level, then as Street points out he owes us an explanation for such a
convenient happenstance. However, Copp provides no specific details on any of his proposals.
Another major weakness of Copp’s theory is that it does a poor job of explaining
commonsense moral discourse. When someone says that murder is wrong, they do not typically
mean that prohibiting murder is the best way for society to meet its needs. Even if they consider
that to be the case, few people would say that this is what makes it wrong to murder. In such a
case, murder might be acceptable under circumstances in which it would help society better meet
its needs.499 Typically, moral realists would want it to be the case that murder is always wrong,
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no matter what society’s needs are, and no matter what society is under consideration. Copp
acknowledges such complications to his theory as relativism, and argues that this simply shows
that Street’s Darwinian dilemma does not offer a unique challenge that is not already part of the
background of moral philosophy in general.500 But this depends, at least in part, on Copp’s
theory being understood as a form of moral realism.501
Begging the Question and Burden of Proof
It might be thought that there is something of a stalemate between debunkers and realists.
From the debunking standpoint, third factor arguments are all fatally question-begging. From the
realist perspective, however, they are simply assuming one or two fairly obvious moral truths as
starting points from which to build a realist metaethical theory. As we have seen, some realists
acknowledge that other third factor arguments are question-begging, but then attempt to
introduce a different argument which appears to make a very similar move using a different
factor. Recall that Vavova thought it was question-begging for Enoch and Wielenberg to assume
substantive moral truths about survival and rights, respectively, but thought that pain being bad
was acceptable because supposedly it is less controversial. For the debunker, however, a claim
like this is less controversial precisely because evolution would be expected to produce creatures
with a propensity to believe it because of its fitness-enhancing tendency, not because of its truth
value.
Copp and Morton have both made attempts to specify when and how responses to
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debunkers beg the question. We saw above how Morton tries to show that debunking arguments
do not debunk perceptual and inductive beliefs, while mathematical and logical beliefs are
somewhat more ambiguous. Now we can look more closely at his argument for why he thinks
third factor arguments are question-begging. As we saw above, Morton endorses a principle of
“probabilistic independence.” He presents this in Bayesian form as “Pr(We believe that P|P) =
Pr(We believe that P).”502 This means that the truth value of P makes no difference to the
probability of our holding the belief. Morton argues that “A reply to some sceptical worry begs
the question if, having assumed the substantive claims in question, our beliefs within the relevant
domain are probabilistically independent of their truth.”503 We also saw above that his final,
modified version stipulated that beliefs should be non-trivially probabilistically independent of
their truth.504 It should also be noted that Morton thinks only moral realists who hold that moral
facts are impotent are susceptible to this argument.505 This would suggest that moral naturalists
are exempt from Morton’s criteria for begging the question, along with non-naturalists who
believe moral facts are efficacious.506
Notice that Morton’s probabilistic independence formula has some affinity with
Brosnan’s likelihood ratio, except that for Morton includes Pr (We believe that P) instead of Pr
(We believe that P|not-P). The effect is the same – the probability of our belief in P is unaffected
by whether or not P is true. While Brosnan’s use of this was to argue that tracking failure does
not imply that a belief is false (which I have argued is a mistaken argument), Morton’s analysis
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gives reason to think that Brosnan cannot simply assume that behavior which promotes wellbeing is good. The same can be said for the other third factor arguments we have looked at
above, with the possible exception of Copp’s. The reason Copp’s might be exempt is that he
argues that moral facts are identical with certain natural facts (for which see above).
Copp, on the other hand, develops his own argument for what constitutes begging the
question which is much more favorable to the realist position. Copp’s aim is to find a nonquestion-begging argument against what he calls the “transitional premise” in EDAs, which is
that, given the genealogical history of our moral beliefs, “it would be a mere coincidence if the
beliefs we form as a result of the operation of our evaluative belief‐forming tendencies happened
to track the truth. It would be a matter of happenstance.”507 Copp argues for a pragmatic rather
than formal view of begging the question, so that whether a particular argument begs the
question depends upon context.508 In addition, Copp argues that it also matters if an assertion is
given in a conversation which is not part of the common ground of what is taken as given by the
participants.509 In this view, an argument which is question-begging in one context might not be
in another.510
So, are third factor arguments question-begging? According to Copp, it depends. If they
are offered as a rebuttal to debunkers, then they are question-begging, because “They do not give
the debunkers a rational ground to change their view.”511 Taking Wielenberg and Enoch as an
example, however, Copp argues that in the context in which they offered their accounts, they are
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not begging the question. This is because, in Copp’s view, Enoch’s goal “is to explain the
correlation between the truths postulated by the normative realist and the moral beliefs,”512 while
Wielenberg’s aim is “simply to explain a puzzling correlation.”513 Copp compares this to a group
of thinkers (presumably realists) who are not debating debunkers but instead are trying to decide
what to make of the argument.514 It isn’t question-begging to offer a third factor account in that
context, because the moral claims in question are part of the common ground and the transitional
premise has not yet been added to that common ground.515
This analysis, however, seems off-base. First of all, Enoch and Wielenberg both
published their articles as rebuttals of debunking arguments, so it isn’t really fair to say that they
were just trying to explain an otherwise puzzling correlation. Also, if a group of realists is trying
to decide what to make of the debunking argument, if they want to resist the transitional premise
then they need to show what’s wrong with the argument. It isn’t enough to simply say they aren’t
going to accept the transitional premise into the common ground if they don’t have good reason
to exclude it. It’s perfectly possible for people to refuse to accept a conclusion because they
don’t like where it leads or the conclusion is otherwise unpalatable. This, however, seems like an
illegitimate response to an argument. Copp writes, “The upshot seems to be that Wielenberg’s
and Enoch’s responses will not satisfy debunkers, but they might help others see how they can
resist the debunking argument.”516 However, using a strategy like this to resist the debunking
argument is unnecessarily complicated. If one assumes that, for example, the claim that “survival
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is pro tanto good” is true, that by itself is enough to resist the debunker’s argument. So if that is
allowed as a non-question-begging response for those considering but not yet decided on the
debunking challenge, the rest of Enoch’s argument is superfluous (the same would be true
mutatis mutandis of the other third factor arguments).
The important question, however, is whether there is a non-question-begging answer that
can be given to the debunker as a rebuttal to the transitional premise, and Copp contends that
there is.517 For this, he presents two strategies, starting with what he calls the “smorgasbord
strategy.”518 Copp argues, “first, that there is a variety of ‘circumstances’ in which the
transitional premise would be false, second, that the argument has not ruled out these
circumstances, and third, that these circumstances are plausible enough to be taken seriously.”519
As it turns out, the “circumstances” in question are, among other things, the assumption that the
moral truths of various third factor arguments are true. So, Copp writes that, “if Enoch is correct,
the transitional premise would be false if survival is good.”520 He repeats a similar conditional
for Wielenberg’s argument about rights, for his (Copp’s) society-centered theory, for Street’s
antirealist theory (which is a blunder on Copp’s part, because Street doesn’t offer antirealism as a
rebuttal of the transitional premise, but rather as a means of avoiding skepticism in the face of it),
and adds in two more: if moral truths are a priori truths and if God exists and “nudged”
evolution.521
Copp contends that the debunker must show each supposition to be false or show that the
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argument from the supposition to the falsity of the transitional premise is wrong.522 This would
be more aptly named the “shifting the burden of proof strategy,” because that is all Copp has
done for the most part. After having presented the debunking argument, Copp contends
essentially that the burden is entirely on the debunker to prove every realist response false, with
no burden on the realists to prove their response true. It is enough in Copp’s mind for the realist
to say that “if the society-centered theory is true, the debunking argument is false,” and then
insist that the debunker prove it false. At no point does the realist ever have to show the
debunker’s argument to be false, because the realist simply refuses to accept the transitional
premise. A strategy like this could seemingly be used to resist virtually any argument about
anything.
The reason why Copp’s strategy will not persuade a debunker has to do with the basis for
the beliefs on which the various third factor arguments rest. Ultimately, they are based on what
boils down to an intuition or sense that they are true – that survival is good, that we have rights,
that pain is bad, that whatever promotes well-being is good, etc. These beliefs just seem
obviously true. But the debunker says this is because evolutionary forces have formed our moral
faculties and predisposed us to believe things like this, and that would be the case whether they
are true or not. By starting with the truth of the belief as a foundational premise, the realist is
assuming the very point which is in dispute.
Copp’s final attempt at a non-question-begging argument is what he calls the “ambitious
natural strategy,” which is using his society-centered theory to show the transitional premise
false.523 This is evidently because Copp does not rest his theory on a particular substantive moral
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claim, but rather on meta-level philosophical principles as we saw above.524 However, since
Street is arguing against value realism, it makes no difference against her dilemma that Copp’s
theory does not rest on a substantive moral belief, as long as it rests on normative beliefs, which
it clearly does. Copp does not engage Street’s critique of his theory in any kind of detail, in
particular her argument that under the most plausible reading it is not realist and thus not a target
of her dilemma in any case.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion
Much more could be said about each of these topics. We have seen that debunkers have a
plausible answer to the charge that EDAs would also debunk perceptual beliefs. In other
domains, particularly mathematical and logical beliefs, the answer is not so clear. It is also not
clear what the ramifications would be if it could be shown that EDAs would undermine
mathematical and logical beliefs. Given that these domains are very closely tied to the very
scientific theories which support the debunking challenge to begin with, it could well be a major
problem. But what exactly would the outcome of that be? It would be hasty to conclude that
EDAs undermine themselves, since as we will see in chapter five that is not the only available
option. It could be that we should rethink our philosophical commitments in the light of all of the
available evidence.
We have also looked at several attempts to circumvent the debunking challenge by means
of a third factor argument. While some of these arguments are meticulously detailed, they all
appear to be fatally flawed. For most the issue has to do with a question-begging assumption of
one or more substantive moral truths. As plausible as these assumptions might seem, the
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debunker’s argument purports to explain why they would seem plausible regardless of their truth
value.
The issue of what it means to beg the question is itself a highly controversial one, and as
we have seen, both sides have criteria for begging the question which put their own argument in
a favorable light. Furthermore, the question also arises as to who has the burden of proof and
why. The debunking argument aims to place the burden on the realist to show why we should
believe that our moral faculties are reliable, while some realists respond that we are entitled to
our moral beliefs unless the debunker can prove them false. If the debunker has to prove our
moral beliefs false, then it seems that realists have won by default. However, the debunking
arguments we have looked at generally aim at showing that, given the genealogy of our moral
beliefs, it would be a highly improbable coincidence if they happened to line up with
independent moral truths. This is the argument which realists must refute, and they must do so
without assuming the truth of particular substantive moral claims. If they are unable to do so,
then we are in danger of moral skepticism. One attempt to avoid skepticism comes from the
ranks of the debunkers themselves, and that is antirealism. The next chapter will explore how
viable of a solution this is.
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CHAPTER 4
ANTIREALISM AND MORAL TRUTH

If non-theistic versions of realism are unable to adequately answer the debunking
challenge without begging the question or illegitimately shifting the burden of proof, then the
question is how to avoid moral skepticism. As mentioned earlier, Street herself has an answer for
this, which is to embrace antirealism. Street endorses a specific type of antirealism, which is
Humean metaethical constructivism. This chapter will examine her theory to see if it is a solution
to her own Darwinian dilemma as she claims. It will also include extensive discussion of the
interaction between Street and Dworkin’s defense of objectivism. The reason for this will
hopefully become clear by the end, when it comes time to evaluating antirealism as a solution to
the problem of moral knowledge.
Sidestepping the Darwinian Dilemma
In her “Darwinian Dilemma,” Street sketches out how antirealism allows one to avoid
falling into the trap set for moral realists. According to Street’s constructivism, “the truth of the
evaluative judgement that ‘X is a reason for agent A to Y’ is a function of A’s evaluative
attitudes – in particular, of whether that judgement would be among A’s evaluative judgements
in reflective equilibrium.”525 By appealing to reflective equilibrium, Street argues that this allows
for the possibility that someone could still be mistaken in a particular moral judgment.526 Street’s
antirealism, then, does not automatically grant every evaluative judgment that we make the status
of being true, which is a feature that overlaps with a realist view. Where realists and antirealists
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differ, according to Street, is in the antirealist’s denial “that there are evaluative truths which
hold independently of the whole set of evaluative judgements we make or might make upon
reflection, or independently of the whole set of other evaluative attitudes we hold or might hold
upon reflection.”527
As we saw in previous chapters, Street argues that rational reflection is of no use in
helping us move toward attitude-independent moral truth because the distorting effects of
evolution mean that we have no good starting point for reflection, and rational reflection only
works by comparing some of our evaluative judgments against others. In this regard, she writes,
“The widespread consensus that the method of reflective equilibrium, broadly understood, is our
sole means of proceeding in ethics is an acknowledgment of this fact: ultimately, we can test our
evaluative judgements only by testing their consistency with our other evaluative judgements,
combined of course with judgements about the (non-evaluative) facts.”528 The idea of reflective
equilibrium comes from Rawls.529 As we will see below, even realists like Dworkin endorse it as
a test of internal consistency. The distinctive feature of how reflective equilibrium works in
Street’s metaethical constructivism is that the internal consistency test is just what it means for
one’s normative judgments to be correct.
With Street’s antirealism, there is no external normative truth for anyone’s normative
beliefs to answer to, so those beliefs answer to the agent’s other normative judgments, combined
with relevant non-normative facts. Street asks us to consider a hypothetical creature (let’s call it
C) with only two values: that its own survival is valuable and that the survival of its offspring is
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valuable.530 Whereas a creature whose only value was its own survival would not be in error to
cease valuing its own survival, C would be in error to do so from the standpoint of its other
value, given that C’s survival is necessary to ensure the survival of its offspring.531
This can be seen in Street’s account of what it means for a judgment to withstand
scrutiny. She writes,
when we ask whether the judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A) withstands scrutiny
from the standpoint of A’s other normative judgments, we are not asking what A or
anyone else thinks withstands scrutiny from that standpoint. Rather, we are asking
whether, as determined by the standards set by A’s other normative judgments in
combination with the non-normative facts, the judgment that X is a reason to Y (for A)
does withstand scrutiny from that standpoint.532
One question this raises is that, if the agent doesn’t know whether her judgments withstand
scrutiny, then who does? Part of the answer to this question is that Street’s view requires, as
mentioned, knowledge of all relevant non-normative facts (and no false beliefs with respect to
relevant non-normative facts). We will examine such examples below. If A is lacking some such
knowledge, then nobody knows if A’s judgments withstand scrutiny. This could be a problem in
that the reason we are forced into adopting antirealism is that supposedly realism leaves us in the
position of being hopeless at knowing what our reasons are. Antirealism is supposed to provide
us with a big improvement over that. It’s also possible Street means that A might be mistaken
about whether a particular one of A’s judgements withstands scrutiny before reflection. After
reflection, assuming that A has knowledge of all of the relevant non-normative facts and has
taken into account all of A’s other relevant evaluative judgments, then perhaps A can be said to
have knowledge of the truth of a particular evaluative judgment.
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Returning to the example of creature C above, the question is if C is correct in ceasing to
value its own survival. The problem is this judgment has come into conflict with C’s judgment
that the survival of C’s offspring is valuable. But we still don’t know which of the two values
should be changed to restore equilibrium. Let OWN be the belief that C’s own survival is
valuable and let OFF be the belief that the survival of C’s offspring is valuable. In Street’s
constructivism, the grounding set of normative judgments which sets the standard for correctness
is “all of the relevant agent’s normative judgments, minus the normative judgment whose
correctness is in question.”533 This creates a conundrum, because if C is questioning the
correctness of C’s belief not-OWN, the grounding set is the belief OFF and so C should change
her belief not-OWN and value her own survival. But if C is questioning the correctness of OFF,
the grounding set is the belief not-OWN and so C should change her belief OFF and stop valuing
the survival of her offspring.
So even with only two evaluative judgments to work with, there are already two
apparently equally correct sets of beliefs at reflective equilibrium that are contradictory,
depending on which of C’s beliefs is in question. Which set is correct? Street believes she has an
answer to this. She writes,
When we’re asking what reasons a given agent has all things considered—and not just
what reasons she has from the standpoint of some (implicitly or explicitly) specified
subset of her values—which standpoint gets priority? The answer, roughly, is that the
standpoint that determines what reasons she has is whichever standpoint is most deeply
hers, where this is a function of how strongly she holds the normative judgments in
question and how close to the center of her total web of normative judgments they lie.534
Street acknowledges that this can be tricky in certain situations. In that case there may be no
“fact of the matter” about a given judgment, and the truth value of it will be indeterminate –
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though she hypothesizes that such situations “may be fairly rare.”535
Let’s assume that C reflects on the matter, realizes that she cares very deeply about her
offspring (we’ll assume C is female with strong motherly instincts), and decides she was in error
to not value her own life. As Street imagines it, C’s sibling says to her, “Of course your survival
is valuable . . . your children need you.”536 What has constructivism given us that normative
realism did not? Under constructivism, just as under realism, C has inherited the tendency to
value caring for her offspring thanks to evolutionary forces. In both cases, C formulated a
normative judgment that she should take care of her kids. The problem under realism was that C
had to conclude that her normative beliefs were probably off track, so the resulting normative
belief was probably mistaken. Under constructivism, C can rest assured that, having spent time
in reflection, her belief is probably true. By changing the status of her normative beliefs from
robustly realist (attitude-independent) to antirealist/constructivist (attitude-dependent), C
changed the truth value as well. At least, this is what constructivists say has happened. Below we
will see some reasons for calling this into question.
While this might all seem a bit esoteric, for Street the implications are very much
practical. She argues that, “If one genuinely thinks one is in all likelihood hopeless at
recognizing one’s reasons, one will be paralyzed and unable to proceed with normative
reasoning.”537 Street appeals to a point made by Gibbard, who writes that, “In order to pursue my
life at all, I have to assume, if the question arises, that I am not hopeless at figuring out how to
live.”538 If we grant Street’s point that continuing to function from the practical standpoint
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commits us to the proposition that we are not hopeless in recognizing our reasons, are we really
thereby committed to antirealism? We will have to return to this question at the end of the
chapter.
One thing to notice about the example of C, who has only two values and is trying to
decide if not valuing her own life withstands scrutiny, is that the value Street ends up affirming is
the one we all thought she should. Of course, C should care for her kids. What kind of a bad
parent wouldn’t? It’s easy to gloss this because, of the two options, Street made sure C took the
“right” one. However, there is nothing in the theory to say that C couldn’t have gone the other
way and decided that she just didn’t care about living anymore, realized upon reflection that her
kids weren’t that important to her after all, and so because of that she should change her
judgment about her kids and decide she didn’t value their survival. In doing so, C would not be
doing anything wrong according to Street.
To see this implication, we need to look at a passage from Street where she spells out
more details about her version of constructivism.
According to metaethical constructivism . . . judgments of truth and falsity in the
normative domain must always relativize to a particular practical point of view. . . . One
option is to understand the truth of ‘X is a reason to Y for agent A’ as a function of the
normative judgments of the person judging whether X is a reason to Y for agent A—for
example, my normative judgments if I’m the one making the judgment about A’s reasons,
your judgments if you’re the one making the judgment about A’s reasons, and so on. A
second option is to understand the truth of ‘X is a reason to Y for agent A’ as a function of
the normative judgments of the person whose reasons are in question—that is, of A
herself. Metaethical constructivism selects the second route. The standards of correctness
determining what reasons a person has are understood to be set by that person’s set of
judgments about her reasons.539
So C’s reasons, then, can only be judged by what judgments C would make at reflective
equilibrium. If C decides to cease caring about her offspring to bring her beliefs into equilibrium,
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she is doing nothing wrong according to Street’s constructivism. Moreover, nobody else can
judge C to be in the wrong, because the only standard for any given judgment is the standard set
by the other evaluative judgments of the agent making the judgment in question. But what if C
can’t make up her mind which value judgment is stronger and more deeply held? In that case
Street says there is no fact of the matter and the truth value is indeterminate. This was alluded to
above. Street says that constructivists have no objection to this kind of indeterminacy.540 It
should be pointed out, however, that this would lead to the same practical paralysis that Street
says will befall us if we remain realists, at least in those situations.
As mentioned above, Street’s view also requires knowledge of all non-normative facts
that would be a relevant factor in a particular judgment. One example she gives is of a woman
(Beth) who takes herself as having reason to eat a bowl of chili.541 Unbeknownst to Beth, the
chili contains peanuts, to which she has a deadly allergy. Because Beth also takes herself as
having reason to live a long and healthy life, she has reason not to eat the chili, except that she is
unaware of it. These two judgments conflict, and they both fail to withstand scrutiny from the
standpoint of the other, so this again raises the question of how to settle which one should be
dropped. As we already saw above, according to Street the answer is that the one most deeply
held should be retained. If Beth “is even remotely statistically normal,”542 then at reflective
equilibrium she will judge that she has reason not to eat the chili, and her belief that she has
reason to eat the chili is mistaken by Beth’s own lights. Of course, she isn’t at reflective
equilibrium as she sits down to eat and, as a consequence, doesn’t know the chili might well kill
her. So it’s hard to know what good this does anyone. Also, Street acknowledges the possibility

540

Street, “Constructivism,” 236.

541

Street, “Constructivism,” 235.

542

Street, “Constructivism,” 235.

156
that someone might value a certain bowl of chili more than life itself, and so have reason to eat it
even at reflective equilibrium.543
The example of eating chili might seem tangential to the question of moral skepticism.
This has to do with the way Street frames the entire realism/antirealism discussion in terms of
normative reasons, as we will see below. Street gives other examples of how constructivism
works in various circumstances. For instance, if someone is looking for her lost keys and the
keys are under the fridge (unbeknownst to anyone), then she has reason to look there and is
mistaken in thinking that she does not.544 In another example, someone is torn between joining
the French resistance or caring for his mother. In that case, Street suggests it might be
indeterminate if there is no other value or principle in the agent’s set of evaluative judgments to
break the deadlock.545
To these examples one might well reply that of course someone with a deadly peanut
allergy shouldn’t eat chili with peanuts in it, and of course you should look under the fridge for
your keys if that’s where your keys are. One might wonder, though, if we really needed a
complicated metaethical theory to know this. The example that looks most likely to raise
important moral issues – whether to join the French resistance or care for one’s mother – leaves
us with no answer (and thus a practical paralysis of the same debilitating kind that normative
realism allegedly commits us to). So far, the areas where constructivism seems to offer the most
help is exactly where we need it the least. As Enoch observes, “The reasons for which we act –
that it contains vitamin C, that she needs help, that he’s charming, that it’s so expensive, that I
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really want to – these can be perfectly ordinary, naturalistically respectable things. So Robust
Realism – and any other metanormative theory, really – need have nothing interesting to say
about them.”546
Having looked at some of the basics, we need to investigate some deeper issues with
Street’s antirealism and in particular her framing of the entire discussion. As a starting point for
this, we will engage with an interaction between Street and Dworkin.
Dworkin and Objectivism
In the previous chapter we looked briefly at some of Dworkin’s thoughts about robust
realism and its relation to commonsense (or what he calls “face-value”) morality. Dworkin’s
main argument is that morality (and other domains of knowledge) cannot be attacked by
skepticism from the outside, but only from the inside. Street herself has written a lengthy
response to Dworkin’s argument. Unpacking the details of this exchange provides valuable
insights for understanding both why Street’s constructivist approach is fatally flawed, and also
why Dworkin’s non-theistic view is inadequate. It also will provide important insights as to why
so many realist responses to the debunking challenge come up short.
Dworkin’s argument is a defense of objectivism against subjectivism/skepticism.547
Dworkin notes that there are two main versions of skepticism of objective truth – wholesale
skepticism of objective truth about anything, and selective skepticism “that concedes objective
truth to ‘descriptive’ claims, including mathematical ones, but denies it to ‘evaluative’–moral or
ethical or interpretive or aesthetic–ones.”548 His argument focuses on selective skepticism, which
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he also thinks is the most dangerous.549 Both of these forms of skepticism are external according
to Dworkin in that they “purport to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a
whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it.”550 As mentioned in the previous
chapter, Dworkin refers to these as “archimedean” arguments.551
Dworkin posits that a successful skeptical argument must be internal rather than
achimedean.552 One example he gives of an internal argument against morality is the argument
that God is necessary as a basis for morality, but that no such being exists.553 Because it assumes
a substantive moral claim as a counterfactual and argues that the counterfactual does not hold, it
is internal rather than external.554 The external, archimedean attack, however, is different.
Dworkin frames it this way: “These selective archimedean skeptics offer to justify their skeptical
claim–that these domains cannot provide objective truth–from premises that are not themselves
evaluative. They argue, they say, not from moral or ethical or aesthetic assumptions, but from
non-evaluative theories about what kind of properties exist in the universe, or how we can gain
knowledge or reliable belief about anything.”555
Notice that this last point corresponds with EDAs in general, and with Street’s Darwinian
dilemma in particular. Evolutionary debunkers critique morality on the basis of a scientific
argument about the genealogy of our moral faculties, arguing that this shows those faculties are
unable to produce knowledge or reliable belief. Dworkin’s point about the kind of properties that
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exist in the universe, moreover, fits very comfortably with Street’s short argument for
antirealism which we saw in chapter two. That argument is based on the supposition that there
were no values until creatures who valued came along.
Dworkin considers all second-order statements about first-order moral claims to be
misleading. They purport to be neutral statements about a substantive moral claim, but in fact are
simply restatements of the original claim. For example, when it comes to the claim of whether
genocide is wrong, Dworkin argues in favor of the view that “it is an objective matter–a matter
of how things really are–that genocide is wrong.”556 What Dworkin denies is that this latter claim
is of a different kind than the bare statement, “genocide is wrong,” whereas archimedeans want
to say, as Street does say, that the latter statement is a second-order statement about the firstorder substantive claim. Dworkin differentiates these as I-propositions (internal or first-order)
and E-propositions (external or second-order), for this idea.557 Dworkin argues that skeptics
“think that when they contradict those E-propositions they leave all I-propositions, like the claim
that genocide is wicked, untouched.”558 But Dworkin thinks this is a mistake.
According to Dworkin, archimedeans pretend not to be taking sides in a substantive
moral debate, but in fact they are. Dworkin does not use the language of attitude-independence
that is common in current literature, but it is easy to see that it fits the same pattern. In Dworkin’s
understanding, the statement that “‘genocide is wrong’ is an attitude-independent truth” is just a
restatement of the claim that genocide is wrong. Thus arguing against this proposition, as
debunkers do, is an illegitimate, external form of skepticism. While the details of Dworkin’s
distinction between internal and external skeptical arguments are interesting and important, we
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need not unpack them here. For the purposes of this argument, it is enough to notice that Street
says she agrees with this point of Dworkin’s (among other things) and attempts to argue that hers
is actually an internal argument rather than an illegitimate, archimedean one.559 She writes,
I assume that realism and antirealism are best understood as substantive normative
claims, and I also accept Dworkin’s point that the only viable form of normative
skepticism is internal—that is, that one can legitimately reach skeptical conclusions only
about subparts of the normative domain, and only by working from further normative
assumptions. . . . What I intend to defend, then, is not a thoroughgoing, external
skepticism about normativity that relies on no normative premises at all, but rather a form
of internal skepticism directed specifically at normative realism, understood as a
substantive normative position according to which value is robustly attitudeindependent.560
This seems surprising, since a straightforward reading of Dworkin would indicate that Street’s
argument, along with every other EDA, is an external, archimedean one by his categorization,
and thus illegitimate. How, then, can Street argue that she is making an internal argument?
Morality and Normativity
The answer is that Street reads Dworkin as talking about normative rather than moral
truths. After giving a quote from Dworkin where he talks about morality as a distinct and
independent dimension of experience, Street writes in a footnote, “When Dworkin states his
conclusions he sometimes focuses, as in this passage, on the domain of morality. But he is best
read as making claims about the domain of the normative in general, and this is how I read him
throughout this chapter (though recall that I am focusing on the domain of practical reasons,
setting aside the domain of epistemic reasons).”561 Street gives no argument for preferring this
reading of Dworkin. This is particularly odd given that Dworkin uses the word morality
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frequently and appears to do so deliberately.
The reason this is problematic is that for Street, the normative domain includes any
“consideration that counts in favor of, or justifies, some action.”562 But it may or may not be
what most people (including Dworkin) consider to be a moral reason. This is particularly
confusing because some thinkers like Enoch use “normative” virtually as a synonym for “moral”
in a robustly realist sense.563 Street, however, is using Humeanism as a theory of normative
reasons in which, as Enoch puts it, “all your normative reasons are grounded in your desires or
motivational set.”564 One might think this unimportant, because “normative realism” means
essentially the same thing either way. But there are two issues in which it is important as we will
see below. The first has to do with the question we have been discussing – whether Street’s
argument qualifies as internal or external under Dworkin’s analysis – and the second has to do
with what Copp calls the different grades of normativity.565 We will examine each of these issues
in turn.
Whose Domain is it, Anyway?
On Street’s interpretation of Dworkin, a challenge to normative realism is internal and
legitimate so long as it comes from within the broader normative domain because she treats
normative realism as a subpart of the normative domain. In Street’s view, the normative domain
includes both attitude-dependent and (perhaps) attitude-independent, normative truths.566 Notice
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that attitude-dependent normative truths are subjective by definition, because they depend upon
the evaluative judgment of a given agent, whereas attitude-independent normative truths are
objective. Call the former claims SN truths (for subjective-normative) and the latter ON truths
(for objective-normative) and call the corresponding claims SN claims and ON claims. Street
wants to argue that it is legitimate to use an SN truth to mount a skeptical challenge against the
entire subdomain of ON truths, because both SN and ON truths are internal to the normative
domain.
For Dworkin, morality is a distinct domain. While a careful reading of Dworkin should
make this clear, he is explicit about it in several places, including this statement: “In this essay I
concentrate on this selective version of archimedeanism–about truth in the ‘soft’ domains of
morality and art rather than the ‘hard’ ones of physics or mathematics.”567 Some reflection will
also demonstrate that for Dworkin, morality has to be exclusively attitude-independent. Dworkin
says in multiple places that he is defending the “face-value” view of morality.568 He also says, “I
would not volunteer the more baroque formulations of that view, about timeless truths among the
furniture of the universe. But if pressed I would insist that, so far as they mean anything at all,
they are true.”569 Dworkin even describes his view as robust, saying “there is no more robust
thesis for any realism to deploy or any anti-realism to refute.”570 Reading Dworkin the way
Street does by taking him as talking about the normative domain in general instead of the moral
domain changes the entire meaning of his argument.
In the previous chapter we looked at definitions of moral realism, including the idea that
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under moral realism, moral truths are attitude-independent. That might create the impression that
there could be moral truths which are attitude-dependent (which is ostensibly the case with moral
antirealism). Under the face-value view, however, such truths would not be moral truths at all. In
other words, “attitude-independent normative truth” is not another term for “attitude-independent
moral truth.” Whatever meaning “normative” has in the former term, it is not synonymous with
“moral.” But Dworkin’s whole point is that, in order to mount a legitimate skeptical challenge to
morality, you need to have a moral reason.571 Dworkin’s view is that each evaluative domain has
its own normative standards that can only be applied within the given domain. He writes, “the
epistemology of any domain must be sufficiently internal to its content to provide reasons,
viewed from the perspective of those who begin holding convictions within it, for testing,
modifying, or abandoning those convictions.”572 The upshot of this is that for Dworkin, ON
truths just are moral truths. Whatever SN truths are, they are not moral truths. Thus, Street’s
move of attempting to argue for skepticism of normative realism from within the broader
normative domain is, according to Dworkin, illegitimate. We will see below why this is more
than an interpretative dispute. The entire argument hinges on how the domains are delineated to
begin with.
Grades of Normativity and Reasons
Copp distinguishes three different kinds (“grades”) of normativity: generic, motivational,
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and authoritative.573 Different kinds of normative claims can have different grades of
normativity. While moral realists hold that morality has all three, other types of claims
(prudential, conventional, etc.) do not. Moreover, Copp highlights some issues with explicating
normativity in terms of reasons. He writes that, “One problem for this approach is that claims
about what we have reason to do are themselves normative, so such an approach does not go
very deep. Another problem is that there seem to be reasons of different kinds. There appear to
be moral reasons, reasons of etiquette, epistemic reasons, and so on. Moreover, these different
kinds of reasons appear to have different grades of normativity.”574 Thus by lumping all
normative claims into a single domain, Street includes claims with different grades of
normativity. The only distinguishing feature is that some are attitude-dependent and some are
attitude-independent. Any normative claim which is true in a robustly realist sense will by
definition be attitude-independent. An attitude-dependent normative claim can include any other
practical claim except for a moral claim in the robust realist sense.
As Street puts it, “when we think of the set of normative claims, the sorts of claims that
often leap to mind are claims such as ‘Abortion is wrong’ or ‘I should exercise regularly’.”575
The first of these two claims is clearly a moral question (one which Dworkin frequently uses as
an example). Few people, however, would think it immoral not to exercise, so the second is best
viewed as prudential. As we saw above, Street uses other examples of normative beliefs in her
essay which are not moral questions, such as eating a particular bowl of chili.576 By expanding
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Dworkin’s domain from morality to the normative in general, Street includes all such claims. A
close reading of Dworkin, however, will show that his examples are all clearly moral issues.
Furthermore, Dworkin distinguishes several different domains as being evaluative (as opposed to
descriptive), including moral, ethical, interpretive, and aesthetic, as we already saw above.577 He
is careful to specify that he uses moral skepticism as an example, but that a similar argument can
be constructed for other evaluative domains separately.578 Street’s reading obliterates these
important distinctions.
To speak of the normative as a separate domain might make sense if it is taken as a
synonym for “moral.” However, with Street’s usage it makes no sense. By changing the scope of
the domain to include any practical normative claim, Street opens the door to anything which is
a reason for doing something. To illustrate, take three different claims, all of which involve
practical reasons and so count as normative in Street’s broad sense. Say that Carl has a) reason to
buy flour, b) reason to stop at the red light on the way to the store, and c) reason not to murder
the store owner when it turns out the store is out of flour. Of these three, c) is clearly a moral
question, a) is prudential, and b) is conventional. According to the moral realist, c) is true
independently of Carl’s or anyone else’s attitude toward it, while the other two are not. But
notice that it makes a difference what reason in particular Carl has for not murdering the store
owner. If Carl’s reason is that he didn’t have a weapon on him and didn’t want to risk injury to
himself by trying to kill the owner with his bare hands, we would not consider that to be a moral
reason for not committing murder even though Street would still call it a normative reason. A
moral reason for not committing murder would be that murder is wrong (in the robust realist
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sense).
When the constructivist says that Carl has reason not to murder the store owner, it means
that within Carl’s own set of evaluative judgments at reflective equilibrium, Carl’s judgment “I
should not murder the store owner” would withstand scrutiny. But the reason for the judgment
can be any practical reason whatsoever. Carl’s wanting to avoid injury (or maybe jail) is just as
legitimate as the reason that Carl values the life of the store owner. It is important to see why this
matters. While the constructivist claims that we are simply changing the status of our normative
beliefs from attitude-independent to attitude-dependent, that’s not what’s happening. What’s
actually happening is that we are replacing a moral belief (like “murder is wrong”) with any nonmoral belief which happens to entail the same normative sentence – a sentence of the form, “I
have reason not to murder,” “I shouldn’t murder this person,” or some other equivalent. Notice
also an important difference in that under moral realism, the moral belief entails the normative
sentence all on its own, for everyone. Under constructivism, the non-moral replacement belief
only entails the normative sentence if it withstands scrutiny against all of the respective agent’s
other evaluative judgments, and then only for that agent.579
The moral belief that we started with has simply disappeared, along with every other
moral belief, but that is hidden behind the normative sentence which has been retained.580 This
can be especially hard to detect if the (ostensible) non-moral replacement belief sounds a lot like
a moral reason. Suppose that Carl’s reason for not murdering the store owner is that he values the
store owner’s life. This might sound like a moral reason (in the good old-fashioned sense), but
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that’s only the case if “everyone’s life is valuable” is an attitude-independent truth.581 If so, then
anyone who held the belief that “not everyone’s life is valuable” would be in error. According to
moral realists, that’s true. According to constructivism, however, normative truth is determined
by all the other evaluative judgments of the agent making the judgment, so we can only judge
Carl’s belief that “everyone’s life is valuable” by Carl’s other evaluative judgments at reflective
equilibrium – but even then, we can only go so far as to say that everyone’s life is valuable to
Carl. So the belief that we are examining isn’t even “everyone’s life is valuable” (an ON claim),
it is “everyone’s life is valuable to Carl” (an SN claim). Even if Carl refrains from murdering the
store owner because he values the store owner’s life, this is not a moral reason even though it
might sound like one – but it is a normative reason. This ties into Dworkin’s point that in
denying the E-proposition (“‘everyone’s life is valuable’ is an attitude-independent truth”), one
also denies the respective I-proposition (“everyone’s life is valuable”). Dworkin does not add
that resourceful antirealists can substitute a similar attitude-dependent claim by adding an
egocentric expression that entails the same normative sentence(s), but if the above analysis is
correct, that is the case.
Under constructivism it might even be possible that Carl’s belief that “everyone’s life is
valuable to me” is mistaken if he would not hold that at reflective equilibrium. Carl might just
think that everyone’s life is valuable to him because he’s been told that’s what people should
think. But deep down, Carl doesn’t actually think that. In that case, even if Carl thought he
shouldn’t murder the store owner because he thinks everyone’s life is valuable to him, he would
be wrong. This would open up the possibility that Carl should murder the store owner, even
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though he mistakenly thinks he shouldn’t because he mistakenly thinks everyone’s life is
valuable to him – a highly counterintuitive result to say the least.
One more complication that Street herself calls attention to has to do with future
contingencies. In the example of the man who couldn’t decide between joining the French
resistance and caring for his mother, Street suggests that if he knew how effective he would be at
each one, then he could choose based on that factual knowledge. The issue, then, would not be
indeterminacy, but rather uncertainty.582 But if we apply this idea to Carl, assuming that his
reason for not murdering the store owner is that Carl is afraid of being injured in hand-to-hand
mortal combat, we could imagine that Carl underestimates his own strength and agility and
overestimates that of the store owner so that Carl would in fact only sustain minor injuries. The
result would be that Carl would again be mistaken in his belief that he had reason not to murder
the store owner, and should murder him. This also highlights the difficulty of attempting to
resolve the debate with these kinds of thought experiments. It’s easy for constructivists to rig the
experiment so that it produces something close to the expected results (such as with the example
of the creature C at the beginning of this chapter), and hope that moral realists don’t ask too
many questions when it doesn’t (as we will see below with ideally coherent Caligula). However,
it is impossible to show what is actually happening in people’s internal, moral deliberations.
Street claims that her constructivism “allows us to say almost everything we ever were
inclined to say about people’s reasons, with the exception of a swath of extremely strong realist
claims.”583 Based on the above analysis, this is plausibly true; it also carries a lot less weight than
Street wants it to. In order to make constructivism work like she wants, all Street needs to do is
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to find non-moral reasons which sound close to moral reasons, and then say that those are the
reasons behind people’s normative sentences . . . or at least, that they could be. But this does
nothing to show what is really going on in people’s deepest, inner attitudes and beliefs.
Alternatively, if Street simply keeps the discussion at the level of “reasons” talk, then she doesn’t
even need to get into the complications that would arise from the vast array of possible practical
reasons someone could have for, say, not committing murder. But then, Street might argue that,
as long as she has a plausible (or at least somewhat plausible) account of our reasons that is
entirely based on attitude-dependent truths, that’s all she needs. The Darwinian dilemma has
already done the work of showing that we have no reason to think that our normative beliefs are
reliable when it comes to discerning attitude-independent truths such as those posited by the
realist. Street might think that ends the discussion. But does it?
Dworkin and Reliability
As we have seen in previous chapters, one of the big concerns of evolutionary debunkers
has to do with the reliability of our moral beliefs given moral realism and evolution. We also saw
in chapter three numerous attempts by realists to give an account of this in various ways,
including third-factor accounts and attempts to grasp one or the other of the horns of Street’s
dilemma. All of these arguments appeared to either beg the question in some important way or to
attempt to illegitimately shift the burden of proof back onto the debunker. Dworkin proposes a
different solution, which is to refuse to accept the terms of the challenge in the first place. He
writes,
Some so-called moral ‘realists’ add to the confusion by accepting the archimedean
challenge as sensible and trying to meet it. They declare that there really are objective
and normative properties or facts in the universe, which is true. But they declare this in
language that strives for metaphysical resonance, as if its truth was to be discovered in
some philosophical domain other than that of substantive evaluation. If I am right, they
share the fallacy of the archimedeans, which is to suppose that some sense can be
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assigned to the supposedly metaphysical claims that is not itself a normative sense, or
that there is some way to establish a normative proposition other than through substantive
normative arguments.584
This analysis would explain the failure of moral realists to answer the debunking challenge on its
own terms, at least in part. It would also mean that this does not, in fact, imply a failure of moral
realism; it would only mean that, by allowing skeptics to set the terms of the debate, the
argument is effectively lost before it even begins.
There is only one brief passage in “Objectivity and Truth” where Dworkin directly
touches on Darwinian considerations. In leading up to it, he speculates that a large part of
contemporary philosophical skepticism may be rooted in the belief that God is necessary for
morality, combined with “the defeat of crude anthropomorphic religion.”585 Dworkin asks
rhetorically, “How else can we explain the widespread but plainly mistaken assumption that a
successful Darwinian explanation of moral concern – that human animals with such a concern
were more likely to survive – would have skeptical implications?”586
We have seen that the question of the reliability of our moral beliefs is central to the
debunking challenge. Dworkin addresses this concern in his response to Harman’s critique that
“we cannot regard any belief as reliable unless we think that the best causal explanation of why
we hold it refers to the state of affairs it describes.”587 Dworkin argues that this kind of test
makes sense for beliefs about the physical world, but not for beliefs in domains such as morality,
aesthetics, mathematics or philosophy because of the nature of the content of those domains.588
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Dworkin writes, “If the ‘best explanation’ causal test is universally sound, therefore, no moral
(or aesthetic or mathematical or philosophical) belief is reliable. But we can reverse that
judgment: if any moral belief is reliable, the ‘best explanation’ test is not universally sound.
Either direction of argument–taking either of the two hypotheses as axiomatic and using it to
deny the other–begs the question in the same way.”589
Dworkin mentions Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium as a way of arriving at
harmony between our different beliefs, but argues that “none of these can be given an automatic
or antecedent veto over the rest.”590 Later, Dworkin adds that, “We may well discover that what
we now think about virtue or vice or duty or right is inconsistent with other things we also think,
about cosmology or psychology or history. If so, we must try to reestablish harmony, but that is a
process whose results must make moral sense as well as every other kind of sense.”591 It is clear
that Street and other debunkers regard scientific conclusions as holding sway over normative
ones, which we will look at more closely below. This entire idea is exactly what Dworkin calls
archimedean. It is also question-begging, but in a much more subtle way than many of Street’s
critics seem to think. This might be because most of Street’s critics share many of her underlying
assumptions, including assumptions about scientific claims.
A Dworkinian Dilemma for Antirealists
Dworkin has his own dilemma which he offers in response to a challenge similar to the
debunking challenge, namely that moral realists have the burden of proof to provide an
explanation of “how human beings could be ‘in touch with’ or aware of [moral] properties.”592
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But before he does, he argues that the burden of proof depends on “how opinion stands when the
investigation begins. . . . none of us can accept such an argument unless we find its premises
convincing even when we grasp their skeptical import. We must find these premises more
plausible than what they require us to abandon.”593 In light of this, he asks this question:
supposing we must choose between the following two options, which should we reject?
(1) Human beings have a special though sometimes fallible faculty of judgment that
enables us to decide which moral claims to accept or reject, a capacity whose
malfunctioning may sometimes result only in moral misjudgment with no spillover
impairment of other cognitive activity. (2) There is no moral objection to exterminating
an ethnic group or enslaving a race or torturing a young child, just for fun, in front of its
captive mother.594
Dworkin answers his own dilemma by writing, “if the hypothesis of the first proposition–that the
moral capacity is ad hoc and not systematically integrated into other intellectual powers–is the
only alternative to denying any capacity to reach credible moral opinions at all, I would be
content to accept it. It involves nothing mysterious or artificial or counterintuitive.”595 Of course,
the Darwinian debunker says that Dworkin’s hypothesis does involve something mysterious and
artificial from an evolutionary standpoint, namely that there is no good scientific explanation for
how we could have moral faculties that are attuned to attitude-independent moral truths. The
reason it isn’t counterintuitive, again according to the debunker, is because evolutionary forces
produced our moral intuitions in the first place. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that Dworkin’s
argument or something like it is really at the heart of the resistance of moral realists to EDAs.
Street gives a lengthy response to this passage from Dworkin.596 Interestingly, she
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concedes that if the choice that Dworkin presents is accurate, then “we are justified in cleaving to
realism.”597 Street, however, argues that Dworkin’s choice is a false one and that the real choice
is between these two propositions:
(1') I am in all likelihood hopeless at grasping the normative truth; and (2') Some
conceivable agents have reason to exterminate an ethnic group or enslave a race or torture
a young child for fun in front of its captive mother, but most real-life human beings have
no such reasons, and if we ever encounter any who do, then we (you and I and the vast
majority of human beings) have reason to band together against them, lock them up, and
throw away the key.598
Street’s (1’) is, of course, the conclusion of her Darwinian dilemma. It is based on a scientific
argument even though it draws a (non-moral) normative conclusion, and stipulates that a special
moral faculty of the kind that Dworkin posits in (1) above has no good scientific explanation.
This may be true, as the realist responses that we saw in the previous chapter seemed unable to
provide an answer to the debunking challenge other than shifting the burden of proof and
begging the question in various ways. But Dworkin’s whole point is that scientific explanations
do not automatically have pride of place, and so if (2) follows from the denial of (1), he’ll take
(1) even without an adequate scientific explanation for it (or explanation of any kind). For Street,
science effectively rules out (1), so (1) is simply not an option (bearing in mind that even Street’s
(1’) says “in all likelihood,” which does not, strictly speaking, rule out the possibility of (1)). We
will have more to say about this below.
Before launching into a defense of (2’), Street first objects that Dworkin’s (2) is “a deeply
misleading, boogeyman characterization of what is involved in accepting antirealism. A
sophisticated antirealist will agree to no such thing.”599 Regardless of what a sophisticated
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antirealist will agree to, is Dworkin’s characterization really that far off? Street begins her
defense of this charge by complaining that Dworkin’s (2) is unfair to antirealists because it’s
couched in terms of what there is a moral objection to rather than in terms of normative reasons
in general.600 Street also argues that an antirealist could opt for morality/reasons externalism so
that even if there is a moral objection to (2), not everyone has a reason to always be moral.601
It’s actually Street’s complaint that is unfair, however. Dworkin is defending the facevalue view of morality so it’s not legitimate to complain about him using that conception in his
argument. Forcing Dworkin to adopt the antirealist framing would be begging the question
against him. There is also a real irony to Street’s objection, since, as we saw above, it was
actually Street who decided to read Dworkin’s statements about morality in terms of general
normative reasons in the first place. Dworkin is being consistent with his use of terms – it is
Street who is arguably trying to stack the deck by changing it. Street writes that, “To avoid
prejudicing the debate against the antirealist with an implicit appeal to platitudes associated with
the concept of morality, then, the claim in question should be couched in terms of reasons.”602 As
we will see below, however, implicit appeals to platitudes associated with the concept of
morality are unavoidable, which is, in fact, part of Dworkin’s whole point. Street actually
illustrates the archimedean’s pretension of neutrality – which she thinks requires the language of
reasons – while in fact it is not neutral at all. Street’s framing of the argument in terms of reasons
obscures the underlying moral issues, as we have already seen. If Street is accusing Dworkin of
begging the question, Dworkin’s response is that the question is being begged either way.
Street’s second point against Dworkin’s (2) follows a similar vein. She writes, “An
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antirealist will not accept blanket statements of the form ‘There is no reason not to Y’ or ‘There
is reason to Z.’”603 Again, notice that Street has re-cast Dworkin’s statement about moral
objections into the language of reasons, which obfuscates the point being made. Dworkin is not
asking anyone to accept a blanket statement of the form, “there is no reason not to Y,” but he is
insisting on rejecting the statement that “there is no moral objection to Y,” where Y is the
atrocities he describes. The debate is, after all, about moral realism.
Street says, “one might think that it’s a conceptual truth or near conceptual truth that
there is ‘some moral objection’ to torturing a child for fun—such that any ‘morality’ that denied
this wouldn’t be recognizable as a brand of morality at all. Because it denies such a fundamental
moral platitude, proposition (2) sounds almost crazy.”604 Dworkin’s answer would be yes, that’s
exactly the point. If we can’t conclude that genocide is morally wrong (as opposed to just our
having no reason to do it but somebody else might), then we can reach no credible moral
opinions at all. But that’s just what Street thinks – that we can reach no credible moral opinions
at all, only non-moral (i.e. mind-dependent) normative ones. In that case, the only objection for
Street appears to be that having it spelled out in such stark terms looks obviously wrong to any
normal, rational person.
Street does admit that the antirealist might agree to a statement such as the following:
“Some agents, because they possess a starting set of evaluative attitudes very different from our
own, have no normative reason not to exterminate an ethnic group, enslave a race, or torture a
young child for fun. An ideally coherent Caligula would be an example of such an agent.”605 At
the same time she notes that “Kantian antirealists such as Korsgaard—would not even assent to
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this much, claiming instead that it’s entailed from within every practical point of view that one
has reason [emphasis added] not to do such things.”606 Leaving aside for the moment that Street
herself has said that she thinks Kantian antirealism is implausible, the point to notice is that
Street is still reading (2) by replacing “moral objection” with “reason” and importing her
expansive category of reasons which includes non-moral reasons. That objection holds just as
much against Kantian antirealists as against Humeans. Dworkin’s (2) is correct if moral realism
is false and moral antirealism is true, assuming that “moral objection” is taken in the face-value
sense. Street may not like it or want to accept it because of its stark counterintuitive force, but
this seems to be simply bringing to light the full effect of adopting antirealism and forcing
antirealists to “bite the bullet.”
Biting the Bullet: Ideally Coherent Caligula
Street’s reference to an ideally coherent Caligula is a useful point of departure for
discussion. The concept is straightforward enough: “Caligula judges that he has most normative
reason to torture others for fun, and this conclusion (it is stipulated) follows perfectly from
within his own practical standpoint: he is utterly consistent in holding that he has this reason, and
he is making no mistakes about matters of non-normative fact.”607 Street notes that realists would
hold that such a person could exist, but he would be mistaken about his reasons, whereas Street’s
Humean antirealism says that he can exist and is not mistaken.608 On the Kantian view which
was mentioned above, an ideally coherent Caligula is not even possible.609 With only minor
adjustments we can see that an ideally coherent Caligula could have reason to commit genocide
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or enslave a race under antirealism. Street has the unenviable task of defending Caligula. The
question is how much water her defense holds.
For ease of reference, here again is the proposition that Street gives as a more palatable
replacement for Dworkin’s (2) above:
(2') Some conceivable agents have reason to exterminate an ethnic group or enslave a
race or torture a young child for fun in front of its captive mother, but most real-life
human beings have no such reasons, and if we ever encounter any who do, then we (you
and I and the vast majority of human beings) have reason to band together against them,
lock them up, and throw away the key.610
A straightforward reading of the words “most real-life human beings have no such reasons,” with
no other context, would mean that most people have no reason of any kind to commit genocide,
not even one which is outweighed by other reasons. Street’s readers will no doubt be apt to
accept this statement without question, because of course we know that only evil monsters would
even think of committing genocide. But that’s because Street’s readers most likely have a strong
intuition that genocide is unspeakably evil and abhorrent in the robust realist sense, even if they
profess to be antirealists. It’s not simply that we have no reason to commit genocide, it’s that we
have a strong moral reason not to even think about doing such a thing.
With constructivism, the question is what someone’s reasons are on the whole. In line
with what we saw earlier, if Joe’s reason for not committing genocide is that, as much as he
would like to see some particular ethnic group exterminated, on the whole he considers it to be
too much of a time commitment that would detract from other pursuits that he values, then he
can be said to have normative reason not to do it. A little reflection will show that it would be
unusual for there to be any person who had no normative reason whatsoever not to commit
genocide (i.e. an ideally coherent Caligula), given Street’s expansive understanding of
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normative. To put it in language that is abhorrent from a moral standpoint, genocide would be an
enormous undertaking with significant obstacles and risks. Given the number of possible
practical reasons for not doing it, it would be unsurprising to find that very few people have no
such reasons in their entire range of evaluative judgments.611 So the fact that there are few
ideally coherent, genocidal Caligulas does not help Street’s cause. That would be true even if the
world was mostly populated by people who would love to commit genocide but were simply too
preoccupied to tackle such an intense and demanding project. It seems more likely that Street is
thinking most real-life people have no reason to commit genocide because most people aren’t
evil monsters.
Again returning to previous points, even if someone does have reason not to commit
genocide, Street’s argument guarantees that it is not a moral reason. Instead, it has to be an SN
truth which entails the sentence, “I have reason not to commit genocide.” Once more, just as we
saw earlier with Carl, if someone’s reason is that they value all people, that still isn’t a moral
reason even though it sounds close. But in Street’s constructivism, it makes no difference if it’s
because the person cares about other people including out-group members or if it’s because he’s
just too tired after torturing puppies all day. In both cases he has reason not to commit genocide.
Neither reason is a moral reason, though one of them looks like it is.
One final point to make about ideally coherent Caligula before moving on is this. So far,
we have talked about a very small number of behaviors that most people find morally abhorrent.
Street assures us that most likely there are very few ideally coherent Caligulas with respect to
genocide, enslaving a race, or torturing a child. Consider all of the other possible atrocities we
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practical standpoint. But notice how abhorrent it is to even speak in such terms.
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could mention – rape, assault, various acts of terrorism, animal cruelty, etc. These kinds of things
happen all the time. How does Street know – how can she know – that many of the people who
do these things do not have normative reason to do them? Under antirealism, she can’t.
Good Reasons and Not-So-Good
The constructivist view is made to seem more palatable in part by not thinking it through
deeply enough. Consider that A’s reason for not committing genocide is that he just doesn’t want
to make the effort, while B’s reason is that B values all people including members of out-groups.
Is one of those reasons better than the other? Not according to constructivism, because “better” is
a value judgment that can only be made relative to the set of evaluative judgments of the agent
making the original judgment. I can’t judge someone else’s reasons to be bad, even if those
reasons wouldn’t withstand scrutiny in my own set of evaluative judgments.
Street’s statement that most people have no reason to commit genocide is true. But by
appealing to real-life human beings, Street is smuggling in everything that those human beings
believe about morality. Most of those human beings see things the way Dworkin does, not Street.
This is not to say that if people become constructivists they are more likely to commit genocide.
It just means that constructivism is an artifice that hides what is really going on in people’s moral
deliberations (though one might be tempted to ask constructivists who are forced to concede that
genocide might be okay for some people but is unthinkable for them why they aren’t more openminded).
We could apply a similar analysis to Street’s statement that the vast majority of human
beings would have reason to lock all the ideally coherent Caligulas up “and throw away the key.”
Under Street’s constructivism, Caligula is doing nothing wrong in committing genocide. It
doesn’t matter if what he is doing is wrong by our lights, because for Street the only standard
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that counts is Caligula’s, and by Caligula’s own lights, he should commit genocide. So, even if
we personally find genocide abhorrent, that has no bearing on whether Caligula’s actions are
right or wrong.612
Street argues that “even if it’s true that a person has reasons that are repugnant to us,
there are still plenty of other things we can say about this person—for instance that he is
despicable to us, and that it’s sad, from our point of view, that he and his reasons are like this.”613
To this one might reply, “so what?” What we’re looking for is an SN reason to lock him up and
throw away the key, even though he has done nothing wrong. Street can’t argue that he has done
something wrong from our point of view, because our point of view is not the view that counts
for right or wrong when it comes to Caligula’s actions, only his does. This, of course, is just the
problem with relativism. Much more could be said about it, but space does not permit.
Constructivists might say that even though the status of our moral intuitions has changed
(since we no longer think they correlate with attitude-independent truths), the intuitions
themselves can still be used. A parent can still follow the intuition to care for her offspring even
if it is in a mind-dependent sense (what Street refers to as “an antirealist’s more modest
sense”614). So we can still follow the intuition to stop genocidal maniacs even if it isn’t an
attitude-independent truth that we should. Even this is much more complicated than it sounds,
because we have a variety of conflicting intuitions in that case. For example, there is an intuition
already alluded to that we shouldn’t lock people up who haven’t done anything wrong. What
about the intuition that we should protect the innocent? That would mean that we should protect
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Caligula, because he is innocent by his own standards. The answer might be that, even if
genocide isn’t wrong according to the agent’s own standards, it is still against the law. This
would make “genocide is wrong” a conventional, rather than a moral standard. But that would
also mean that in a jurisdiction where there is no such law, there is no reason to lock up Caligula
(not to mention that the reason genocide is illegal in many places is because people writing laws
thought it was morally evil). It really is not as simple as just changing the epistemic status of our
moral beliefs and acting like not much has changed. At least some of the intuitions we held in a
realist sense would have to go, and probably more than we realize. The real question is if any
actual constructivist would ever undertake that project.
This does not prove that Street is wrong about what most people would have reason to
do. What it does show is that 1) things are not nearly as simple as Street would have us believe,
and 2) nobody really knows how the entire web of our normative beliefs would be affected by
replacing every single reason that would be considered an attitude-independent (i.e. moral)
reason with an attitude-dependent one. In the end, Street’s defense of Caligula looks like a
smokescreen which trades on the fact that people reading it believe deep down that genocide is
wrong – really wrong – and that anyone who commits genocide is unspeakably wicked and evil.
Without the support of that and a great many other face-value moral beliefs, the argument rings
quite hollow.
Our inner convictions are inescapably saturated from top to bottom with beliefs and
attitudes which we take to be true in the robust realist sense no matter how much we might try to
pretend otherwise in abstract philosophical arguments. There appears to be one particularly
revealing instance of this in Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma,” in a passage where Street is
discussing the tendency for people to give “out-group” members lesser treatment than those in
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their “in-group.” As we saw in previous chapters, this phenomenon is readily explained by
evolution. Street is making the point that tracking accounts don’t explain our tendency to make
evaluative judgments contrary to evolutionary forces (in chapter five we will see how theism can
answer this in a much more satisfying way that Street’s antirealism). But as for the belief itself,
that out-group members should be given lesser treatment than in-group members, Street writes,
“More and more, many of us are coming to think that this is not true [emphasis added].”615 It’s
possible that Street means “true” in the constructivist sense of “withstands scrutiny at reflective
equilibrium relative to our other beliefs,” but in that case what would it matter how many people
were having a similar reflective experience? According to Street’s own theory, someone who
thinks that out-group members should be treated with less regard is just as correct, provided that
person’s other beliefs mesh with it. But reading this passage gives a very strong impression that
Street thinks discrimination against outsiders is objectively wrong and momentarily let her guard
down in voicing that belief. It even sounds as though Street thinks growing numbers of people
are becoming aware of this fact, suggesting that something like moral progress is occurring.
Assessing Street’s Assessment of Dworkin
In responding to Dworkin’s solution to the realism/antirealism debate, Street repeats the
same interpretive mistakes that we have seen above. For example, she addresses the question
about internal and external arguments, saying, “one might worry that the argument is asking for
the very thing that Dworkin has already argued is impossible—namely a justification of one’s
normative convictions from some standpoint outside the normative domain.”616 As we have
already seen, this is not Dworkin’s argument, but rather Street’s reformulation of Dworkin’s
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argument in what Dworkin would call archimedean terms. But according to Street, Dworkin still
has left unresolved the following problem:
on the one hand, Dworkin accepts that there are robustly independent normative truths,
and on the other he thinks that he has a good idea of what they are, but it turns out that
these two normative views are incompatible when combined with other plausible
normative premises—in particular, reasoning about the odds that among all the possible
consistent evaluative systems, one’s own is among the independently true ones, coupled
with the point that one has no non-trivially-question-begging reason to think it is.617
Dworkin does see that there is a problem here, but argues that the archimedean conclusion is too
strong. At one point, Dworkin discusses the question of moral progress in the context of
answering the charge that, if moral disagreement is not the result of factual error or defective
cognitive faculties on the part of one or more of the disputants, then moral progress can’t be
explained. The archimedean conclusion which Dworkin resists is that “our moral opinions and
the opinions of those who disagree with us are all wrong because no moral opinions can be
right.”618 Dworkin counters that, for example, someone who is convinced that slavery is wrong
and that therefore we are right and the Greeks were wrong about this still has some explanations
available depending upon that person’s personal beliefs and convictions.619 However, Dworkin
concedes that in some cases we might have no good explanation other than that others “did not
‘see’ or show sufficient ‘sensitivity’ to what we ‘see’ or ‘sense.’”620
In responding to this, Street latches onto this last statement and suggests that this is akin
to saying that we won the lottery “without any non-trivially-question-begging reason to think
so.”621 That’s because Street thinks that Dworkin’s preferred solution to the entire debate is to
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consider our capacity for true moral beliefs to be pure luck.622 However, the passage in which
Dworkin appeals to moral luck is not in regard to how it is that our moral faculties happened to
be able to light upon attitude-independent moral truths, but is a response to a different question
altogether, namely the problem of psychological egoism.623 Space does not permit a detailed
examination of this, but Dworkin is addressing the supposed claim to austerity of archimedean
arguments and showing how, even in the worst-case scenario in which psychological egoism is
true, “non-moral discoveries cannot undermine or structurally change morality without
morality’s help.”624 As we saw above, Dworkin’s preferred solution to the realism/antirealism
debate is to refuse to accept the archimedean’s terms to begin with.
One might want to ask Street if she does or does not agree that we are right about slavery
being wrong, and that those who practiced it in the past were wrong in doing so. This isn’t to say
that constructivists think slavery is right, of course, but that it is not an attitude-independent truth
that slavery is wrong. Antirealists want to retain convictions such as “slavery is wrong,” but then
claim that they are retaining it in some subjective (i.e. attitude-dependent) sense. Dworkin thinks
part of the appeal of this view is that
It allows its partisans to be as culturally modest and relative as anyone might wish, to
abandon all claims as to their own morality's ultimate truth or even superiority to other
moralities. But it allows them to do this while still embracing their morality as
enthusiastically as ever before, denouncing genocide or abortion or slavery or gender
discrimination or welfare cheats with all their former vigor. They need only say that they
have revised their view not about the substance but about the status of their convictions.
They no longer claim objective truth for these convictions; they no longer think their
thoughts ‘mirror’ an external ‘reality.’ But they still hold them with the same intensity.
They can be as willing to fight or even die for their beliefs as they ever were, but now
with a difference. They can have their moral convictions and lose them too. Richard
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Rorty calls this state of mind ‘irony.’625
Dworkin says that there is no way to retain a moral belief in a subjective sense, there is only the
restatement of the original claim in philosophical language. Street and other antirealists want to
argue that it is question-begging for realists to talk about moral reasons rather than normative
reasons in general. After all, what is a moral reason except an attitude-independent, normative
truth? To claim that “slavery is wrong” is one of those attitude-independent truths is just begging
the question in the same way that many realist responses we saw in the previous chapter beg the
question. Dworkin is actually happy to concede this, except that he says the antirealist is begging
the question in the same way by restating the argument in subjective, rather than objective,
terms. As we saw in the previous chapter, the charge of begging the question has frequently been
lobbed at the other side by all combatants in this debate. If Dworkin is right, then both charges
have some truth to them. The problem with most realist arguments is that they want to level the
charge of begging the question at antirealists while retaining the same archimedean language and
way of thinking. Dworkin says this effort is misguided and doomed to failure.
The response of the debunker, of course, is to say that we only think of morality in
objective terms because evolutionary forces made us do it. The reason we are supposed to be
required to accept this is because of a scientific argument about the genealogy of our moral
faculties and beliefs.
Science and Moral Skepticism
Street argues that we are forced to become antirealists simply by continuing to function
from the practical standpoint. Street says that if her Darwinian dilemma is successful, “the realist
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is committed not only to a somewhat mysterious epistemology, but also to the much more radical
conclusion that—given the apparent odds against having won the normative lottery and the lack
of any (internal) reason to think we did—we are in all likelihood hopeless at discovering the
normative truth.”626 By continuing to reason practically – that is, by making choices based on our
practical reasons – Street argues that we are implicitly affirming that we aren’t hopeless at
knowing what our reasons are, and are thus practically affirming antirealism.627 Thus, in this way
of framing it, we have an SN reason to be skeptical of all ON claims.
But this isn’t quite right. According to the Darwinian dilemma, the reason we are
supposedly hopeless at discovering normative truth is because of a scientific claim, not a
normative one. Street is explicit about this in several places. For example, in talking about how
evolution could have produced an ability to grasp independent evaluative truths, Street writes
that, “this proposal, for the reasons I’ve already given, is scientifically [emphasis added]
unacceptable.”628 Many realists who want to resist the debunking conclusion also want to give
science pride of place in the discussion, which is why their arguments fail. Recall that
FitzPatrick’s solution in chapter three was to be willing to give up the principle of parsimony in
order to hold onto the belief that rape is wrong. The conviction that morality is worth holding
onto is a good one. Parsimony, however, is an essential principle that is applicable not just in
science but in every domain, so we can’t just give it up when it suits us. The problem with
FitzPatrick’s approach is in wanting to give scientific explanations the highest billing, but then to
arbitrarily deprive science of a vital tool if its machinations hit too close to home. Dworkin’s
solution, which is much closer to the mark, is to say that no domain automatically gets the
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highest billing, not even science. Sacrificing morality is too high of a price to pay in order to
keep science as preeminent.
Suppose that the debunkers are correct and science does rule out the possibility that our
moral faculties are reliable – as Street says, that this idea is scientifically unacceptable? Notice
that Dworkin’s point is that the antirealist position is morally unacceptable. Given the choice
between scientifically unacceptable and morally unacceptable, which should we choose? If
Dworkin argues that taking either side begs the question in the same way, then where does that
leave us? According to Dworkin, it leaves us to consider our own convictions and find what we
believe. He writes, “I mean that any reason we think we have for abandoning a conviction is
itself just another conviction, and that we can do no better for any claim, including the most
sophisticated skeptical argument or thesis, than to see whether, after the best thought we find
appropriate, we think it so. If you can't help believing something, steadily and wholeheartedly,
you'd better believe it.”629 In response to this statement, Street writes, “I agree with this. But the
thing I claim we can’t help believing, steadily and wholeheartedly, is that we have some idea of
what our reasons are. And this conviction is what drives us to antirealism.”630
Think back to Dworkin’s dilemma and Street’s response to it. Dworkin’s point was that
accepting (2) was simply out of the question, so whatever qualms there might be about (1)
(which might well be more than he allows), he’ll take it. Street’s rejoinder was, in effect, the
opposite. Because rejecting (1’) was out of the question, whatever qualms there might be about
(2’) (which were substantial in spite of her valiant attempts to mollify us), we must bite the bullet
and accept (2’). In each case it was a question of which premise was not up for discussion. For
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Dworkin, the moral premise (2) is not up for debate. But for Street, the conclusion of her
Darwinian dilemma, which is based on the results of science, is not an open question. According
to the debunker, if we have no scientific explanation for having reliable moral faculties, then we
can’t accept them as being reliable. It would have to be fantastic luck or a miracle, and neither of
those is acceptable in scientific terms. If morality has to go, it has to go; but we can retain
something close if we become antirealists about morality – or so the antirealist claims.
Suppose we bite the antirealist bullet and accept the possibility of an ideally coherent
Caligula. Are we really willing to accept that, for example, Hitler might have been an ideally
coherent Caligula for all we know? That he might not have been morally depraved?631 Would
Street really care to defend the proposition that Hitler might not have done anything wrong,
while hastening to add that we still had reason to go to war against him even though he might not
have done anything wrong? With regard to the question, “what can we not help believing?” isn’t
it the case that we can’t help believing that what Hitler did was really wrong, and it would be
wrong no matter who did it or what their evaluative judgments were? Or that not committing
genocide because you value all people including out-group members is really a better reason than
not committing genocide because you would rather spend your life getting rich off the stock
market – even though you wish someone would exterminate some minority ethnic group that you
find annoying? Dworkin’s point seems to be that of course this is what antirealists believe; they
just think they’ve found a way of “having their convictions and losing them, too.” The bulk of
this chapter has aimed at showing that antirealists have to really bite the bullet, not just pretend
to for the sake of philosophical arguments. Part of the contention of these concluding sections is
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that, no matter how hard they might try, they can’t.
On the other hand, what about biting the bullet of holding that we have no scientific
explanation for how we could have reliable moral beliefs, but we’re going to hold them anyhow?
Street thinks that the Darwinian dilemma forces us to conclude that if moral realism is true (I
deliberately use “moral” instead of Street’s “normative”) then we are hopeless at knowing what
our reasons are, and will experience practical paralysis as a result. Yet moral realists don’t seem
to have any more paralysis than antirealists – and as we saw at the beginning, antirealists can
have paralyzing situations as well.
Dworkin says that no domain should get veto power over the others. However, can the
antirealist argue that Dworkin is giving morality veto power over science? Is it just a case of
deciding which of our domains to give veto power to? The answer to that question is tied up with
the question of whether it’s really the case that science rules out human beings having a special
moral faculty that is in tune with attitude-independent, moral truths. This will be addressed in
chapter five.
Antirealism and Skepticism
One question which still remains to be asked is how exactly antirealism is supposed to
provide relief from skepticism in the first place. Recall Bedke’s cosmic coincidence argument
with the illustration of someone with a belief in a non-physical goblin war caused by a tumor.632
Upon learning that the tumor was causing his belief, the man’s belief in a goblin war would no
longer be justified. Could he save himself from goblin war skepticism by changing the status of
his goblin war beliefs to antirealist? It is hard to know what that would even mean. The man’s
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belief has been shown to be caused by a tumor, so he knows the goblin war is not real. What is
the difference between being an antirealist about a goblin war and holding that the goblin war is
not real? They seem to be two different ways of saying the same thing. So, if knowing the goblin
war is not real makes someone a goblin war skeptic, then being an antirealist about goblin wars
is just another way of saying that one is a goblin war skeptic. Yet Bedke argues that the cosmic
coincidence argument does not necessarily lead to skepticism because of the possibility of
antirealist options such as constructivism and expressivism.633
Bedke is not the only one who thinks that antirealism can help avoid skepticism. Kahane
opines that, “anti-objectivist metaethical views are attempts to give an account of existing
evaluative discourse, and as such, if successful, should leave our first-order evaluative beliefs
exactly as they are.”634 As we have seen, this is debatable. While we might be able to preserve
some of the normative sentences we had as realists, the beliefs lying behind those sentences will
have changed from moral to non-moral as we saw above. The important question is whether all
of the non-moral beliefs can continue to support the weight of all of the normative sentences that
used to be supported by our moral beliefs. Or at least, that would be the question if we could
actually get rid of all of our moral beliefs in the first place. Part of Dworkin’s argument, as we
have seen, is that we cannot.
Enoch argues that if realists cannot explain the reliability of their moral beliefs, then they
can only remain realists by accepting skepticism. Thus, he writes, “If the only way to be a realist
is to deny epistemic justification for any normative belief . . . then antirealism gains significant
ground”635 – which seems to imply that if realists become antirealists, their normative beliefs are
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then justified. The appropriate question here would seem to be “justified in what way?”
Typically, justification is the status of a belief in which the person holding it has good reason for
thinking it to be true. This can be the case even if the belief is not true, but the person holding the
false belief has good reason to think it is true anyhow. But with antirealism, we are talking about
believing that some supposedly objective fact is not an objective fact. Applying this again to
goblin war beliefs, it would be like saying that the man’s belief in a goblin war is justified –
meaning that he has good reason to think it is true. Except that it is not true, and he knows it is
not. So whatever “justified” means in this context, it is a much different sense from someone
who has good reason for thinking that a belief is true. It seems misleading to use the language of
justification to describe an antirealist belief. Of course, as we have seen above, a belief such as
“genocide is evil,” when translated into the language of reasons, does not simply change its
status and suddenly become justified. Instead it disappears altogether and is replaced by a
different belief entirely – or a belief which is almost the same, but not quite.
Schafer and Crow both argue that adopting antirealism is one way to ensure that our
normative faculties are reliable, since our normative beliefs in that case are mind-dependent.636
But this is even more perplexing than speaking of justification. One might as well argue that our
beliefs about Andromedans are reliable as long as we understand them in a mind-dependent way
rather than mind-independent. Crow, recall, argued that there are two ways to save a domain
from skepticism in the case that a cosmic coincidence argument was needed for those beliefs to
be reliable – antirealism or theism.637 Crow also argued against Street by saying that if Street’s
dilemma was successful, then so was Plantinga’s. However, as we saw, theism was still an
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option for Street as it was for Plantinga. If antirealism is not an option, then, theism will remain
as an option, if not the most plausible option for explaining moral knowledge.
Not everyone sees antirealism as an escape from skepticism, however. Machuca argues
that antirealism just is a form of skepticism. He writes that, “though some might be reluctant to
regard moral anti-realism as a form of skepticism, not only is it a fact that it is commonly
regarded that way among metaethicists, but there are also good reasons for so doing.”638
Machuca observes that metaethicists find it obvious that antirealism is a form of skepticism, but
that epistemologists see this as “a surprising mistake.”639
Street addresses this worry briefly, asking that, supposing we discovered good evidence
that our perceptual beliefs were being caused by a “whimsical hypnotist,” if it would make sense
to change our beliefs about our surroundings to antirealist beliefs “so that we’d no longer have
reason to think we were hopeless.”640 Street says she doesn’t think this would make sense, but
then follows that up by saying that “I think that every domain of judgment needs to be looked at
individually, and—as Dworkin would agree—it’s a question of what’s most plausible all things
considered.”641 But this misses the point. If you have a set of beliefs that you come to conclude
are false, and thus those beliefs are no longer justified, they don’t suddenly become justified
because you decide to hold them in some attitude-dependent way. It has nothing to do with what
domain it is – if it makes no sense to do it with perceptual or empirical beliefs, then it makes no
sense to do it with moral beliefs, either.
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The idea that antirealism can rescue us from skepticism seems to be based on the same
kind of archimedean thinking that Dworkin argues so forcefully against. It seems on the one
hand like a kind of make-believe in which we have our own set of beliefs which are “true for us”
but no one else, like some kind of an invisible friend. Some atheists think that’s what theism is
like, but Street (an atheist herself) would likely scoff at a religious believer who said he was an
antirealist about God. What would that mean? That God existed for that believer in an attitudedependent sense? In that case, that wouldn’t be God at all. The same is true of morality. What the
moral (or normative) antirealist claims is morality in an attitude-dependent sense isn’t morality at
all, but a cheap imitation. Antirealism does not deliver us from skepticism; it just encourages us
to embrace it and make peace with the consequences as best we can.
Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined Street’s claim that becoming antirealists, besides being
something we are forced into by her Darwinian dilemma, also allows us to avoid the normative
skepticism entailed by that argument. By adopting an antirealist view toward our normative
beliefs, those beliefs could go from being unjustified to being justified, and allow us to continue
living as people who were not saddled with the predicament of being hopeless at knowing what
their reasons are. What we saw, however, was not what was promised.
The moral beliefs we had as realists did not just change their status; they disappeared
altogether. We received assurances that our normative beliefs would not be affected much, but
that there might be some – probably very few – people who would now have reason to engage in
murder, genocide, and other practices that most people find morally abhorrent. The reason this
was supposed to be a price worth paying was that science rules out the possibility that our moral
faculties are in tune with attitude-independent, moral truths. We also saw Dworkin resist this
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idea by appealing to things that we can’t help believing. The antirealist and the realist just can’t
agree on what those things are.
In the end, antirealism does not seem like a way around moral skepticism at all, but just a
special form of it. There is still the problem lurking in the background raised by the debunking
challenge, that says that maybe morality isn’t real, after all. If that’s the case, then maybe
skepticism is the fate that awaits us. There is still some reason for hope, however, as we have not
yet exhausted all options. The final chapter will be an examination of one such option, namely
theism.
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CHAPTER 5
THEISM AND EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING

It would be good at this stage to review the results of the previous chapters. Chapters one
and two laid out the evidence and arguments for the two premises of evolutionary debunking
arguments: the empirical premise and the epistemic premise. We looked at some preliminary
objections that were aimed at keeping the argument from getting off the ground, but none of
those objections provided any compelling reason not to engage with the debunking challenge.
We also saw several different versions of EDAs. The most prominent challenge is that of Street,
though Joyce, Ruse, and several others also made notable contributions to the argument. The
conclusion of those arguments seemed to pose a real challenge to moral realism, with the focus
of that challenge on how to explain the correlation between moral truths and our moral beliefs,
given that our moral faculties were produced by evolutionary processes.
In chapter three we saw numerous attempts on the part of realists to answer this challenge
in various ways. One such way was to point out that the debunker’s challenge proves too much,
and thus poses a threat not just to moral knowledge, but other kinds of beliefs such as perceptual
beliefs, as well as mathematical and logical beliefs, which would possibly undermine the
debunker’s own argument. The strongest rebuttal to this from the debunkers had to do with
explaining perceptual beliefs, while mathematical and logical beliefs were somewhat more of an
open question. Nevertheless, there did not seem to be any conclusive reason to show that the
debunking challenge had failed. Other attempts included a number of third-factor arguments
which all seemed to be susceptible to the charge of begging the question by assuming one or
more of the beliefs that the debunking challenge had called into question in the first place. Other
attempts tried to escape Street’s Darwinian dilemma by taking one of the two horns and showing
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how we could reason our way to moral truth in spite of evolutionary influences on our starting
values, or how evolution might be able to track moral truths after all. None of these efforts
provided much hope for moral realists. Most of them appeared to be designed to shift the burden
of proof back onto the debunker, or show why realists shouldn’t have to shoulder it to begin
with.
In chapter four we looked at the idea that antirealism could help us avoid moral
skepticism in spite of the debunking challenge. The primary argument here was that of Street
herself, and her version of Humean metaethical constructivism. Rather than showing how
antirealism avoids moral skepticism, however, the arguments indicated that in fact antirealism
just is a kind of moral skepticism. Part of Street’s argument, however, was to show that we could
avoid normative skepticism, where normativity is understood as including any practical reason.
Street’s primary argument was that it was scientifically unacceptable to postulate that human
beings have a faculty which could reliably discern attitude-independent, moral or normative
truths. We saw Dworkin’s response to this, which was to argue that the debunking challenge is
morally unacceptable, and to point out that both sides are begging the question in the same way.
This seemed to leave us at an impasse, standing on the brink of moral skepticism with nothing to
break the deadlock.
This chapter will examine a solution which is occasionally mentioned in the debunking
literature but rarely developed or considered seriously, and that is theism. It will be argued that a
special moral faculty is not ruled out by scientific arguments at all, but rather by underlying
philosophical assumptions which do not themselves have a scientific basis. It will also be argued
that Dworkin is correct in his judgment that the debunking conclusion is morally unacceptable.
Where Dworkin’s analysis falls short, however, is in providing no way to break the deadlock
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between science and morality. Not only does theism provide a solution to that, but also arguably
offers a much more satisfactory solution to other issues which have arisen during the course of
this dissertation.
Background Assumptions
Wielenberg notes that “most of the parties to the contemporary debate over EDAs assume
that theism is false,” and because of this, the possibility of theistic implications of EDAs is not
developed or seriously considered.642 We did see, however, Crow’s contention in chapter three,
reiterated at the end of chapter four, that antirealism and theism were the only options for
avoiding skepticism in the face of a cosmic coincidence argument.643 We have seen that
antirealism does not avoid skepticism at all, so in a sense the challenge is still unanswered. It’s
just that the options might be reduced to a choice between skepticism and theism. On the face of
it, it certainly seems as though theism can account for a cosmic coincidence, since the
coincidence would turn out to have been orchestrated.644 Klenk suggests that divine revelation
could be one response to the tracking problem.645 This is essentially the idea to be explored in
this chapter, and in particular the question of whether such an explanation actually is
scientifically unacceptable as is often alleged. Locke, meanwhile, suggests that a theist could
answer the debunking challenge by arguing that “God set up the initial conditions of the universe
in the way that he did because the normative facts are what they are, and he knew that setting
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things up in that way would lead us to normative beliefs in line with the normative facts.”646 This
option might appear, on the surface at least, to be more acceptable to someone inclined to think
that causal closure is an essential principle of science and is not congenial to the idea of a God
who intervenes in the created order. We will not have any more to say about this here, but it is
mentioned as an option.
It will be recalled that Greene’s debunking argument was aimed not at morality per se but
at deontological moral theories (although Greene himself is an antirealist who endorses
utilitarianism for pragmatic reasons). It is worth taking another look at a quote from Greene in
which he gives his reasons for rejecting Kant’s solution to the coincidence between moral
emotions (such as disgust responses) and the conclusions of his deontological theories (which
Greene views as rationalizations of the underlying emotions with evolutionary origins). Greene
writes,
Present-day rationalist deontologists, as citizens of the twenty-first century, cannot
depend on the notion that God gave us our moral emotions to encourage us to behave in
accordance with the rationally discoverable deontological moral truth. Instead, they need
some sort of naturalistically respectable explanation for the fact that the conclusions
reached by rationalist deontologists, as opposed to those reached by consequentialists,
appear to be driven by alarmlike emotional responses.647
It is difficult for theistic arguments to even get a hearing in an environment in which even
serious consideration of them is considered a relic of bygone centuries. Notice that Greene says
twenty-first century deontologists need a “naturalistically respectable explanation.” This is
reminiscent of Street’s “scientifically acceptable” requirement. While this is likely to remain as
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an unspoken assumption, nevertheless it is an assumption that “scientifically acceptable” and
“naturalistically respectable” are part and parcel of the underlying theoretical commitments of
vast swaths of modern academic philosophy. It is also an unspoken assumption that scientifically
acceptable and naturalistically respectable are part of the same package deal. This assumption,
however, is not a scientific one at all, as we will see.
Bogardus is one of the few published authors in this debate to treat divine revelation as a
serious option, saying that this was important “if only because there have been and still are many
Divine Revelationists—perhaps not lately in academia but certainly out there in the wild.”648
Joyce makes a similar observation with respect to his preferred categories of moral
nonnaturalists and moral supernaturalists. He writes that, “Even if these stances are not
abundantly populated by contemporary philosophers, I think it is safe to say that they come the
closest to capturing what ordinary speakers believe.”649 A 2014 survey by Bourget and Chalmers
backs up these statements. According to their research, only about 26% of philosophers identify
as non-naturalists, while a scant 15% are theists. At the same time, over 56% are moral
realists.650 The implication seems to be that a sizable number of contemporary philosophers are
moral naturalists. But almost all of the moral non-naturalists we have looked at in this
dissertation are atheists.
Dworkin observed that the question of burden of proof in a philosophical investigation
depends upon “how opinion stands when the investigation begins.”651 To put this statement in
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context, Dworkin is responding to Wright’s argument that moral realists have the burden of
proof to explain the mechanism of how human beings can come to know about moral facts, and
includes an appeal to Ockham’s razor (parsimony) in the process. Dworkin says that there is no
such “free-standing methodological postulate” to resolve such disputes.652 This could lead to the
troubling result that someone could simply hold onto any belief in anything whatsoever, whether
morality or invisible goblin wars or Andromedans, no matter what the evidence suggests. This is
not what Dworkin is saying, as he explains later: “Of course, we cannot simply stipulate that
some set of opinions––astrological propositions, for example, or religious doctrines about a God
with causal powers––are true and then declare that whatever methods of investigation would
confirm those opinions, no matter how apparently scandalous, are for that reason reliable.”653
The issue is that debunkers like Street, Joyce, and company are demanding an explanation for
moral knowledge that is able to receive the stamp of approval of science, when morality as a
domain makes no scientifically testable or verifiable claims. As Dworkin points out, such
explanations are not available for many philosophical disputes, either.654 Nevertheless, there does
seem to be something right about wanting an explanation for how human beings can have
knowledge of moral facts.
Sauer analyzes Street’s argument in terms of what he calls “the weakest link argument,”
which nicely captures the ideas here – with one important caveat. Given the following three
beliefs which are incompatible, says Sauer, the question is which one to give up:
(i) Our evaluative beliefs have been shaped by evolutionary forces that did not track
mind-independent evaluative facts.
(ii) We are justified in accepting (and continuing to accept) our most central evaluative
beliefs.
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(iii) There are mind-independent evaluative facts.655
The caveat is that (iii) isn’t the issue for Street, at least as not as far as her Darwinian dilemma is
concerned. The issue for Street is ostensibly epistemic – whether we can have knowledge of
mind-independent evaluative facts. In his attempt to lay out Street’s dilemma, Sauer makes the
same mistake when he presents the conclusion of it as “Therefore, there are no mindindependent moral facts.”656 But no evolutionary debunking argument or any other scientific
argument can reach this conclusion, any more than scientific arguments can prove that God does
not exist. Street tries to work around this by, as we saw in the previous chapter, expanding the
relevant domain from morality to normativity in general and arguing that we have a practical
reason to adopt normative antirealism.
As Sauer presents it, Street’s argument is that (i) is non-negotiable and (ii) is practically
necessary, so (iii) is the one that has to go. In response, Sauer suggests that if pragmatic
considerations are allowed (which is what Street uses in her assessment that we can’t live
without (ii)), then there is no obstacle to someone using that as a reason to drop (i), since “it is
clear that human beings can get along without accepting it, as evidenced by the fact that they
have gotten along without accepting it for most of their history.”657 Sauer’s point is not that he
would take that option himself, saying “that most people, myself included, would find this bullet
too hard to bite”658 (although by “most people,” Sauer may be mainly thinking of most of the
people he associates with – namely, other academics). The point is that there is no reason why
someone couldn’t just drop (i) based on the choices that Street offers. In response it might also
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be pointed out that one does not even have to go so far as to give up evolutionary science, but
instead the more expansive conclusion that evolutionary science says everything there is to say
about human nature. This seems to be the approach taken by Nagel, for example. He writes,
“There is no reason to allow our confidence in the objective truth of our moral beliefs, or for that
matter our confidence in the objective truth of our mathematical or scientific reasoning, to
depend on whether this is consistent with the assumption that those capacities are the product of
natural selection.”659
In the previous chapter we saw that Street’s position involved biting the bullet of
rejecting the view that certain clear moral intuitions, like that genocide is wrong, pointed to
objective moral facts. Dworkin’s view, on the other hand, involved biting the bullet of not having
a scientifically approved explanation for the reliability of our moral faculties. For both Dworkin
and Nagel, adopting theism evidently involves biting other bullets that they are not willing to
bite, which we will examine at the end of this chapter. The upshot, however, is that the argument
does seem to often resolve into a question of one’s prior philosophical commitments and which
bullets one is willing to bite.
Without the underlying assumptions that give reason to think that objective moral values
do not, in fact, exist, debunking arguments would have significantly less appeal. These
assumptions are not the result of scientific investigation, but rather an assumption of materialistic
philosophy that is often fused with science in modern academia. The reason this matters has to
do with Dworkin’s observation that the results of a philosophical investigation depend upon the
starting points. If the starting point is that moral values couldn’t have existed before creatures
with the ability to value something evolved (as Street argues), then it is very difficult to account
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for those values being attitude-independent. However, as we have seen there are several atheists
who defend moral realism against EDAs. Two of those arguments that have not yet been
examined in detail include one by Huemer and another by de Lazari-Radek and Singer. Both
Huemer and Singer were included in the discussion of limited debunking arguments. In the next
section we will examine their arguments against global debunking arguments. Singer and de
Lazari-Radek base their argument on universal benevolence, while Huemer’s is based on what he
calls liberal values. I will argue that neither of these arguments succeed in providing a nontheistic account of moral realism, but that both point the way toward a theistic argument which
does succeed.
The Argument from Universal Altruism
One issue which has been discussed at some length in previous discussion is that of
altruism. The phenomenon of altruism is an important issue with regard to ethical theories in that
altruism has to do with behavior done for the benefit of another rather than for the benefit of the
agent. In fact, this can be seen as the very essence of morality. Dugatkin writes, “at its heart,
altruism is about incurring a personal cost in order to help others, and that is close to what most
of us mean when we speak of doing good. So in essence, a theory on altruism is a theory on
goodness.”660 Alexander agrees as far as the connection between altruism and morality goes,
saying that, “the concept of morality implies altruism or self-sacrifice.”661 While he notes that
not all moral acts require self-sacrifice, and not all self-interested acts are immoral, he says that,
“I suspect most would agree that a moral life will inevitably call for some acts with net cost to
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the actor.”662
If it is the case that altruism and morality go hand-in-hand, then the problem for moral
realism is accounting for an attitude-independent truth that altruism is good. Moreover, in light
of the debunking challenge that has occupied our attention for the previous four chapters, realists
also need to account for how we can have knowledge of such an attitude-independent truth. We
saw various attempts to provide an account of moral knowledge in chapter three, either indirectly
(via third factor arguments) or directly. None of the realist models in that chapter attempted to
explicate altruism or benevolence as a substantive moral truth. The reason for this in regard to
third factor arguments is that these arguments require a starting point (the so-called “third
factor”) which evolution would select for – things such as survival being good, pain being bad,
having rights, promoting well-being, and the like. As we saw in chapter one, altruism does not
make a good fit for that. We saw several different models that attempted to account for altruism
in evolutionary terms, with the primary models being kin selection, group selection (which is
controversial among biologists), and reciprocity. We also noted that these models only work
under very specific circumstances and require all of the factors to be just right. Moreover, even
the best of them result in what Sober and Wilson describe as “within-group niceness and
between-group nastiness.”663
As we already know, the debunker’s charge against realists is that our moral (or
evaluative) judgments are strongly influenced, even if not entirely determined, by evolutionary
forces. In discussing these evolutionarily-influenced values, Street writes,
Why, for instance, do we view the death of our offspring as a horror, rather than as
something to be sought after? Why do we think that altruism with no hope of personal
reward is the highest form of virtue, rather than something to be loathed and eliminated?
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Evolutionary biology offers powerful answers to these questions, very roughly of the
form that these sorts of judgements about reasons tended to promote survival and
reproduction much more effectively than the alternative judgements.664
But Street’s contention that evolution has a “powerful answer” for the belief that altruism is the
highest form of virtue is simply not true. Biologists have struggled to explain altruism in
evolutionary terms ever since Darwin’s time, even in a limited sense. Universal altruism is
beyond what any evolutionary model can account for. Darwin himself attempted to gloss over
this problem by saying that once altruism within the group had arisen, there was only an
“artificial barrier” to extending it to all of humanity.665 This, however, is mistaken. With
evolutionary models, it is not an artificial barrier at all. In fact, evolutionary pressures will select
against any tendency toward universal altruism or benevolence, because such benevolence will
decrease the fitness of the group that has it and increase the fitness of rival groups that lack it.
Far from being an “artificial barrier” as Darwin said, the barrier is actually natural selection
itself. Evolution might explain (with some difficulty) limited altruistic tendencies toward family
and possibly members of close groups, but not universal altruism.
Universal Altruism as Maladaptive Moral Intuition
De Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that universal benevolence escapes Street’s Darwinian
dilemma because of its inexplicability in evolutionary terms. To be precise, de Lazari-Radek and
Singer offer an argument in support of the proposition that Sidgwick’s axiom of rational
benevolence (which they also refer to as universal benevolence) counts as moral knowledge.
They correctly observe that “It is . . . difficult to see any evolutionary forces that could have
favored universal altruism of the sort that is required by the axiom of rational benevolence. On
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the contrary, there are strong evolutionary forces that would tend to eliminate it.”666 This strategy
would also receive support from Shafer-Landau’s principle of causal immunity, which states that
if we have cognitive and conative commitments that were probably not adaptive in the past,
“then their presence is not (or not very substantially) the result of doxastically discriminating
selective pressures.”667 This appears to give the realist a potential foothold that was lacking from
third factor accounts, because third factor accounts must be based on beliefs which are adaptive
in order to support the claim that evolution would indirectly track them. So what about starting
from moral intuitions which are maladaptive?
Street’s answer as to why people hold values which do not reflect evolutionary influences
is that evolutionary pressures are indirect, shaping our basic tendencies toward certain evaluative
judgments. The specific content of our judgments is also influenced by other factors such as
culture, upbringing, and personal reflection.668 One objection to this might be that it is so vague
and malleable as to be virtually useless. The exact genealogy of any particular moral belief is
very difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint. Part of the challenge for the realist, however, is to
show not just that a belief such as universal benevolence is not evolutionarily adaptive, but that it
was produced by a truth-tracking process. De Lazari-Radek and Singer, as well as Huemer, see
moral truths as a kind of a priori truth, and the cognitive faculties used to grasp these truths as a
kind of rational intuition.
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Moral Beliefs as Rational Intuitions
De Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest that the ability to discern self-evident moral truths
which do not help with survival may have arisen as a byproduct of reasoning abilities which did
help with survival as part of “a package that could not be economically divided by evolutionary
pressures.”669 As we saw previously, Street has an answer to the byproduct hypothesis which is
that this only pushes the problem back a level and requires an explanation for what this other
faculty was and how it produced truth-tracking moral faculties. At that point, her Darwinian
dilemma can be run again on the byproduct faculty, with the same skeptical results. De LazariRadek and Singer acknowledge Street’s objection, but think they can survive it by appealing to
Sidgwick’s intuitionist utilitarian philosophy, which views moral truths as truths of reason
similar to other a priori truths (such as mathematical truths).670 They present three criteria by
which they think an intuition can be established as having the highest degree of reliability: “1.
careful reflection leading to a conviction of self-evidence; 2. independent agreement of other
careful thinkers; and 3. the absence of a plausible explanation of the intuition as the outcome of
an evolutionary or other non-truth-tracking process.”671 They argue that Sidgwick’s maxim of
universal benevolence meets all three of these criteria, a claim which we will evaluate in more
detail below.
Huemer also holds that moral knowledge is “of a kind with our other a priori knowledge,
such as our knowledge of mathematics and of necessary truths of metaphysics.”672 According to
Huemer,
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Rationalist intuitionism simply needs the assumption that there is some substantive, a
priori (non-evaluative) knowledge. Knowledge requires a reliable belief-forming
mechanism . . . so there must be a reliable mechanism that produces these non-evaluative
a priori beliefs. Whatever that mechanism is, the rationalist intuitionist maintains, that
mechanism is also capable of producing some moral beliefs.673
Notice carefully that Huemer says that a faculty which produces non-evaluative beliefs is also
capable of producing some moral beliefs. This will become important below in discussing what
morality is. In spelling out the details of how one can attain this moral knowledge, part of
Huemer’s answer is a response to a challenge from cultural debunkers – that is, those who argue
that we hold the moral beliefs we do only because of the culture we live in.674 As we saw above,
Street appeals to culture as one of the factors that influences the specific content of our
evaluative beliefs, even while evolutionary pressures play an indirect role in shaping our general
tendencies. Huemer argues that we can have confidence in the moral beliefs of our culture in the
same way that we can have confidence in the scientific beliefs of our culture – by trusting those
in our culture with relevant expertise, knowing that they have more reliable methods than experts
in other cultures. As an example, Huemer says we can trust our culture’s answer to the question
of how old the earth is, when in most times and places relying on the experts in one’s culture for
an answer to this question would lead someone astray. The belief now is reliable “because my
society used a reliable method to arrive at its estimate of the Earth's age—even if other societies
in other times used unreliable methods.”675
The natural question that follows is what is this method that experts in our culture have
that other cultures have lacked for moral beliefs? Before attempting to explain that, Huemer
presents five assumptions. These include two assumptions of rationalist intuitionism, namely that
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we have a capacity for producing substantive, a priori knowledge and that ethics is one area
where this is possible.676 Before even moving on to Huemer’s three additional assumptions, the
immediate problem is that his account of how one can know that moral knowledge in one’s
culture is produced by a reliable process begins by assuming that human beings are equipped
with faculties that can produce, among other things, reliable moral beliefs. But this, of course, is
not what debunkers are looking for when they ask for an account of how our moral faculties can
be truth-tracking if they were produced by evolution. They actually want an account of how
those faculties work at the level of detail, and specifically how evolution happened to result in
them tracking attitude-independent truths. Rather than giving such an account, Huemer just
assumes that there is one and that it’s a relevantly similar process to how we have knowledge of
other a priori truths, like mathematical and logical truths. It isn’t clear if the same cognitive
abilities that make one good at, say, math or logic also make one good at discerning moral truth,
but that seems to be the implication. This will strike many people as odd, but it will make more
sense below once we understand that Huemer’s idea of morality is much different from the
commonsense, face-value view.
Huemer’s three additional assumptions that he tacks on to the two above involve the fact
that people are influenced by various non-rational biases, that it is hard for anyone to diverge too
greatly from their culture, and that some people are better at grasping moral truths and are less
biased than others.677 Because of these factors, Huemer argues that even relatively unbiased
individuals will still find it difficult to differ from their culture too much, so change happens
gradually over time as reformers – those people who are more rational and less biased than
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average – promote ideas that are closer to the truth even if not all the way there. Huemer uses the
example of John Locke and his intolerance for atheists, even though he tolerated members of
other religions.678 It isn’t clear which experts the common folk should defer to, although Huemer
does give some hints: they are the reformers who are more rational and less biased than “their
conservative opponents,” and tend to be overrepresented in influential professions such as
“authors, professors, other intellectuals, or business or political leaders.”679 The message is that if
we want reliable moral knowledge, we should listen to the cultural elites.
It isn’t entirely clear what it is about the method of gaining moral knowledge in modern
Western culture that is different from any other culture. The scientific method does give modern
Western culture the edge in scientific claims, and hence in fields like technology, engineering,
medicine, aeronautics, and so forth. But even in Huemer’s account moral claims are not
scientific claims – they are comparable to a priori truths like mathematical truths, not a posteriori
claims like scientific ones. Perhaps Huemer means to argue that, because moral change
accumulates gradually over time, cultures in later times will be closer to the truth than previous
ones. But this is far from obvious and admits of plenty of counterexamples. As we will see
momentarily, Huemer offers evidence for this which we will have opportunity to assess.
Huemer’s “trust the experts” moral epistemology, then, fails to actually explain how the
experts have access to moral truths that the regular folk do not – except that the experts are,
according to Huemer, smarter and less biased than everyone else. Huemer writes, “It is even
compatible with the story I have told that almost everyone’s moral beliefs be almost entirely
determined by genes and culture—but not quite everyone, not quite entirely. Thus, empirical
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evidence showing that moral beliefs are often strongly influenced by genes and culture does not
undermine my account.”680 In other words, some people have moral faculties that are more
trustworthy – namely, the experts. Apparently not all smart people are moral experts though,
since it evidently doesn’t include antirealists and debunkers even though many of them appear to
fit the general profile Huemer has sketched. It isn’t clear how the rest of us are supposed to
recognize the right experts from the wrong ones. Huemer seems not to account for the possibility
that there might be people who are not the right kind of expert but might portray themselves as
such to others – or perhaps even be convinced in their own minds that they are even though they
are not. In that case, there could be clever people who are inching society in the wrong direction
instead of the right one.
In chapter two we discussed briefly Huemer’s argument that the convergence of
worldwide moral beliefs on liberal values is evidence that those values are true. In Huemer’s
view, liberalism involves three interlocking parts of a coherent whole that, “(1) recognizes the
moral equality of persons, (2) promotes respect for the dignity of the individual, and (3) opposes
gratuitous coercion and violence.”681 Huemer gives several areas where he believes that the
development of moral beliefs across history have moved toward liberalism. This includes war
and murder (movement in the direction of a lower death rate from these causes over time),
torture and execution, slavery, racism and sexism, democratization, and decolonization.682 He
argues that this moral progress toward liberalism “has been ongoing for millennia, accelerating
in the last two centuries, and even the last 50 years, and it affects virtually every country on
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Earth.”683 Huemer argues that evolutionary explanations do not account for how the emergence
of liberal values has occurred so recently and quickly, if they emerged because they were
adaptive.684 Huemer’s and de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s arguments have this in common: they
both argue on the basis of a claim which they believe is not susceptible to the debunker’s attacks.
For de Lazari-Radek and Singer, it is the intuition of universal benevolence. For Huemer, it is the
global convergence on liberal values. As we will see, however, both of these arguments are
better support for theism than for the consequentialist views of these thinkers. Before looking at
that, however, we need to unpack the above observations with respect to our moral faculties.
Moral Faculties and What Morality is For
Huemer, de Lazari-Radek, and Singer all think of moral truths as being relevantly similar
to truths in mathematics. We saw in chapter three one problem with appealing to mathematical
truths in answering the debunking challenge, since it isn’t clear that debunking arguments will
not also debunk mathematical truths. Another problem is that there appears on the surface at least
to be a fundamental difference between a priori truths in, for example, mathematics and logic on
the one hand, and morality on the other. The difference is the evaluative part – the part that says
that something is not just correct or incorrect, as in when we get a math problem wrong, but that
something is good or evil, which is right and wrong in a (face-value) moral sense. If someone
makes a mistake working on a math problem, we don’t consider that to be evil. It might be due to
inattention, to ignorance, or just that the person lacks an aptitude for math. But if someone
commits genocide, we think that is more than just making a mistake or being inattentive – it is
morally blameworthy, wicked, depraved, and evil. To place moral beliefs in the same category as
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mathematical ones is to fundamentally alter what morality is all about. It isn’t just that thinking
of morality this way leaves out something important – it leaves out the most important part, that
which distinguishes moral truths from non-moral truths. It is related to the approach of Street
who views everything in terms of reasons, but in the process loses any distinction between
different kinds of reasons. In that approach, any distinctively (face-value) moral reason simply
disappears altogether.
Huemer, along with de Lazari-Radek and Singer (not to mention Sidgwick), endorse a
kind of consequentialism. However it is spelled out, it involves the idea that actions which are
good are those which produce certain consequences, such as increasing the overall happiness in
the universe as in Sidgwick’s universalistic hedonism.685 As Anscombe points out,
consequentialist philosophies such as Sidgwick’s are incompatible with what she calls the
Hebrew-Christian ethic, the reason being that “it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that
there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten.”686 This also happens to
correspond with what is normally understood by robust moral realism. With consequentialist
theories, Anscombe points out, there is no basis for holding that it is never right to kill the
innocent.687 This leads to something which most people wouldn’t recognize as morality at all.
With consequentialist views, the goal of morality is to figure out what actions will lead to the
greatest net increase in universal happiness, which is perfectly compatible with great increases in
misery for certain unfortunate individuals. Recall Copp’s society-centered moral theory, in
which the authoritative moral code for a society is the one that would best serve that society’s
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basic needs. It reduces morality to a kind of engineering problem. But the face-value view of
morality is not like that.
When it comes to a discussion of what kind of faculty would be required to correctly
intuit moral truths, it is important to notice that that discussion has to proceed based on what
one’s underlying view of morality is. In the face-value view, there are important differences
between claims like “do to others as you would have them do to you,” a2 + b2 = c2, and modus
ponens. It certainly seems as though people who lack the capacity to readily grasp and utilize the
second and third truths in this set nevertheless can grasp and appreciate the first. However, if the
same faculties are used for cognizing all of these types of truths, then it would seem to imply that
someone who has a natural aptitude for math and logic will also have the same for morality. But
this raises a further problem. We know someone is good at math and logic by their practices in
those disciplines. Can someone be good at morality without practicing being a good person? Of
course, this requires a definition of good, and of what constitutes being a good person – both
evaluative, moral claims. The ethical views of Singer and Huemer are so different from that of
commonsense morality that someone who would qualify as a good person under the one might
be considered an evil monster under the other, as we will see below.
As Dworkin writes, “Even the deepest skepticism is an opinion about what morality
demands, and no argument can be decisive of that question that does not include premises or
assumptions about what morality is for.”688 This is inseparably connected to the conception of
what kind of faculty is required to produce beliefs which are compatible with a given metaethic.
If morality is like an engineering problem, then you want people working on it who are good at
solving those kinds of problems – in which case Huemer’s moral epistemology might actually
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make some sense. But if morality is more like a higher law, then attempting an engineering
solution is liable to get you into trouble. Also, the type of faculties that are good for engineering
will be of no help at all. Notice the circularity problem involved as well. The conception that one
has of what morality is for will determine what sort of truths moral truths are. And that question
will be determinative of what sort of cognitive faculties are needed to perceive those truths. But
the question then becomes where does the foundational view of what morality is for come from?
If the answer is it came from our rational faculties, it becomes viciously circular.
If moral truths are the same kind of truths as mathematical and logical truths (or at least
relevantly similar), then what was wrong with Hitler’s final solution? Assume Hitler believed
that eliminating the Jewish people would result in a net increase of happiness in the universe,
which would be a good result from a utilitarian standpoint. Assume also that he was mistaken in
that belief. In that case, Hitler’s error would seem to amount to something like getting his sums
wrong, or of committing a fallacy along the lines of affirming the consequent. We can use the
term “wrong” to describe both committing a logical fallacy and committing genocide, but of
these two only the latter also merits the description of “evil.” Huemer refers to Hitler as evil in a
footnote,689 but he can’t possibly mean by that word the same thing that the rest of us mean. In
the face-value view of morality, genocide would still be evil even if one could somehow show
that in fact it would result in a net increase in happiness in the universe. Moral questions are not
merely mathematical problems to be solved in the face-value view. Moreover, would we think
that Hitler was not morally blameworthy if he sincerely believed that eliminating the Jews would
be a net benefit to humanity? After all, in that case he was just sincerely trying to do what he
thought was best. Again, it implies that genocide might be just a miscalculation or an example of
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fallacious reasoning.
Notice that this actually shares more in common with Street’s antirealist constructivism
than with face-value morality. As we saw in the previous chapter, an ideally coherent Caligula
would be perfectly justified in committing genocide – in fact, it would be wrong for him not to.
Under utilitarianism, someone could be perfectly justified in committing genocide if the end
result is an overall increase in happiness. A utilitarian might argue that genocide could never
produce a result like that, but it would at least be a question open to debate. In the same way,
someone might commit genocide under Street’s constructivism and be mistaken if they wouldn’t
make that judgment at reflective equilibrium. But in that case, it would just be a matter of having
made an error or miscalculation in their thinking. This is in line with Anscombe’s observation
that the differences between modern moral philosophers are “trifling” compared to the fact that
they all exclude the Hebrew-Christian ethic, and without any evident awareness that there is such
an ethic to exclude.690 Huemer, along with de Lazari-Radek and Singer, often speak about
people’s preferences and common intuitions about morality, and are fully aware that their own
moral views are greatly out of step with the commonly held ones. Moreover, they see this as a
feature, not a bug. What really needs to be noticed, however, is not just that the consequentialist
view is greatly at odds with people’s common moral intuitions, but with their entire concept of
what morality is. This must be kept firmly in mind during discussions about moral faculties and
how they produce reliable moral beliefs.
Consequentialism and Moral Truth
Even if someone holding the face-value view of morality might see more in common
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between consequentialist views and antirealist ones, Huemer, de Lazari-Radek, and Singer all
claim to be defending realist or objectivist views.691 It is time to examine their defenses of that
position to see if they hold up under scrutiny. We begin with de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s view
that universal benevolence is a substantive moral truth that can evade the debunking challenge.
As we have seen, they begin by arguing that moral truths are similar to other a priori truths such
as mathematical ones. Setting aside the serious concerns raised above about this move for the
time being, another problem for de Lazari-Radek and Singer is the objection by Kahane
mentioned in chapter two, namely that because the disposition for limited altruism has an
evolutionary explanation, the reasoned extension of it to universal altruism should fall under
suspicion as well.692 Kahane’s objection is too quick, since as we have seen evolutionary
pressures would actually work against universal altruism, thus eliminating any tendency to make
such a reasoned extension. Taking a different tack, however, de Lazari-Radek and Singer argue
that if we can reach the principle of universal benevolence from a starting point which is not
debunkable, Kahane’s objection can be avoided altogether. Remember that de Lazari-Radek and
Singer have three criteria for establishing the highest degree of reliability for an intuition, the
first of which is “careful reflection leading to a conviction of self-evidence.”693 In their account,
“We form the intuition [of universal benevolence] as a result of a process of careful reflection
that leads us to take, as Sidgwick puts it, ‘the point of view of the universe.’”694
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Self-Evidence and the God’s-Eye View
The quote from Sidgwick about the point of view of the universe comes from a passage
in which he derives the maxim of benevolence based on an inference from two other principles
which he holds as self-evident: first, that present good is not preferable to future good (excepting
for the relative uncertainty of future good),695 and second, in Sidgwick’s own words, that “the
good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of
the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing
that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other.”696 Sidgwick appeals to
these principles as self-evident; we saw in chapter three what a debunker like Joyce would say to
this – namely, that it should be an embarrassment to philosophy that so many thinkers appeal to
their own opinions as self-evident truths. But there are other problems here that should be
noticed.
For starters, the universe doesn’t have a “point of view,” so whatever it is that Sidgwick
imagines as the point of view of the universe is simply an abstraction which is ostensibly neutral.
It is what Nagel means by “the view from nowhere,” an attempt to view oneself and the world
objectively.697 The question, however, is why is the “view from nowhere” the “right” view for
deciding questions of value? This, itself, is an intuition – not just that the good of one individual
is no more important than that of any other, but also that the detached, external point of view
which we can attain only through imagination is better than the internal, subjective view which
we all actually inhabit. But rather than a “view from nowhere” (which makes no sense if taken
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literally), I submit that this is actually an attempt to take God’s point of view.698 It is the point of
view of a conscious agent which is able to see all people at once without the limitations of time
and space that actual people have.
So, what we actually have here is an intuition that a God’s-eye view of the world is
“right” for questions of moral value, and that it is a better perspective than our own, limited
views. De Lazari-Radek and Singer might respond that it makes sense to take an objective view
for arriving at moral values because that’s the view that we try to use as much as possible for
scientific enquiries. However, it only makes sense to do this for moral values if one assumes that
there are objective moral values in the first place which can be perceived somehow from that
objective standpoint – but this is the question under dispute. It also assumes that by this act of
imagination we can actually free ourselves from the subjective standpoint. A little reflection,
however, should make it clear that we cannot. The imagined being which occupies the place of
God in this thought experiment is simply a projection of our own selves and our own values.
If the view from nowhere does not actually exist – which it doesn’t if there is no
conscious agent able to view the world from the outside, as it were – then there is no reason to
think that such an abstract, neutral point of view is to be preferred to any other point of view.
The reason why the good of any individual is no more important than another’s from the point of
view of the universe is because nothing is important to the universe at all. One might just as well
say that no one person’s good is more important than another’s from the point of view of some
particular slab of granite in Madagascar. That’s true in a trivial sense, but also entirely irrelevant
from a moral standpoint. If, however, the God’s-eye view does exist (which it does if theism is
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true), then it makes sense why that would be the right view to take for deciding questions of
value. It would also explain why we have an intuition that this is the case, assuming that our
moral intuitions are given by God in some way. Finally, if the Christian teaching that God is love
is true, this would also account for the intuition that universal benevolence is the highest good –
an intuition which may not depend upon what de Lazari-Radek and Singer think it does.
Jesus and the Golden Rule
The second criterion for maximal reliability for de Lazari-Radek and Singer is
“independent agreement of other careful thinkers.”699 They point to the fact that universal
benevolence is endorsed across cultures and religious traditions as supporting their claim that it
is a principle of reason. Specifically, they refer to various formulations of something like the
Golden Rule in Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in addition to Jewish and Christian
ones.700
Of course, de Lazari-Radek and Singer have more recent examples of careful thinkers
they can point to for endorsement of the Golden Rule. Sidgwick held that the Golden Rule is
self-evident and has practical importance even while he questioned some imprecision with it.701
Darwin also pointed to the Golden Rule as a singularly important moral principle, but then spoke
as if it was a result of evolutionary and scientific progress while ignoring the fact that it was
taught by Jesus as a revelation from God. Darwin wrote that, “the social instincts,—the prime
principle of man's moral constitution—with the aid of active intellectual powers and the effects
of habit, naturally lead to the golden rule, ‘As ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them
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likewise;’ and this lies at the foundation of morality.”702 Not only does Darwin not acknowledge
the origin of the Golden Rule in the teachings of Jesus, he also speaks elsewhere of how ancient
Rome – the era when Jesus lived – was lacking in advanced moral sensibilities, offering by way
of evidence “their abhorrent gladiatorial exhibitions.”703 It might be easy for philosophers living
centuries after it was introduced to breezily opine that the Golden Rule is perfectly natural,
obvious, and rational. But those same thinkers were intellectually fed by the culture that was
founded upon and promulgated this teaching for generations before they were born.
Tersman points out that the Christian teaching of love toward outsiders was “something
entirely new, and could not be found in, for example, Judaism or the pagan religions that at the
time existed in the Roman Empire.”704 For Tersman, a debunker himself, the implication is that
Singer has as much reason to reject the intuitions behind the maxim of universal benevolence as
he does the other moral intuitions which Singer takes to have been passed down by centuries of
Christian teaching. More relevant for the present argument is Tersman’s point that it was
centuries of Christian teaching that “encouraged the train of thought that leads to the conclusion
that the good of no one is more important from a moral point of view than the good of any other,
especially in the case of a philosopher like Sidgwick who so strenuously searched for
consistency and generality.”705 Hart makes a similar point when he argues that it took “centuries
of the relentless and total immersion of culture in the Christian story, to make even the best of us
conscious of . . . the moral claim of all other persons upon us, the splendor and irreducible
dignity of the divine humanity within them, that depth within each of them that potentially
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touches upon the eternal.”706 Sidgwick’s “point of view of the Universe” intuition also seems
most likely to originate in the cultural influence of Christianity, and in the teaching of
disinterested benevolence as the highest good. So even Sidgwick’s “self-evident” starting
assumptions upon which he builds his maxim of benevolence appear to be due to cultural
influences – specifically the influence of the Christian faith.
It might seem a bit peculiar for de Lazari-Radek and Singer to be citing ancient religious
texts as an example of the confirmation of other careful thinkers, given that they reject virtually
all traditional moral systems and intuitions. Singer, for example, sees the intuitions that have
been formed based on the cultural domination of Christianity as something to be gotten rid of.707
One of his complaints about Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium is that it utilizes our
intuitive moral judgments as part of the data that we take into account in trying to reach
equilibrium.708 If those intuitions are faulty, then using them as inputs will skew the results in
unwanted directions. Instead, Singer argues for getting rid of all of them since they “are likely to
derive from discarded religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from
customs necessary for the survival of the group in social and economic circumstances that now
lie in the distant past.”709 He instead argues that we should start with self-evident moral axioms
such as Sidgwick’s and do our reflective equilibrium on those.710 The problem is, those “selfevident moral axioms” likely seemed self-evident because of the influence of the religious
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system that Singer says we should discard.
It also seems highly doubtful that any of the traditions cited by de Lazari-Radek and
Singer reached their beliefs by using anything remotely like Sidgwick’s method. It is also worth
noting that, while de Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest that the Golden Rule is present in many
traditions, the actual versions that they cite in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are not
the Golden Rule but the Silver Rule, which says not to do to others what you would not want
them to do to you. Meanwhile the quoted version that they and Sidgwick actually use is that of
Jesus, who taught that the Golden Rule was a direct revelation from God.711 As far as Jewish
tradition goes, Neusner concludes that, “Classical Judaism is defined by generative propositions
and invites judgment concerning systemic traits. But the Golden Rule in its articulated form is
not one of these.”712 If Jesus was such a careful thinker, one might ask, then how is it that he
discovered such an important moral principle while getting the source of it completely wrong
according to de Lazari-Radek and Singer? We will consider possible answers to that below.
Universal Benevolence and Truth-Tracking
The third and final criterion given by de Lazari-Radek and Singer for establishing an
intuition as highly reliable is “the absence of a plausible explanation of the intuition as the outcome of an evolutionary or other non-truth-tracking process.”713 The proposition that there is no
plausible evolutionary account for the intuition of universal benevolence appears to be
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unassailable. However, de Lazari-Radek and Singer shift the burden of proof to the debunker to
provide a non-truth-tracking process to explain the intuition. This could seem like a bit of
cheating, since the absence of a non-truth-tracking explanation does not prove that there is a
truth-tracking one. They do admit that “the absence of good rival explanations for our intuitive
grasp of the principle of universal benevolence does not prove that it is a substantive normative
truth, but we consider it makes that a reasonable hypothesis to hold, at least until a better
explanation is offered.”714 So they at least must think there is some reasonable truth-tracking
explanation, perhaps in similar terms to the position of Huemer above since they hold along with
Huemer that moral truths are rational intuitions. The question, then, is if it is really the case that
debunkers have no good non-truth-tracking explanation – and, if not, what does that actually
show?
As we saw above, Street argues that culture, upbringing, and personal reflection all play a
role in determining the content of our evaluative beliefs. We have also argued that cultural
factors played a greater role in producing the supposedly self-evident intuitions above – namely
that the God’s-eye view is the “right” one and also the intuitions favoring universal benevolence
and the Golden Rule – than the thinkers mentioned above appreciated. If that is the case, then
debunkers can posit that a kind of selection occurred between different cultural systems in which
the successful ones were passed down, grew, and continued, while systems that did a poorer job
of successfully transmitting their ideas and values did not survive as a civilization, as Kitcher
argues.715 Ayala likewise posits that
The moral systems that currently exist in humankind are those that have been favored by
cultural evolution. They were propagated within particular societies for reasons that
might be difficult to fathom but that surely must have included the perception by
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individuals that a particular moral system was beneficial for them, at least to the extent
that it was beneficial for their society by promoting social stability and success.716
Joyce argues along a similar line, albeit somewhat whimsically, when he writes that, “A group
whose cultural value system revolved around wearing a pumpkin on one’s head would, on the
whole and in the long run, lose out to a group that valued intragroup peacefulness and a degree
of self-sacrifice for the welfare of one’s fellows.”717 From the debunker’s perspective, the
Christian tradition was simply more successful than most of its competitors, even if some of the
reasons why are obscure.
These arguments purport to show that the debunker doesn’t need attitude-independent
moral truths for reason to discern in the way that de Lazari-Radek and Singer propose.
Rationality can serve the function of coming up with ideas which are better able to survive the
passage of time, or of sifting through ideas of previous efforts. The same debunking argument
could be run against Huemer’s theory, arguing that the convergence (as he sees it) of liberal
values is not evidence for moral truth but rather for a successful society, with “success” being
measured in terms of ability to pass on ideas. The values that Huemer argues for as the core
components of liberal values are basically Western values, and Western culture has spread
around the globe in recent times through technology and consumer goods. It is no great mystery,
then, why those changes would accelerate in more recent times, as it coincides with the rapid and
accelerating development of technology during the same period. In making this argument,
however, the debunker must also argue that things like ending slavery were not objectively good,
but simply the result of people coming to hold the belief that they have no reason to practice
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slavery for whatever reason. Under Street’s constructivist view, for example, this gives no
impetus or motive for anyone to end the practice of slavery by other people, since those people
might well have reason to practice slavery. It also means the debunker must deny the claim that
universal benevolence – or any kind of benevolence – is actually good.
But notice that the values which Huemer identifies as liberal – the equality and dignity of
persons and concomitant opposition to gratuitous violence – are recognizable corollaries of the
Golden Rule or the maxim of universal benevolence. In other words, these are also Christian
values. Huemer tries to make much out of the supposed coincidence that major social changes in
many different countries have all moved in the direction of liberalism, such as abolition of
slavery, women’s suffrage, democracy, decreased popular support of war and use of torture.718
The coincidence that Huemer points to as evidence that liberalism is true is much less impressive
when it is seen that all of them follow from the Golden Rule or something like it. In other words,
it would be strange if some of the changes went in the direction of universal benevolence and
some went the opposite direction.
Unlike the debunker, Christian theists should have no trouble accounting for the data. If
Huemer’s argument from the spread of liberal values actually goes through as an argument for
realism, it would serve to show that Christian values are true. Huemer, like de Lazari-Radek and
Singer, ignores the historical influences which brought about Western liberal values in the first
place, in particular the influence of Judeo-Christian teaching on values such as the dignity of
human beings as created in the image of God, and on the equality of all people. If, as I have
argued, Huemer’s liberal values are simply another variation of the Golden Rule or maxim of
universal benevolence then debunking arguments against these as moral truths run up against the

718

Huemer, “Liberal Realist,” 1999.

227
same problem as against de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s – they still fail to explain how a society
that promotes the idea of universal benevolence would succeed over societies that promote fierce
loyalty within the group and utter disregard for those outside. From an evolutionary standpoint
the latter kind of civilization should have a significant advantage, all other things being equal,
over the former. If the debunker responds that all other things were not equal or the society that
taught universal benevolence would not have survived, it becomes ad hoc and viciously circular.
The debunking argument on this score is so malleable as to be able to “explain” any result
whatsoever, and thus is vacuous. Also, notice that in Joyce’s comparison above between
pumpkin-wearers and another hypothetical culture, the hypothetical society includes among its
values “a degree” of sacrifice for others – not unlimited or universal benevolence. Arguing that
Christianity was successful because it promoted social cohesion and stability is unsatisfactory.
Values promoting “within-group niceness and between-group nastiness” will work at least
equally as well for this, while universal altruism exacts a cost in terms of fitness from the society
that has it and gives that benefit to competing societies for free.
What is needed, then, is an explanation for why the successful values from a cultural
evolutionary standpoint would run counter to the expected results of biological evolution. Simply
arguing that some societies are successful but we can’t really say why does not prove anything.
On the contrary, it gives a strong indication that the values associated with universal benevolence
are better for human beings in that they create a society which is conducive to well-being. For
this to be the case, it would require a correspondence between universal benevolence and human
flourishing – where human flourishing does not line up with evolutionary pressures but in fact
goes contrary to them. This is a kind of cosmic coincidence, but on a different level from the
cosmic coincidence needed to explain how our moral faculties could track with attitude-
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independent moral truths. Instead, human nature somehow has to line up with those moral truths,
with universal benevolence being one of them – if not the foundational one. There is a need here
for a deeper cosmic coincidence, not just on the epistemological level, but on the ontological
level. Unlike the epistemological cosmic coincidence of having our beliefs line up with attitudeindependent moral truths, however, this one cannot be denied simply by changing one’s
metaethical stance.
Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason and Debunking
De Lazari-Radek and Singer believe that the evolutionary perspective provides a solution
to Sidgwick’s problem of the dualism of practical reason. Sidgwick believed that rational
considerations alone could not resolve the tension between acting in one’s own self-interest and
acting in disinterested benevolence. While often helping others also gives one a sense of
satisfaction, this is not always the case and so self-interest and benevolence never fully overlap.
But there is no rational reason for anyone to choose benevolence over selfishness. Sidgwick
hypothesized that the existence of God could resolve this tension (a solution to which Kant
actually did appeal719), but Sidgwick himself rejected that solution and famously left the problem
unresolved. Because self-interest is easily subject to a debunking explanation while universal
benevolence is not, de Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that this resolves Sidgwick’s problem and
shows as a conclusion of reason that we should act in disinterested benevolence rather than selfinterest.720
We have already seen above part of the problem with de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s
proposed solution, which is that it is questionable how much Sidgwick’s maxim of benevolence
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is really based on rational self-evident beliefs rather than on the cultural heritage of Christian
teachings starting with Jesus, who taught the Golden rule as a revelation from God. In that case,
the solution that we should act in disinterested benevolence might well be true, but not because it
is a conclusion of reason. Yet the problem in Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason was that it
seemed impossible to fully rationalize self-interest and universal benevolence.721 If universal
benevolence is not a principle of reason after all, then de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s proposal
will not solve it. On the other hand, Sidgwick did suggest that God could resolve his dualism.
Sidgwick gives his reason for rejecting this solution, saying that
I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in
Arithmetic or Geometry, that it is ‘right’ and ‘reasonable’ for me to treat others as I
should think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I
believe to be ultimately conducive to universal Good or Happiness. But I cannot find
inseparably connected with this conviction, and similarly attainable by mere reflective
intuition, any cognition that there actually is a Supreme Being who will adequately
reward me for obeying these rules of duty, or punish me for violating them.722
In taking the view of “the Universe” as the “right” view, one might argue that Sidgwick is
actually tacitly assuming the existence of God without realizing it. How much weight can be
given to the fact that some people (such as Sidgwick and others) testify to lacking any sense or
intuition that God exists? Many other people report having such a sense and/or intuition.
Moreover, it is questionable if everyone finds the maxim of benevolence as self-evident, given
the number of philosophers we have seen already who reject moral realism altogether. Sidgwick
can’t have it both ways – if his finding universal benevolence to be intuitively true is an
argument in favor of utilitarianism in spite of the fact that many people do not share that
intuition, then the fact that many people find the existence of God to be intuitively true is an
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argument in favor of theism – in spite of the fact that Sidgwick reports not finding it that way.
There is also a further consideration that throws cold water on de Lazari-Radek and
Singer’s proposed solution to Sidgwick’s dualism. This is a problem which was alluded to in
chapter three, namely that a utilitarian ethic such as the one they propose also requires an
account of well-being in addition to the utilitarian principle.723 However, virtually any account of
well-being is going to run squarely into the debunking challenge, since it is almost surely to
consist of things like pursuing pleasure, avoiding pain, survival, and other considerations that we
have looked at in our previous examination of third factor arguments. De Lazari-Radek and
Singer acknowledge the problem but then brush it aside by saying that, “we will limit ourselves
to pointing out that if no theory of well-being or intrinsic value were immune to a debunking
explanation, this would show only that no theory could be preferred over others on the ground
that it alone cannot be debunked. It could not show that no theory of well-being is true.”724 This,
however, looks exactly like other realist responses we have seen which simply attempt to shift
the burden of proof. De Lazari-Radek and Singer can’t argue that we should reject all moral
intuitions that have a debunking genealogy on the one hand, and then on the other hand slough
off the fact that any plausible candidate for an account of well-being will be based on debunkable
claims by shifting the burden of proof.
Notice, however, that the correspondence between the doctrine of universal benevolence
on the one hand and social success measured as being able to pass down moral values and beliefs
to succeeding generations on the other, as we saw above, requires a cosmic coincidence between
moral truth and human flourishing. Of course, an account of human flourishing also requires an
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account of well-being given that those two things are, if not synonymous, at least joined at the
hip. Theism provides the solution to both problems at once. Moreover, it also provides an
account of how Jesus discovered such an important moral principle centuries before it was
declared to be rational by eminent scholars like Darwin and Sidgwick. Jesus taught that it was a
revelation from God because it was. The fact that such an explanation is not scientific (how
could it be?) and does not jibe with modern academia should not be disqualifying. It simply does
a better job of explaining the observed phenomena, which should be all that matters. We will
have more to say on this below.
Consequentialism Re-examined
We should also ask if Singer actually believes that “do to others as you would have them
do to you” is an attitude-independent moral truth – or even “do not do to others as you would not
have them do to you.” Going back to Anscombe’s complaint about modern moral philosophy,
her contention was that there is nothing in any of these philosophies by which one could say that
you should never have an innocent person put to death. For Singer, the right thing to do is
whatever promotes the greatest net increase in universal happiness. What if that means putting an
innocent person to death? Huemer, himself a consequentialist, points out that Singer’s view
commits him to the proposition that it would be right for a doctor to kill an unsuspecting healthy
patient and distribute his organs to five people in need of transplants.725 Not that Huemer is off
the hook, since he says he thinks Singer may be right with his highly revisionary ethic.726 This
only raises the question if Huemer really believes that the liberal values he talks about are
attitude-independent moral truths. As a reminder, according to Huemer, those were that

725

Huemer, “Meta-Ethics,” 363-64.

726

Huemer, “Meta-Ethics,” 364.

232
liberalism “(1) recognizes the moral equality of persons, (2) promotes respect for the dignity of
the individual, and (3) opposes gratuitous coercion and violence.”727 Which of these three would
not be violated by a doctor who kills an unsuspecting healthy patient to harvest that patient’s
organs for the sake of maximizing overall utility? Perhaps Huemer would not consider it
gratuitous to kill someone for organ harvesting, but the patient might disagree if given the
choice. The fact that Huemer only says that this position “may well be right” doesn’t help his
cause. If he really believes the values that he claims are objectively correct, it shouldn’t even be
an open question. As Anscombe writes, “if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to
question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be
quite excluded from consideration – I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt
mind.”728
Given this, in what sense can Singer (or Sidgwick, for that matter) affirm the Golden
Rule as an objective moral truth? For Sidgwick, it is partly in a change of perspective to the more
abstract principle “that individuals in similar conditions should be treated similarly.”729 This,
however, is not the Golden Rule. It is a caricature of the Golden Rule as viewed from the point
of view of “the Universe.” If one puts oneself in a distant, removed vantage point and ignores the
inner emotional tugging that says it’s wrong to murder an innocent person to harvest his organs
(perhaps by dismissing such feelings as the vestige of some old, discarded religion), then it
makes it easier to approve of such a heinous act. But we are not in the place of God, and the
Golden Rule says to do to others as we would have them do to us, not to some other, random
person. The personal involvement is a crucial component of the principle. If we don’t want to
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have our organs harvested against our will, then we shouldn’t do it to someone else. So it is
highly questionable that Singer even believes that the Golden Rule is actually a self-evident,
objective moral truth. If he does, he seems to miss the fact that it is utterly incompatible with his
consequentialist ethics.
Atheism and Methodological Naturalism
Non-theistic moral realists, then, still require an account of truth-tracking for our moral
faculties. The question is whether such an account is forthcoming that can fit within the confines
of what is regarded as scientific explanation. While Huemer doesn’t offer such an account, he
does assume that there is one when he writes that “an evolutionary account of ethics must be
correct: human beings evolved; therefore, however our capacity for moral judgment works, that
capacity is ‘a product of evolution,’ in the same sense that our capacity for any sort of judgments
is a product of evolution.”730 For a debunker like Tersman, however, this sort of hand waving is
unlikely to impress. Tersman argues that,
if an explanation of an intuition entails that it is true or likely then it is ‘validating.’ . . .
Unfortunately, modern intuitionists largely ignore the task of developing such an account.
The defence they offer consists mainly in the assurance that intuitionism is not committed
to the controversial metaphysical and epistemological claims associated with the early
intuitionists (such as the view that there is a special organ or faculty for grasping moral
truths).731
Metaphysical naturalists, of course, want an account of such intuitions that holds up to scientific
scrutiny. But what if the reason such an explanation has not been given is because it is simply
not available? We saw in the previous chapter Dworkin’s statement that a special moral faculty
involved nothing mysterious, artificial, or counterintuitive. Perhaps he was reflecting the same
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kind of blasé overconfidence shown by Huemer – there must be a suitable evolutionary
explanation, since we have knowledge of a priori truths of various kinds and we assume
evolution can explain that, too. As we saw above, this depends crucially on one’s view of what
morality is. Robust moral realism insists that there are moral truths that are true regardless of
what anyone thinks about them; perhaps one should add regardless of consequences.
Dworkin argued against Harman’s challenge that a belief is reliable only if it can stand up
to a causal explanation that includes the state of affairs it describes by pointing out that the
content of moral, philosophical, and mathematical beliefs is not appropriate for such a test. This
is all well and good, but it still doesn’t explain how we have knowledge of such things. The
problem of a priori knowledge is outside the scope of this dissertation, but suffice to say that
there is still not, at present, a satisfactory naturalistic account of a priori knowledge even of
mathematical truths. The argument from non-theistic moral realists is to say that we have
mathematical and other metaphysical knowledge without invoking God in any way, so we can
just be confident that it’s the same with moral knowledge. But what if that isn’t the case? Nagel
questions the assumptions behind the debunkers’ epistemological arguments, such as the
presumption that mathematical truths have a satisfactory naturalistic explanation. He writes,
“The existence of conscious minds and their access to the evident truths of ethics and
mathematics are among the data that a theory of the world and our place in it has yet to
explain.”732 Like Dworkin, Nagel does not find theistic accounts to his liking, admitting that he is
not only unreceptive but strongly averse to the idea of God.733 Nevertheless, he recognizes the
inadequacy of reductionistic materialist explanations to account for mental phenomena. It is not
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an answer to that to simply say that there must be an explanation even if we don’t know what it
is – absent some sort of actual proof that materialism is true. As it stands now, the only reason
for even thinking materialism true is that it is the prevailing view among cultural elites. But even
debunkers have to admit how cultural influences can lead our beliefs off-track.
At the beginning of the chapter we looked briefly at what I have called Street’s short
theoretical argument for antirealism – namely, that there were no values until creatures who
valued came along. This reflects the view of metaphysical naturalism. Note that this is not a
conclusion of empirical science, even though it might sometimes be presented that way. Instead,
it is an assumption based on methodological naturalism (MN)734 combined with the belief that
science can ultimately explain everything. Something like Street’s scenario follows if it’s true
that science can explain everything, and if the only explanations that count as scientific are those
that follow from MN. But what reason is there to think this is the case? Popular arguments to this
effect might appeal to the fact that science has explained a lot of things that people used to
explain by appealing to supernatural causes, so we have reason to expect that science will
eventually explain everything. To deny this would be to risk being labelled “anti-science” –
which seems to be not just mistaken in the eyes of many people, but reprehensible in a way that
almost seems like a moral sense. As we have seen in this dissertation, even academic
philosophers dismiss any kind of supernatural explanation with comments about what twentyfirst century scholars should and should not be saying. But the belief that science can explain
everything is not itself a scientific belief. It is a statement of faith – namely, the faith of
naturalism.
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We saw in chapter four that Dworkin challenges the notion that science should have veto
power over other domains of knowledge. This is a particularly important argument when it is
understood that “science” is generally understood in terms of MN, so to give science veto power
over every other domain of knowledge means that every other domain must accept MN as an
operating principle. Dworkin, however, is still not persuaded by theistic arguments. Nagel is in a
similar boat, not persuaded by theism but also resisting the consensus to adopt MN as an
overriding principle of enquiry. They are both moral realists and also non-naturalists, and thus
share many commitments with theists. They make an interesting case study, as they both settle
on what looks like a kind of halfway house between metaphysical naturalism and theism. In what
follows, I hope to show that their non-theistic explanations still come up short of a satisfactory
account of robust moral realism.
Dworkin, Religious Atheism, and Faith
We ended chapter four with essentially a deadlock between moral realism and skepticism
(having concluded that antirealism is simply a form of skepticism). Dworkin, recall, challenged
Harman’s causal explanation test of knowledge, arguing that, “If the ‘best explanation’ causal
test is universally sound, therefore, no moral (or aesthetic or mathematical or philosophical)
belief is reliable. But we can reverse that judgment: if any moral belief is reliable, the ‘best
explanation’ test is not universally sound. Either direction of argument––taking either of the two
hypotheses as axiomatic and using it to deny the other––begs the question in the same way.”735
The crucial ingredient in this is that causation is to be understood purely in terms of the operation
of the physical laws of nature. While Dworkin sees this as giving science veto power over all
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other domains, that’s only the case if physicalism and causal closure are taken to be tenets of
science. These, however are not proven tenets of science, nor could they ever be. What is
actually going on is that Street, Joyce, Ruse, and the rest of the debunkers are operating under the
assumption of MN, and insist that the discussion be carried on under those restrictions. The
moral realists that we have seen seem to have essentially agreed to that stipulation, which is why
they have such a hard time of it. Under MN as a constraint, Dworkin’s insistence that a special
moral faculty would involve nothing mysterious or counterintuitive might appear to be just silly.
Considering the fact that Dworkin is a non-naturalist moral realist (which is the primary target of
Street’s dilemma argument recall), how can unguided evolutionary processes develop a special
faculty for acquiring moral truths? Street sees this as an “unreasoned faith, with realism about
reasons and value thus becoming a rather odd form of religion.”736 In modern academia, of
course, “religion” is one of the worst pejoratives one can receive – right up there with “faith.”
For his part, Dworkin might not object to either pejorative. In Religion without God,
Dworkin writes about what he calls “the religious attitude,” which, as he understands it, “accepts
the full, independent reality of value.”737 Dworkin seeks to establish a basis for “religious
atheism,” which he hopes will demonstrate a deeper rapport between traditional theists and
atheists than the sort of atheism represented by Richard Dawkins. To do this, Dworkin argues
that traditional theistic religions have a science part that seeks to provide answers about things
like the origin of the universe and human beings and life after death, as well as a value part,
which includes how we should live.738 The value part of theistic religion, in addition, can be
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divided into a godly part (including things like prayer and worship), and a part that is not godly
in that sense.739 Religious atheists, thinks Dworkin, can accept the non-godly part of value and
reject the rest.
Moreover, Dworkin argues based on an application of Hume’s law that the science part
of theism cannot ground the value part.740 As Dworkin puts it,
There is no direct bridge from any story about the creation of the firmament, or the
heavens and earth, or the animals of the sea and the land, or the delights of heaven, or the
fires of hell, or the parting of any sea or the raising of any dead, to the enduring value of
friendship and family or the importance of charity or the sublimity of a sunset or the
appropriateness of awe in the face of the universe or even a duty of reverence for a
creator god.741
This is the basis of Dworkin’s argument that God can’t underwrite value because that very
conviction “presupposes a prior commitment to the independent reality of that value.”742
Dworkin thinks the theist must be stymied by the following challenge: “Is there an intelligible,
even if unfamiliar, conception of agency from which it follows that its exercise can in and by
itself create value?”743 This, however, is the wrong question. The position offered here is not that
God creates value, but that God values. Moreover, everything he creates, including human
nature, is a reflection of his values. How could it be any different? Anything we create is formed
by and reflects our values – whether it be a work of art, a building, a book (or dissertation!), or a
civilization. If universal benevolence is one of those values, then that would explain the deep
cosmic coincidence between universal benevolence and human flourishing mentioned above
(among other things).
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The challenge to Dworkin would be to present an intelligible concept of any kind by
which values can exist apart from being the property of the mind of a conscious agent. Consider
again Street’s formula: “Before life began, nothing was valuable. But then life arose and began
to value – not because it was recognizing anything, but because creatures who valued (certain
things in particular) tended to survive. In this broadest sense, valuing was (and still is) prior to
value. That is why antirealism about value is right.”744 There certainly seems to be something
right about the intuition behind Street’s logic. What is it about “creatures who value” that
separates them from other creatures? At least in Street’s understanding, at a bare minimum it
would seem to require sentience, or something like a mind. Another way of saying this is that in
a mindless universe, there are no values. I am calling this an intuition, but it seems correct.
The universe does not value. Rocks, trees, and atomic nuclei do not value. But beings
with minds do. When living beings on earth first began to value, either value was already present
in the world, or it wasn’t. If it wasn’t, then it seems that Street is correct and the only values are
the ones that depend on our own attitudes. In order to account for attitude-independent values,
however, something more is needed. Whatever that something more is, it must be something
with a mind. This can be seen by means of an argument as short as Street’s. If value depends
upon mind, and if value was already present before the first earthly valuing creatures appeared,
then there must have been a mind already present. Moreover, something about that mind made it
such that there is a deep correspondence between universal benevolence and human nature.
Nagel, Dworkin, and other realists who are non-naturalists might hope for a non-theistic
explanation for this, but certainly none has presented itself. Even a non-theistic solution to this
would still need to involve something with at least some properties that are normally associated
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with God. Any other value realist explanation would require values to somehow exist without
being in any mind, such as some of Platonic realm of abstract ideas. In that case, however, there
is no explanation for the deep coincidences we have observed.
Dworkin’s analysis in this case is superficial. Theism, at least Christian theism, holds that
God created human nature in the imago dei. Given that that’s the case, it stands to reason that
human nature would have a deep coherence with God’s nature in the same way that any creative
work bears something of the imprint of its creator. Dworkin is mistaken in thinking that theism
requires values to be grounded in purely scientific descriptions of historical events. Rather,
theism provides a grounding for objective human values which is independent of the attitude of
any human being. This is sufficient for robust moral realism. There is nothing that requires
theists to be committed to the independent reality of value apart from God as Dworkin argues. In
fact, there isn’t even a compelling reason for theists to hold such a view. Indeed, if it’s correct
that values are a property of minds, then the idea of value independent from any mind is
incoherent and Dworkin’s challenge to theists fails to hit the mark.
In the end, Dworkin argues that it is a matter of faith. He writes that, “We accept our
most basic scientific and mathematical capacities finally as a matter of faith. The religious
attitude insists that we embrace our values in the same way: finally as a matter of faith as
well.”745 But with nothing to ground that faith, it is faith in faith. Dworkin also writes,
“Acknowledging the role of felt, irresistible conviction in our experience of value just recognizes
the fact that we have such convictions, that they can survive responsible reflection, and that we
then have no reason at all, short of further evidence or argument, to doubt their truth.”746 This
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appears to be faith in his own convictions and his own reasoning. But this is not an explanation
as to why his faculties are reliable. The above quote comes right after he says that, “But of
course I do not mean, in speaking of faith, that the fact that a moral conviction survives
reflection is itself an argument for that conviction.”747 The problem is that at a certain point, one
can only rest on one’s moral intuitions. Surely it matters where those intuitions came from.
One can argue that explanations have to stop at some point, since infinite regresses are
nasty things and should be avoided. Dworkin can choose to stop explaining and just take it as a
kind of atheistic faith or brute fact that his moral faculties are reliable, and simply point out that
the debunker is taking it just as much by faith when it comes to many, perhaps even most, of the
debunker’s beliefs. But that only shows that both he and the debunkers are groping in the dark,
simply choosing to put their respective faith in different things (while agreeing among
themselves that whatever the object of their faith is, it isn’t God because we don’t do that in the
twenty-first century). Dworkin could argue that the theist is also taking it by faith that the theist’s
faculties are working properly in the assessment of arguments in favor of theism. This is also
true; we are all ultimately at the mercy of our own faculties. However, Dworkin’s explanation
still seems like no explanation at all, whereas the theistic explanation also includes within it an
explanation of why our faculties would be attuned to moral facts.
Nagel: Values, Mind, and Consciousness
Nagel has doubts about the entire reductive project of naturalism and many things that it
entails. For example, he expresses skepticism about the probability that self-replicating life forms
could have spontaneously come into existence through only the laws of physics and chemistry,
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as well as the occurrence of the necessary sequence of viable genetic mutations permitting
natural selection to produce the organisms that exist within the available geological time.748 He
writes that,
My skepticism is not based on religious belief, or on a belief in any definite alternative. It
is just a belief that the available scientific evidence, in spite of the consensus of scientific
opinion, does not in this matter rationally require us to subordinate the incredulity of
common sense. . . . I realize that such doubts will strike many people as outrageous, but
that is because almost everyone in our secular culture has been browbeaten into regarding
the reductive research program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else would not
be science.749
For the purposes of this argument, the point is that the supposed science behind EDAs is not as
solid as is often portrayed, and is based more on underlying assumptions, chiefly MN.
Nagel’s attempt at working toward a non-theistic solution to this problem begins with his
conviction that mind is a basic aspect of nature.750 This is a consequence of Nagel’s antireductionism. At the same time, Nagel’s cosmological theory doesn’t sound that much different
from Street’s. He writes that, “Each of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe
gradually waking up and becoming aware of itself.”751 Nagel wants to find a theory in which
mental properties are somehow present in all matter but are only manifested in certain
arrangements. The final arrangements are not to be seen as accidental, but rather include a
teleological aspect along the lines of Aristotelian thought without the intention of a personal
agent behind it.752
Nagel gives no concrete answers to the problem of mind and consciousness, only that the
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prevailing worldview of reductive materialism is wholly inadequate to explain everything.
Nagel, like Dworkin, reverses the inferential logic of the debunking argument. He writes, “Street
concludes that realism cannot be right; I conclude that something is missing from Darwinism,
and from the standard biological conception of ourselves.”753 One obvious solution to the
problem that Nagel sees is that Mind preceded the first “creatures who valued.” If the universe
was not mindless from the very beginning, but in fact was the product of a Mind, then values
have a reality that is independent of the attitudes of any human being. If the nature of that Mind
is also benevolent, then universal benevolence also has a basis in reality beyond human values.
Faith in God, however, is ultimately personal; Nagel admits a personal aversion to the idea of
God, for whatever reason. Those with no such personal aversion might wonder that Nagel fails to
see the solution which is right under his nose. Nagel says he wants to “extend the boundaries of
what is not regarded as unthinkable, in light of how little we really understand about the
world.”754 However, in extending the boundaries beyond naturalism, Nagel has no principled
reason to exclude theism – something that perhaps many of his fellow atheists understand better
than he does.
Moral Truth and Theism
I promised above to show that the arguments of Huemer and de Lazari-Radek and Singer
point toward an argument for theism. Several hints have already been dropped in that regard in
the previous sections, but it is time to refine them. The following argument supposes that
someone finds plausibility in Huemer’s premise that a convergence on liberal values shows that
those values are true, and also in de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s proposition that there is no
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evolutionary explanation for the widespread belief in universal benevolence or the Golden Rule.
I have argued that Huemer’s liberal values are actually corollaries of the Golden Rule, so that
whatever is said about that in the following also applies to Huemer’s liberal values. Furthermore,
I have argued that the accounts of these premises offered by these philosophers is inadequate.
First, the idea that universal benevolence is a self-evident truth of reason as held by Sidgwick is
highly dubious. In fact the supposedly self-evident truths used to make this inference, including
the intuition that the God’s-eye view is the right one for making moral judgments as well as the
intuition that all people are morally equal, are a part of the Christian heritage of the society in
which Sidgwick was born and raised. Second, I have argued that the fact that Jesus taught the
Golden Rule as a revelation from God – given that the principle itself has been widely affirmed
as true – is at least an indicator that it was just that. Third, I have argued that, given that
Christianity has been so successful at passing down its ideas and values in spite of being founded
on a set of beliefs that is maladaptive from an evolutionary standpoint (and thus beyond the reach
of EDAs), there is evidence for a deep cosmic coincidence between moral truths and human
nature such that universal benevolence promotes human flourishing and well-being – which goes
contrary to evolution. This also is beyond the reach of EDAs because it is based on empirical
rather than evaluative facts. The success of Christianity since its inception is an empirical fact,
and Huemer’s data for the convergence of liberal (Christian) values is also an empirical fact.
Non-theistic views have no obvious way to account for such a deep cosmic coincidence.
There is also, as we have seen in previous chapters, the cosmic coincidence that is
necessary to explain moral knowledge – namely, the coincidence between attitude-independent
moral truths and our moral faculties. The consequentialist solution to this is unsatisfactory
because it requires a concept of morality which bears little to no resemblance to robust moral
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realism. The other arguments for moral realism that we have looked at all come up short in one
way or another in that they ignore or attempt to explain away any need for a cosmic coincidence,
given that such a happenstance would be inexplicable in (scientific) non-theistic terms. The
argument here is that the cosmic coincidence is in fact greater and deeper than has been
appreciated. Far from being evidence that moral realism is not true, however, it is in fact
evidence for theism as the most viable solution to the problem of moral knowledge.
Parsimony Reconsidered
The question of parsimony has arisen at various times in the course of this discussion.
Parsimony is usually thought to favor the atheist in arguments about the existence of God due to
the fact that theism postulates an entity which the atheist does not. As we have seen, it also is
thought to favor debunkers over moral realists, even if those moral realists are atheists. Again,
the reasoning is that postulating extra entities (in this case attitude-independent moral truths)
saddles moral realists with too much extra ontological baggage to allow them to shoulder the
burden of proof. One challenge to the claim that parsimony favors atheism comes from
Swinburne, who argues that theism is actually a simpler (i.e. more parsimonious) explanation for
the universe with its observed characteristics than rival non-theistic explanations.
To understand this, we must first understand Swinburne’s distinction between scientific
explanation and personal explanation. For the purpose of this argument, I am glossing a number
of important details. However, the main point is that personal explanation is not reducible to
scientific explanation because of the nature of intentions.755 Indeed, Swinburne argues that
explaining intentions requires some kind of dualism.756 A scientific explanation, argues
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Swinburne, “will have to postulate as a starting point of explanation a substance or substances
that caused or still cause the universe and its characteristics.”757 This would either require
postulating more entities than required by theism, or a single entity which is not infinite and thus
not as simple as God.758 This in turn is based on Swinburne’s argument than an infinite person is
the simplest person there could be, because finite limitations require some explanation of why
there is a particular limit rather than another.759 Finally, Swinburne argues that “A substance who
is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly free is necessarily a terminus of complete
explanation.”760 This is because the ultimate explanation for a given observed characteristic of
the universe is God’s free choice of his intention, which, as a personal explanation rather than a
scientific one, is not caused by anything else.761 Swinburne’s argument shows that the question
of parsimony which is thought to favor the atheist against that theist is not the slam-dunk that its
proponents make it out to be.
There is also another issue with respect to parsimony that complicates things. What
happens if explanations in terms of MN come up short of accounting for the data? In this chapter
we have looked at some such data, courtesy of atheists Singer and Huemer. These arguments
point to universal altruism or benevolence as an attitude-independent, moral truth (which also
happens to be inconsistent with their consequentialist ethical theories). This gives us reason to
believe that the debunkers are wrong in their contention that Darwinian explanations can account
for our moral beliefs, seeing how EDAs have no explanation for the widespread intuition
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pointing toward universal benevolence. Furthermore, since universal benevolence is close to, if
not identical with, what we think of as morality, it means that EDAs do not explain morality. In
other words, this is not a case of some random moral belief that EDAs cannot account for, it is
rather one of the most central moral beliefs, if not the central one. Critics might point out that I
have argued above that this intuition itself is based on the cultural influence of Christianity, and
thus my belief about what morality is and what it is for is question-begging. A fuller account
such as the one I am giving would require examining the connection between morality and
altruism as it is viewed in other cultural traditions, but there is not space here for that.762
The appeal to parsimony which Street and other debunkers make is thus illegitimate in
any event because we do not have a complete naturalistic explanation of the phenomena in
question. Occam’s Razor can be legitimately applied in cases where there are two explanations,
both of which adequately explain the data in question, and one of them proposes extra entities
which the other does not. That is not the case with EDAs. The assertion that EDAs are adequate
is based in several key respects on nothing more than an assumption of naturalism. Most realist
arguments against EDAs are made by thinkers who share the same naturalistic faith, and thus are
forced to make question-begging moves or shift the burden of proof back to the debunker. Some
theists might be tempted to play by the same rules, but this would be to concede ground to
naturalists which there is no reason to concede in the first place.
Faith and Belief
Dworkin has suggested that it all comes down to a matter of faith, which is part of what
he calls “the religious attitude.” He means this not as an epithet, but as more of a recognition of
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the epistemic limitations that we all must face. Faith in Dworkin’s sense means something like
drawing conclusions that are unsupported by evidence, but instead are based on personal inner
conviction or practical necessity. It is hard to see how this is different from wishful thinking,
which is just what faith is to many skeptics. In Dworkin’s case he simply embraces that
understanding of faith and argues that there is nothing wrong with it, because he thinks both the
skeptic and the theist are in the same boat with him when it comes down to it. Dworkin’s
understanding of faith is much like the skeptical view of Christian belief that C. S. Lewis
addresses in his article, “On Obstinacy in Belief.” Lewis writes, “We have been told that . . . the
Christian regards it as positively praiseworthy to believe without evidence, or in excess of the
evidence, or to maintain his belief unmodified in the teeth of steadily increasing evidence against
it. Thus a ‘faith that has stood firm,’ which appears to mean a belief immune from all the assaults
of reality, is commended.”763 This contrasts with what Lewis calls the scientific attitude to belief,
which involves proportioning the strength of one’s beliefs exactly to the evidence.764 Lewis,
however, argues that this is not an accurate understanding of faith and belief in the Christian
view.
The important issue for Lewis is that the Christian, having come to faith, comes to trust in
a person, not a theoretical proposition or hypothesis.765 As Lewis observes, “Our opponents,
then, have a perfect right to dispute with us about the grounds of our original assent. But they
must not accuse us of sheer insanity if, after the assent has been given, our adherence to it is no
longer proportioned to every fluctuation of the apparent evidence.”766 Lewis illustrates this point
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by means of analogy, as when a child must trust a parent in allowing the parent to extract a thorn
from the child’s finger, causing more pain, as the way to make the pain eventually cease.767 The
theist (Christian theist in this example) is similarly called upon to trust in God’s good work in the
Christian’s life in spite of appearances to the contrary. Driving the point home, Lewis writes that,
“I am not saying that the strength of our original belief must by psychological necessity produce
such behavior. I am saying that the content of our original belief by logical necessity entails the
proposition that such behavior is appropriate.”768
Given that the theist (or at least Christian theist) has reason to maintain belief in spite of
challenges based on the content of those beliefs, it is worth asking if this is the case for the
debunker and for the non-theistic moral realist, respectively. One challenge for the debunker was
discussed at length in chapter four – that antirealism simply is a form of skepticism and does not
save us from it, nor does it preserve our first-order moral beliefs. In the case of Street’s Humean
constructivism, it also implies that some people might be perfectly right in committing genocide
and other acts that are held to be morally reprehensible by most people. There is nothing in the
content of the debunker’s belief to justify an unwavering commitment to antirealism in the face
of such clear moral objections – instead, the debunker’s commitment is based on a commitment
to methodological naturalism and the view that the debunking position is more parsimonious
than rival views. But as we have seen above, neither of these considerations are legitimate bases
for the debunker to claim that hers is a better explanation than either theism or non-theistic moral
realism. Furthermore, the arguments presented above shows that the debunking argument does
not account for all of the data, given the widespread acceptance of universal benevolence and
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corollary beliefs. The debunker, then, has no principled reason to maintain her commitment to
antirealism based on the content of her beliefs.
Next, we turn to the non-theistic moral realist position and ask the same question: is there
anything in the content of the position itself to give a reason for standing firm in the face of
challenges? Taking Dworkin’s understanding of faith, the answer is clearly no. Dworkin’s
confidence in his position is based purely on the strength and seemingly inescapability of the
conviction itself; nothing in the content of the belief provides a reason for maintaining the
conviction. Dworkin would argue that we cannot help but make moral judgments, and even the
attempt to deny morality involves making moral judgments. He would be content to accept a
special moral faculty without any further need for justification or explanation. The problem is
that this seems like a very inappropriate terminus of explanation, besides the fact that such a
special moral faculty does not appear to admit of any good, natural explanation.
Nagel’s position is somewhat different. He holds that there are attitude-independent,
moral truths. But rather than suggesting we just rest content with this as Dworkin does, Nagel
tries to point the way toward a more or less complete overhaul of the reductionistic program of
modern science in search of a theory of everything that will include mental properties as a
fundamental part of reality, but which are only manifested in certain arrangements. Nagel’s
approach is very much susceptible to Swinburne’s argument for the simplicity of theism. Even if
a theory like Nagel’s were to be developed, it still would not explain the underlying grounds for
it. It also would not explain the phenomenon of intentionality. By focusing only on
consciousness, Nagel leaves out this important facet of our experiences, not to mention one that
is vital with respect to morality. Again, however, there is nothing in the content of Nagel’s belief
which gives a principled reason for resisting the debunking challenge. Vavova calls Nagel’s
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response to debunkers a kind of dogmatism,769 a criticism which could also be applicable to
Dworkin.
Finally, there is the non-theistic moral realist view represented by Singer and Huemer
above. Their evidence shows the debunking position to be inadequate. At the same time, their
consequentialist approach to ethics belies the very moral truths which they claim are attitudeindependent. Their account of moral facts as being largely similar to a priori truths in other
domains such as mathematics and logic is based on the same consequentialist view of morality. It
is questionable whether it would work for the face-value view of morality that is reflected in a
robustly realist account. Beyond that, we have seen that the truths which are touted as selfevident in the Sidgwickian sense are most plausibly the result of centuries of transmission of the
Christian tradition going back to Jesus, who taught universal benevolence as a revelation from
God.
Of course, a non-theist must argue that Jesus was mistaken about the origin of this belief.
Nevertheless, the principle which Jesus taught has been affirmed as true by subsequent thinkers,
including notable and highly influential scholars. It seems peculiar that anyone should be
impressed by a philosopher like Sidgwick who, eighteen centuries later, claims to have
confirmed a truth which was originally taught by an ancient Jewish peasant, yet without so much
as an acknowledgment that that’s what he is doing. De Lazari-Radek and Singer, meanwhile,
seem to take it that the fact that Jesus taught the Golden Rule provides some confirmation of
their theory – a theory which they came up with centuries later, having been brought up in a
civilization which was built on the teachings of Christianity, one of which was the Golden Rule.
The circularity is obvious. Unlike Dworkin and Nagel, Singer and Huemer do have a basis for
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resisting the debunker: facts which the debunker cannot explain. However, they do not have a
basis for resisting the theistic argument that has been presented above. If they attempt to hold
onto their atheism through appeal to parsimony or methodological naturalism, they will run into
the same problems that have been indicated above with the debunker’s view.
Plausibility, All Things Considered
The above arguments address the question of whether the various positions have within
them a principled reason to maintain that position in the face of challenges. It will be pointed out
that little to nothing has been said about coming to hold the position in the first place. This is
largely because the focus of this study is on responding to the challenge presented by EDAs to
moral realism. A full account of the evidence for theism in general and Christian theism in
particular would require several more dissertations, many of which have already been written by
others. I have, however, attempted to show that the most compelling arguments from non-theistic
moral realists against EDAs actually point toward theism as a better explanation than any nontheistic account. I have also tried to show that non-theistic responses from moral realists are
inadequate to stave off the debunking challenge. Non-theistic arguments between debunkers and
moral realists result in a stalemate. Neither side has a principled reason to resist the objections of
the other; the main appeal of the debunking argument is in its appeal to the supreme authority of
science, and the naturalism on which it is presumed to rest, but it is an illegitimate appeal as I
have tried to argue above.
It has sometimes been taken for granted that theism can adequately address the
debunking challenge.770 However, most theorists in this area do not give the theistic option any
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consideration due to the factors mentioned in this chapter. What I have attempted to show is
more than this relatively bland conclusion. I have argued that realist responses to the debunking
challenge that begin from non-theistic premises do not adequately meet that challenge. The
strongest such arguments either result in a stand-off, or else they point toward theism as a better
explanation for moral knowledge.
In one comment that we looked at in the previous chapter, Street argued for antirealism
on the basis of what is most plausible “all things considered.” That is sound advice. The
naturalistic arguments that we have seen, however, do not generally consider all things – only
those things which they believe are allowed by their prior commitment to methodological
naturalism. Freed from this artificial constraint, theism provides a better explanation than nontheistic solutions to the challenge of EDAs for reasons that we have examined in some detail.
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CONCLUSION

Either universal benevolence is an attitude-independent moral truth, or it is not. If it is,
then we ought to love all other people – including members of out-groups. It also means that the
Golden Rule is something that everyone should practice, just as Jesus taught his followers. It is
beyond the scope of Darwinian evolution to account for how we could have knowledge of this
kind of truth, as it would require an inexplicable cosmic coincidence. It is also beyond the ability
of evolution to account for how a society based on universal benevolence could avoid being
eliminated by societies which teach care for in-group members and hostility to out-group
members. The evidence that we saw in the last chapter points toward a deep cosmic coincidence
between universal benevolence and human nature such that belief in the former promotes human
flourishing and well-being.
In chapter four, a passing comment from Street was mentioned which was quite puzzling
given her commitment to antirealism. The comment was in reference to the belief that out-group
members should be treated with less consideration than members of one’s in-group – a belief
which makes sense under the evolutionary models of altruism that we have seen. In response to
this, Street wrote, “More and more, many of us are coming to think that this is not true [emphasis
added].”771 If it is not true that out-group members should be given less consideration than ingroup members, then something like universal benevolence should be regarded as an attitudeindependent moral truth – yet Street’s own antirealism denies that there are any such truths.
Other non-theistic approaches might claim universal benevolence as some sort of brute fact, but
that would be an arbitrary terminus of explanation.
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Traditional theism, meanwhile, holds that God is omnibenevolent. For this reason, theism
provides a satisfactory explanation of the above data. Non-theists may argue that theism is
objectionable on other grounds. Street does have a separate challenge for theism, which is
essentially a version of the problem of evil.772 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to
examine that argument. However, we saw above Lewis’s argument for why the Christian’s
obstinacy in the face of challenges and attacks on faith is not only not irrational, but virtuous;
that argument is particularly germane to objections such as Street’s. Moreover, universal
benevolence itself provides an argument not merely for maintaining belief in God in the face of
various challenges, but also for coming to faith in the first place. Someone who thinks that
universal benevolence is an attitude-independent moral truth has reason to become a theist.
The Revisionary Ethics of Jesus
Many of the moral philosophers that we have reviewed here have an interest in
overthrowing what they consider to be traditional moral beliefs. This is particularly true of
Singer, Greene, and Huemer, and the idea of “revisionary ethics.” The main differences between
these different writers has to do with just how far they think we should diverge from traditional
moral views. What they seem not to realize is that whatever moral system takes the place of
“traditional” morality will simply become another tradition. Moreover, nothing in their package
of supposedly revisionary ethics is new. Upon closer examination, it appears to be little more
than an attempt to justify the current popular trends in ethics, which are themselves the result of
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various cultural trends and forces. Just as Darwin saw Victorian English morality as the pinnacle
of evolution, so these contemporary philosophers see modern progressive values as the best and
most reliable views.
In chapter two, for example, we briefly looked at Huemer’s supposedly revisionary ideas
about sexual behavior in which he advocated a complete overthrow of “conventional” sexual
morality. What Huemer calls conventional is, in fact, Christian sexual morality. It takes very
little thought to realize that the views of the early church in this area, based on the teachings of
Jesus, were far more radical and revisionary than anything that Huemer advocates. In fact,
Huemer’s supposedly revisionary ethics of sexuality is actually a stamp of approval on almost all
of our basic sexual instincts, drives and urges – tempered with a call for benevolence and respect
which he borrows from the same tradition whose overthrow he advocates. The New Testament
records Jesus as saying that even to look at a woman with lustful intent is enough to make one
guilty of adultery in the heart (Matt. 5:28). It is hard to imagine a more radically revisionary
ethical statement that deviates more drastically from our natural intuitions and inclinations. What
Huemer and others are proposing, however, is not far removed from the sexual ethics of ancient
paganism, and which has had a popular following in every age since the earliest recorded history.
Jesus’ teachings were also highly revisionary in other areas; especially in the area of
moral consideration for out-group members that, as we have seen, is affirmed even by Street and
(ostensibly) by Singer and Huemer. Jesus taught his follower to love their enemies (Matt. 5:44),
and specifically enjoined going beyond the ethic of reciprocity (Matt. 5:46-47). This was
centuries before evolutionary psychologists told us that reciprocity made sense from a Darwinian
standpoint – even though it already made sense to everyone else. So if Huemer, Singer, and
others of their ilk are looking for a revisionary ethic, they might want to try looking a little

257
harder at the tradition which they seek to overthrow and replace with the current culturally
dominant ethic of secular progressivism.
Future Directions
Several questions have arisen in the course of this dissertation which require further
thought and development. One of those has to do with our moral faculties, and in particular the
relationship between one’s view of morality and the kind of faculties which would be suitable for
it. I suggested in chapter five that the view of moral truths as being relevantly similar to a priori
truths in mathematics and logic might make sense if one has a consequentialist view of morality.
This, however, is not the face-value, commonsense view of morality that most people have. If
face-value, commonsense moral realism is at least generally correct, then a reassessment of what
sort of moral faculties are suitable for that is needed. I am aware that some theists (notably Audi)
endorse a similar view of intuitionism as that of Singer and Huemer – that is, a broadly Rossian
form of intuitionism.773 My suggestion is that this view is in need of revision, although I have no
specific suggestions here as to how to approach that.
I have also suggested that the teachings of Jesus concerning universal benevolence, in
particular his formulation of the Golden Rule, be given further consideration as evidence of
divine revelation. Others have previously undertaken such work, but the present work might
dovetail with that and provide a new and fruitful angle on the teachings of Jesus and his
influence on Western moral philosophy. Also relevant to this wider discussion is the question of
other religious traditions, and how their teachings compare and contrast with Christianity.
I am of the view that all moral realists should be theists, and that everyone should be a
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moral realist. It is my hope that this dissertation has contributed toward establishing that
conclusion.
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